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Abstract
The Web consists of numerous Web communities, news sources, and services, which are often ex-
ploited by various entities for the dissemination of false or otherwise malevolent information. Yet,
we lack tools and techniques to effectively track the propagation of information across the multiple
diverse communities, and to capture and model the interplay and influence between them. Further-
more, we lack a basic understanding of what the role and impact of some emerging communities
and services on the Web information ecosystem are, and how such communities are exploited by
bad actors (e.g., state-sponsored trolls) that spread false and weaponized information.
In this thesis, we shed some light on the complexity and diversity of the information ecosystem
on the Web by presenting a typology that includes the various types of false information, the involved
actors as well as their possible motives. Then, we follow a data-driven cross-platform quantitative
approach to analyze billions of posts from Twitter, Reddit, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/),
and Gab, to shed light on: 1) how news and image-based memes travel from one Web community to
another and how we can model and quantify the influence between the various Web communities; 2)
characterizing the role of emerging Web communities and services on the information ecosystem, by
studying Gab and two popular Web archiving services, namely the Wayback Machine and archive.is;
and 3) how popular Web communities are exploited by state-sponsored actors for the purpose of
spreading disinformation and sowing public discord.
In a nutshell, our analysis reveal that small fringe Web communities like 4chan’s /pol/ and
The Donald subreddit have a disproportionate influence on mainstream communities such as Twitter
with regard to the dissemination of news and image-based memes. We find that Gab acts as the new
hub for the alt-right community, while for Web archiving services we find that they are popular on
fringe Web communities and that they can be misused by Reddit moderators in order to penalize
ad revenue from news sources with conflicting ideology. Finally, when studying state-sponsored
actors, we find that they exhibit substantial differences compared to random users, that their tactics
change and evolve over time, and that they were particularly influential in spreading news on popular
mainstream communities like Twitter and Reddit.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the past decades, the Web became the predominant medium for the rapid acquisition of infor-
mation. Unfortunately, the Web has also become a medium where false information, hateful content,
and weaponized information is disseminated. Recently, we have seen extensive anecdotal evidence
suggesting that users on the Web are exposed to such information. Some examples include the spread
of false and weaponized information by state-sponsored actors, namely Russian trolls were dissem-
inating weaponized information related to the vaccine debate [59] and the 2016 US elections [13] to
sow public discord and likely change voting preferences of people. Another example is the one of the
now infamous Cambridge Analytica: during the 2016 US elections the company targetted millions
of people in the US on Facebook by exposing them to political weaponized information with the
goal to shift their voting decision [126]. On top of this, regular users on the Web are also involved
in the dissemination of false, hateful, or weaponized information, which further compounds these
emerging problems on the Web. Therefore, there is a pressing need to understand how information
is shared on the Web, who the main entities involved are, and how information shared on the Web
can alter real-world behavior.
At the same time, the information ecosystem on the Web has become an enormous and com-
plex medium. It involves various entities that contribute to the dissemination of information: ranging
from Web communities like Twitter, where users can share information, to news sources that dis-
seminate articles to users. On top of this, the barrier of entry of new communities and news sources
is minimal, hence the Web is becoming more complex as more communities and news sources are
added. Due to the increased complexity of the ecosystem a lot of its aspects are relatively unstudied
by the research community.
In this thesis, we focus on the following aspects of the information ecosystem: 1) how we
can track the propagation of information across multiple Web communities and how to study the
interplay and influence between these communities; 2) characterizing the role of emerging Web
communities and services; and 3) understanding the exploitation of Web communities from bad
actors for the purpose of advancing an agenda or sowing public discord. We focus on these mainly
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because we argue that providing knowledge and tools to analyze these aspects is a significant step
towards understanding and mitigating emerging socio-technological phenomena on the Web. Such
phenomena include studying the spread of hateful, fake, and weaponized information that can have
great impact on the world (e.g., excessive spread of weaponized and targeted information can lead
to shift in voting results of major elections). We elaborate on each of these aspects below.
Spread of information across multiple Web communities. As the number and diversity of com-
munities and news sources grow, so does the opportunity for the production and dissemination of
hateful or fake content. Nevertheless, previous work (see Chapter 2) only examined the propagation
of information on the Web, to the best of our knowledge, by looking at specific communities in
isolation. In reality, however, the various communities on the Web do not exist in vacuum. Users
are members of multiple communities and they can share information seen on one community to
another, possibly mutating it along the way. Such interactions, indicate that information travels
from one Web community to another, hence denoting influence from the source to the destination
Web community. Furthermore, anecdotal evidence emerged suggesting that fake news dissemination
might start on fringe Web communities, eventually reaching mainstream communities and likely af-
fecting the opinion of a vast amount of people [224, 45, 77]. Nevertheless, as a research community,
we lack tools to effectively track the propagation of information across multiple Web communities,
and more importantly, we lack knowledge on understanding the interplay and influence between
multiple Web communities. Gaining this understanding will be extremely important for the research
community and the public, allowing us to understand and mitigate emerging pressing issues of our
era like the spread of hateful, weaponized, and fake information across the Web.
Characterizing the Role of Emerging Web Communities and Services on the Information
Ecosystem. As new communities are added on the Web, we have limited knowledge of their role
on the ecosystem. One example is the Gab social network [30], which was introduced back in 2016
as an alternative to Twitter. This specific Web community claims to be all about free speech and
welcomes users banned from other Web communities. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
this community has become the new hub for the alt-right community and likely it is used for the
dissemination of false or hateful content [46]. Therefore, it is important to gain knowledge on what
content is disseminated in these emerging Web communities, what users are attracted, and how such
emerging communities affect the Web.
Information can be extremely diverse: the same piece of information can be disseminated
via text, images, and URLs, hence constituting the tracking of information on the Web a non-
straightforward task. In particular, URLs have several aspects that need to be considered. First,
the information provided by the URL can change when the source updates the page. Second, URLs
can get inaccessible after some time, a problem known as link rot [188], which can affect references
across the Web. Third, there are several services that work with URLs that add complexity to studies
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that use URLs. An example is URL shorteners that generate a shortened URL, which redirects the
user to the source page (i.e., different URLs point to the same information). Another, more interest-
ing example, is the one of archiving services. These services, archive the content of the URL at a
specific point in time and provide a new URL. However, in contrast with URL shorteners, the page
is served by the archiving service itself without redirection to the source. This aspect can have im-
portant implications to the Web, as the content will not be able to be changed by the original author
and because traffic is taken away from the original source (i.e., content is served by the archiving
service). Despite these interesting aspects, Web archiving services are relatively unstudied: we lack
a general understanding of how these services are used on the Web and what is their role and impact
on the information ecosystem.
Exploitation of Web communities from bad actors. The Web provides an ideal environment for
the diffusion of information to a vast amount of people in a short period of time. Clearly, this aspect
of the Web can become an extremely powerful and dangerous tool when exploited by bad actors.
Recently, anecdotal evidence emerged that highlights how popular mainstream Web communities
like Twitter were exploited by state-sponsored actors that disseminated disinformation on a wide-
variety of subjects ranging from health issues [59] to politics [13]. These actors are employed
by governments and they possess several online personas that disseminate specific information that
helps in pushing the agenda of their government. Motivated by the real-world impact that these actors
can have, popular mainstream communities like Twitter and Reddit, started working on identifying
and removing such actors from their platforms. However, as a research community, we lack an
understanding on the behavior of these actors on the Web and how they impact and disrupt the
Web’s information ecosystem.
Motivated by the above aspects of the information ecosystem on the Web, we focus on providing
answers to the following research questions (RQs):
• RQ1: What are the various types of false or otherwise malevolent information (e.g., propa-
ganda) that exist on the Web, what are the main actors that contribute to the dissemination of
false information, and what are their possible underlying motives?
• RQ2: How information propagates across multiple Web communities and how can we quan-
tify the influence between Web communities?
• RQ3: What type of content is disseminated in small fringe Web communities like Gab, what
user base they attract, and what is the influence and impact of these communities to the rest of
the Web?
• RQ4: What is the role of Web archiving services and how are these services exploited
by users on various Web communities. Also, how do such services impact the information
ecosystem on the Web?
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• RQ5: How are state-sponsored actors exploiting mainstream Web communities in order to
disseminate weaponized and possibly fake content? Do these actors have substantial differ-
ences when compared to random users? More importantly, how do these actors evolve over
time, and what is their influence on the Web.
To provide answers to these research questions, we follow a large-scale cross-platform data-
driven quantitative approach. To do so, we first implement a data collection infrastructure that
consists of various crawlers, which allow us to collect large-scale datasets from the Web. Then,
we apply various statistical analysis and machine learning techniques to extract meaningful insights
from the large-scale datasets. Specifically, we use the main following techniques:
• Hawkes Processes [121]: A statistical analysis framework that enable us to investigate possi-
ble causalities between events. We use this technique to assess the influence that various Web
communities have to each other by modeling and fitting our datasets with Hawkes Processes.
More details regarding this technique can be found in Section 2.2.
• Changepoint Analysis [150]: A statistical analysis technique that allows us to extract points
in a time series where statistically significant changes occur. This is particularly useful as it
allows us to isolate significant days in a time series and investigate why these changes occur
on the various Web communities we study, and possibly link them to real-world events. More
details on the methodology and application of this technique can be found in Section 5.1.
• Neural Networks: We apply neural networks for various purposes. For instance, we use
word2vec [222], which are shallow neural networks, to understand the use of language in
the various communities we study. Also, we use neural networks to build custom classifiers:
e.g., we use Convolutional Neural Networks to build a custom screenshot classifier (see Sec-
tion 4.2.2.2).
• Graph Analysis & Visualization: We leverage several graph analysis and visualization tech-
niques to analyze data that can be modeled with graphs. Among other things, we use commu-
nity detection techniques (e.g., the Louvain method [52]) to detect meaningful communities
from the underlying graph structure, and graph layout techniques (e.g., OpenOrd [215] and
ForceAtlas2 [138]), which allow us to lay out graphs in the space where the distance between
nodes represents something useful (e.g., nodes that are layed out closer means they are more
similar).
• Clustering Algorithms: We use traditional clustering algorithms for the purpose of creating
groups of similar information. For instance, we use the DBSCAN algorithm [91] to cluster
images that are visually similar with the ultimate goal to track the propagation of memes
across the Web (more details can be found in Section 4.2.2).
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1.1 Contributions
This thesis makes several contributions towards understanding the information ecosystem on the
Web. We make contributions in three main lines of work: 1) understanding the spread of informa-
tion across multiple Web communities; 2) characterizing emerging Web communities like Gab and
assessing the role of Web archiving services on the information ecosystem; and 3) understanding
the behavior and influence of state-sponsored actors on the Web’s information ecosystem. In more
detail, we make the following contributions:
• We provide a comprehensive overview of the information ecosystem on Web. To do this, we
present a typology that sheds light into the types of false information on the Web, the actors
that are involved as well as their possible underlying motives (RQ1).
• We introduce a novel methodology, based on Hawkes Processes, to quantify the influence
between multiple Web communities. We applied this methodology to several datasets with the
goal to quantify the influence that each community has on other communities with respect to
the dissemination of news and image-based memes (RQ2).
• We present the first study of mainstream and alternative news shared on Twitter, Reddit, and
4chan, measuring how mainstream and alternative news flow between these platforms, and
demonstrating how alt-right communities have surprisingly high influence on Twitter (RQ2).
• We design and implement a highly scalable processing pipeline that is able to track the prop-
agation of image-based memes across multiple Web communities.1 By applying the pro-
posed pipeline to 160M images posted on Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab, we study the
memes ecosystem and characterize each community with respect to the memes their users
share (RQ2).
• We provide some exploratory analyses on some relatively unknown, by the time we started
looking at them, communities and services. Specifically, we provide the first study on Gab,
finding that it is becoming the new alt-right’s hub despite the fact that it started as a social
network promoting free speech (RQ3). Furthermore, we study two Web archiving services,
the Wayback Machine and archive.is, and their use on Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab,
finding several “nuggets”: 1) these services are used to archive news content and are exten-
sively used by fringe Web communities like 4chan; 2) these services are exploited to a large
extent by Reddit bots; 3) these services can be used to deprive ad revenue from the original
source and we find evidence that Reddit moderators actually “force” users to share archived
content from sources with opposing ideology in order to deprive them of ad revenue (RQ4).
1We make the memes processing pipeline publicly available so it can be used by other researchers [15]
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• We study the behavior of state-sponsored actors on the Web, finding that they exhibit sub-
stantial differences when compared to a set of random users. We find that they change their
behavior and that they target different populations over time. Also, we quantified the influence
that these actors had to Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab, finding that these actors had a dis-
proportionate influence to the rest of the platforms, with respect to the dissemination of news
URLs (RQ5).
1.2 Peer-Reviewed Papers
A large body of work presented in this thesis is already published in peer-reviewed journal, con-
ference, and workshop papers. Specifically, some aspects of our work (in collaboration with other
researchers and academics) appear in the following papers:
• Zannettou, S., Sirivianos, M., Blackburn, J. and Kourtellis, N., 2019. The Web of False Infor-
mation: Rumors, Fake News, Hoaxes, Clickbait, and Various Other Shenanigans. Journal of
Data and Information Quality (JDIQ), 11(3), p.10.
• Zannettou, S., Caulfield, T., De Cristofaro, E., Kourtellis, N., Leontiadis, I., Sirivianos, M.,
Stringhini, G. and Blackburn, J., 2017, November. The Web Centipede: Understanding How
Web Communities Influence Each Other Through the Lens Of Mainstream and Alternative
News Sources. In Proceedings of the 2017 Internet Measurement Conference (pp. 405-417).
ACM.
• Zannettou, S., Caulfield, T., Blackburn, J., De Cristofaro, E., Sirivianos, M., Stringhini, G.
and Suarez-Tangil, G., 2018, October. On the Origins of Memes By Means of Fringe Web
Communities. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference 2018 (pp. 188-202).
ACM (Distinguished Paper Award).
• Zannettou, S., Bradlyn, B., De Cristofaro, E., Kwak, H., Sirivianos, M., Stringini, G. and
Blackburn, J., 2018, April. What is Gab: A Bastion of Free Speech or An Alt-Right Echo
Chamber. In Companion of the The Web Conference 2018 on The Web Conference 2018 (pp.
1007-1014).
• Zannettou, S., Blackburn, J., De Cristofaro, E., Sirivianos, M. and Stringhini, G., 2018, June.
Understanding Web Archiving Services and Their (Mis) Use on Social Media. In Twelfth
International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media.
• Zannettou, S., Caulfield, T., De Cristofaro, E., Sirivianos, M., Stringhini, G. and Blackburn,
J., 2019, May. Disinformation Warfare: Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls on Twitter
and Their Influence on the Web. In Companion Proceedings of The 2019 World Wide Web
Conference (pp. 218-226). ACM (Best Paper Award).
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• Zannettou, S., Caulfield, T., Setzer, W., Sirivianos, M., Stringhini, G. and Blackburn, J., 2018.
Who Let The Trolls Out? Towards Understanding State-Sponsored Trolls. In Proceedings of
the 2019 ACM on Web Science Conference. ACM.
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 provides the required background.
Chapter 3 describes previous work on: 1) user perception and interaction with false information on
the Web; 2) propagation of information on the Web; 3) detection and containment of false informa-
tion on the Web; and 4) false information on the political stage. In Chapter 4 we present our work
that focuses on understanding how information spreads from one Web community to another and
how to measure the influence between multiple communities. In Chapter 5 we present our work
related to characterizing various communities and services on the information ecosystem; namely,
we study Gab and Web archiving services. Chapter 6 describes our work on understanding the role
and impact of state-sponsored actors on the Web. Finally, we conclude in Chapter 7.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we present useful background information regarding the Web communities we study,
as well as some statistical techniques that we use to analyze data from various Web communities.
Specifically, for the former, we briefly describe Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab, while for the latter,
we overview Hawkes Processes for estimating influence between Web communities.
2.1 Web Communities
In this section, we briefly describe the Web communities that we use in our work, as well as the
methodology for collecting data from each community.
2.1.1 Twitter
General. Twitter is a popular microblogging social network. Users can broadcast 280-character
messages, called “tweets”, to their followers. By default, tweets are publicly available, however,
users are able to restrict tweets to be available only to their followers. Twitter includes several
traditional social networking features like sharing other tweets (i.e., retweet), liking tweets, as well
as posting tweets in reply to other tweets. On top of this, users can use hashtags (#) in their tweets,
which can help other users to find and weight in on tweets with specific content. Also, users can
refer to other users by mentioning them in tweets (i.e., by using the @ character).
Moderation. Twitter moderates content on their site with the goal to remove hateful content and
ban users that incite violence or share hateful content. Some examples include the permanent ban
of Milo Yiannopoulos after continuing hateful abuse against Leslie Jones1 and the permanent ban of
several accounts linked to the alt-right because of targeted abuse and harassment of others.2 Also,
Twitter employs a demoting system which automatically hides content that is likely to be abusive
and the user can only see the possibly hateful tweets by pressing a button.3
1http://fxn.ws/2zshTl8
2https://wapo.st/2fYdQRG
3https://cnnmon.ie/2smPCaF
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2.1.2 Reddit
General. Reddit is called the “front page of the Internet” and it is a popular news aggregator. Users
can create threads (called “submissions”) by posting a URL along with a title. Other users can
reply below in a structured manner (e.g., reply to submission or reply to specific reply). Popularity
of content within the platform is determined via a voting system: each comment or submission
can be up-voted or down-voted, hence a score can be calculated. Submissions and comments with
higher score appears on top of submissions and comments with lower score. Also, there is a user-
based “score” called karma that is basically the sum of scores for all of the user’s comments and
submissions. Note that on Reddit the community structure is not defined by the friendship/follower
relation like Twitter (a user can list another user as a friend but it does not change anything in the
structure or use of the platform).
Subreddits. Reddit is divided into millions of communities called “subreddits”.4 Subreddits are
created from users of the platform and this has lead to a plethora of communities discussing a wide
variety of topics ranging from video games, to politics, pornography, and even meta-communities
that summarize interactions of users on other subreddits/social networks. Subreddits are monitored
by Reddit’s administrators and they are removed when they share “extremely inappropriate” content.
For instance, in the past, Reddit removed subreddits related to the promotion of conspiracy theories
(e.g., /r/greatawakening, which promoted the Qanon conspiracy theory [236]), subreddits that shared
suggestive photos of underage girls (e.g., /r/jailbait), as well as subreddits sharing “deepfakes” (e.g.,
/r/deepfakes).5
2.1.3 4chan
General. 4chan is a discussion forum known as an imageboard.6 Users can create a new thread by
creating a post that must include an image. Other users can reply to the thread (images are optional
in replies) and possibly add references or quotes to previous posts within the thread. 4chan is an
anonymous community: users are not required to have an account in order to create a post. At the
same time, users can add a pseudonym when posting, however, their pseudonym is bounded to the
specific post and they can use a different one for other posts. On top of this, each post is associated
with a flag. Usually, the flag is determined based on the location of the user, however, it can be
tricked by the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPN). Furthermore, there are communities within
4chan that introduce custom flags. For instance, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/), allow
users to either add the flag based on their location or from a set of 23 pre-defined flags. Examples of
such flags include the flag of Kekistan, the Nazi flag, confederate flag, etc.
4According to statista as of 2017 there are nearly 1.2M subreddits (https://www.statista.com/chart/
11882/number-of-subreddits-on-reddit/).
5For a list of controversial subreddits that were removed see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Controversial_Reddit_communities.
6http://4chan.org/
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Boards. 4chan is divided into multiple communities called boards, which are defined by 4chan.
Each board has its own general theme and topic, ranging from politics, to sports and pornogra-
phy, and likely attracts different user bases. For instance, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/)
focuses on discussions of politics and world news, while the Video games board (/v/) focuses on
discussions around video games. As of April 2019, 4chan has 70 different boards. In our work, we
mainly focus on 4chan /pol/ board, which is mainly used for the discussion of news and real-world
events that are happening. Also, we are particularly interested in this community since previous
work showed that it exhibits a high degree of hate speech and racism [128], and because of anecdo-
tal evidence that suggests the community’s influence and impact both on the online and offline world
(e.g., spread of Pizzagate conspiracy theory [309]).
Moderation. 4chan has an extremely lax moderation: each board has a handful of volunteers called
janitors that are moderating each board. Janitors can remove posts and threads and recommend user
bans to 4chan employees. Generally, Janitors pretty much allow everything to be posted as long as
it is relevant to the general topic and theme of the board. Due to this lax moderation and anonymous
nature of the community, 4chan users can use whatever tone and language to express themselves,
hence 4chan’s high degree of hateful content.
Ephemerality. 4chan is an ephemeral community. Each board has a finite amount of active threads.
Threads are removed after a relatively short period based on a “bumping system” that considers the
posting activity within the thread. That is, creating a new thread, results in the archival of the thread
with the least recent post. A new post within a thread can help “bump” the thread as it keeps the
thread alive and makes the thread appear at the top of the board. To avoid having a thread alive
forever, 4chan has bump and image limits, which determine the maximum number of images and
bumps that a thread can receive. Once a thread is archived, it remains to the community for 7 days
before getting deleted forever.
2.1.4 Gab
General. Gab is a new social network, launched in August 2016, that “champions free speech,
individual liberty, and the free flow of information online.7” It combines social networking features
that exist in popular social platforms like Reddit and Twitter. A user can broadcast 300-character
messages, called “gabs,” to their followers (akin to Twitter). From Reddit, Gab takes a modified
voting system (which we discuss later). Gab allows the posting of pornographic and obscene content,
as long as users label it as Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW).8 Posts can be reposted, quoted, and used as
replies to other gabs. Similar to Twitter, Gab supports hashtags, which allow indexing and querying
for gabs, as well as mentions, which allow users to refer to other users in their gabs.
Topics and Categories. Gab posts can be assigned to a specific topic or category. Topics focus on a
7http://gab.ai
8What constitutes NSFW material is not well defined.
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particular event or timely topic of discussion and can be created by Gab users themselves; all topics
are publicly available and other users can post gabs related to topics. Categories on the other hand,
are defined by Gab itself, with 15 categories defined at the time of this writing. Note that assigning
a gab to a category and/or topic is optional, and Gab moderates topics, removing any that do not
comply with the platform’s guidelines.
Voting system. Gab posts can get up- and down-voted; a feature that determines the popularity of
the content in the platform (akin to Reddit). Additionally, each user has its own score, which is the
sum of up-votes minus the sum of down-votes that it received to all his posts (similar to Reddit’s
user karma score [29]). This user-level score determines the popularity of the user and is used in a
way unique to Gab: a user must have a score of at least 250 points to be able to down-vote other
users’ content, and every time a user down-votes a post a point from his user-level score is deducted.
In other words, a user’s score is used as a form of currency expended to down-vote content.
Moderation. Gab has a lax moderation policy that allows most things to be posted, with a few
exceptions. Specifically, it only forbids posts that contain “illegal pornography” (legal pornography
is permitted), posts that promote terrorist acts, threats to other users, and doxing other users’ personal
information [282].9
Monetization. Gab is ad-free and relies on direct user support. On October 4, 2016 Gab’s CEO
Andrew Torba announced that users were able to donate to Gab [296]. Later, Gab added “pro”
accounts as well. “Pro” users pay a per-month fee granting additional features like live-stream
broadcasts, account verification, extended character count (up to 3K characters per gab), special
formatting in posts (e.g., italics, bold, etc.), as well as premium content creation. The latter allows
users to create “premium” content that can only be seen by subscribers of the user, which are users
that pay a monthly fee to the content creator to be able to view his posts. The premium content
model allows for crowdfunding particular Gab users, similar to the way that Twitch and Patreon
work. Finally, Gab is in the process of raising money through an Initial Coin Offering (ICO) with the
goal to offer a “censorship-proof” peer-to-peer social network that developers can build application
on top [28].
2.1.5 Remarks
In this section, we presented the data sources that we use in this thesis. We select these specific data
sources for various reasons. First, our data sources comprise of an interesting mix of both main-
stream Web communities (i.e., Twitter and Reddit), as well as fringe Web communities (i.e., Gab
and 4chan). This enables us to understand how small fringe Web communities influence large main-
stream Web communities. Second, we select these specific fringe Web communities mainly because
of extensive anecdotal evidence that suggest that 4chan and Gab are involved in the dissemination of
false information [309, 10] and hateful content [46, 249]. Third, we avoid using other popular social
9For more information on Gab’s guidelines, see https://gab.ai/about/guidelines.
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networks like Facebook mainly due to limits imposed on their APIs by the company itself, hence
constituting the task of obtaining data non-straightforward.
Obviously, it is likely that on other Web communities we can find important differences that
might affect the results presented in this thesis, however, this thesis sheds light into the information
ecosystem through the lens of multiple Web communities highlighting the need to shift focus into
understanding the various Web communities on the Web and study the interplay between them.
Despite this fact, as we mention in the next section, our influence estimation experiments via Hawkes
Processes allow us to also capture the creation of events from external sources, hence we argue that
the Influence Estimation results presented throughout this thesis can be treated as general, as they
shed light into the influence that each Web community have to the others by also considering external
sources (i.e., communities that we do not study like Facebook).
2.2 Hawkes Processes
In this section, we provide necessary background for Hawkes Processes and how we use them in
order to assess the interplay of multiple Web communities and, more importantly, quantify the influ-
ence that specific small fringe Web communities (e.g., 4chan) have to mainstream ones like Twitter.
In a nutshell, Hawkes Processes is a statistical framework that allow us to assess the causality of
events that occur on the Web, and find the possible root causes (i.e., Web community that is respon-
sible for the creation of the events) along with their respective probabilities.
General. Hawkes Processes are self-exciting temporal point processes [121] that describe how
events (e.g., posting of a URL or an image) occur on a set of processes (i.e., Web communities).
Generally, a Hawkes model consists of a number, K, of point processes, each with a “background
rate” of events λ0,k. The background rate is the expected rate at which events will occur on a process
without influence from the processes modeled or previous events; this captures events created for the
first time, or those seen on a process we do not model and then created on a process we do.
An event on one process can cause an impulse response on other processes, which increases
the probability of an event occurring above the processes’ background rates. The shape of the im-
pulse determines how the probability of these events occurring is distributed over time; typically
the probability of another event occurring is highest soon after the original event and decreases over
time.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates a Hawkes model with three processes. The first event occurs on process B,
which causes an increase in the rate of events on all three processes. The second event then occurs
on process C, again increasing the rate of events on the processes. The third event occurs soon after,
on process A. The fourth event occurs later, again caused by the background arrival rate on process
B, after the increases in arrival rate from the other events have disappeared.
To understand the influence different processes have on the creation of specific events, we want
to be able to attribute the cause of an event being posted back to a specific process. For example, if
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Figure 2.1: Representation of a Hawkes model with three processes. Events cause impulses that increase the
rate of subsequent events in the same or other processes. By looking at the impulses present when events occur,
the probability of a process being the root cause of an event can be determined. Note that on the second part of
the Figure, colors represent events while arrows represent impulses between the events.
an image is posted on /pol/ and then someone sees it there and posts it on Twitter where it is shared
several times, we would like to be able to say that /pol/ was the root cause of those events. Obviously,
we do not actually know where someone saw something and decided to share it, but we can, using
the Hawkes models, determine the probability of each community being the root cause of an event.
Looking again at Fig. 2.1, we see that events 1 and 4 are caused directly by the background rate
of process B. This is because, in the case of event 1, there are no previous events on other processes,
and in the case of event 4, the impulses from previous events have already stopped. Events 2 and 3,
however, occur when there are multiple possible causes: the background rate for the process and the
impulses from previous events. In these cases, we assign the probability of being the root cause in
proportion to the magnitudes of the impulses (including the background rate) present at the time of
the event. For event 2, the impulse from event 1 is smaller than the background rate of process C, so
the background rate has a higher probability of being the cause of event 2 than event 1. Thus, most
of the cause for event 2 is attributed to process C, with a lesser amount to B (through event 1). Event
3 is more complicated: impulses from both previous events are present, thus the probability of being
the cause is split three ways, between the background rate and the two previous events. The impulse
from event 2 is the largest, with the background rate and event 1 impulse smaller. Because event 2
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is attributed both to processes B and C, event 3 is partly attributed to process B through both event 1
and event 2.
For our purposes, fitting a Hawkes model to a series of events on the different processes gives
us values for the background rates for each process along with the probability of an event on one
process causing events on other processes. We emphasize that the background rates of the Hawkes
processes allows us to also account for the probability of an event caused by external sources of
information. Thus, while we are only able to model the specific influences for a limited number of
Web communities we study, the resulting probabilities are affirmatively attributable to each of them;
the influence of the greater Web is captured by the background rates.
For a discrete-time Hawkes model, time is divided into a series of bins of duration ∆t, and
events occurring within the same time bin do not interact with each other. The rate of each k-th
process, λt,k is given by:
λt,k = λ0,k +
K
∑
k′=1
t−1
∑
t ′=1
st ′,k′ ·hk′→k[t− t ′]
where s ∈ NT×K is the matrix of event counts (how many events occur for process k at time t) and
hk′→k[t− t ′] is an impulse response function that describes the amplitude of influence that events on
process k′ have on the rate of process k.
Following [204], the impulse response function hk→k′ [t− t ′] can be decomposed into a scalar
weight Wk→k′ and a probability mass function Gk→k′ [d]. The weight specifies the strength of the in-
teraction from process k to process k′ and the probability mass function specifies how the interaction
changes over time:
hk→k′ [d] =Wk→k′Gk→k′ [d]
The weight value Wk→k′ can be interpreted as the expected number of child events that will be
caused on process k′ after an event on process k. The probability mass function Gk→k′ specifies the
probability that a child event will occur at each specific time lag d∆t, up to a maximum lag ∆tmax.
This interpretation of Wk→k′ is useful because it allows us to compare how much influence processes
have on each other. For instance, we can examine whether an image posted on Twitter or on Reddit
is more likely to cause the same image to be posted on 4chan, or if there is a difference in influence
from one platform to another between various images.
Experimental Setup. We assume a Hawkes model that is is fully connected, i.e., it is possible for
each process to influence all the others, as well as itself, which describes behavior where participants
on a platform see an image and re-post it on the same platform. For example, with Twitter, this value
(WTwitter→Twitter) would likely be quite high, given that tweets are commonly re-tweeted a number of
times: the initial tweet containing an image is likely to cause a number of re-tweets, also containing
the image, on the same platform.
For each type of event, we create a matrix s∈NT×K containing the number of events per minute
for each of the processes (i.e., Web communities). Here, T is the number of minutes from the first
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recorded post of the event on any process, to the last recorded post of the event on any process
(NB: this value can be different for each type of event). We select ∆t = 1 minute as a reasonable
compromise between accuracy and computational cost.
Next, we fit a Hawkes model for each type of event using the approach described in [204, 205],
which uses Gibbs sampling to infer the parameters of the model from the data, including the weights,
background rates, and shape of the impulse response functions between the different processes. By
setting ∆tmax = 60 · 12 = 720 minutes, we say that a given event can cause other events within a
12-hour time window. Experiments with other values (6, 12, 24, and 48 hours) gave similar results.
After fitting the models, we have the values for the W matrix – i.e., the weights of the interactions
between events on different processes for each type of event. These weights can then be interpreted
as the expected number of events. For example, WTwitter→/pol/ = 0.1 would mean that an event on
Twitter will cause n events on /pol/, where n is drawn from a Poisson distribution with rate parameter
0.1. Finally, for each type of event, we also get the λ0,k values for each process, which are the
background rates for event arrivals that are not caused by other events in the system we model.
Again, these background rates capture events due to some other process, e.g., someone posting an
image after seeing it on the original site or seeing the image on another site not included in the
model, like Facebook.
Metrics. Having obtained the weight matrix W , which specifies the strength of connections between
processes for each type of event, we report our influence estimation results using two metrics. First,
we measure the absolute influence, which can be interpreted as the expected number of events that
are created on a destination process because of events previously seen on a source process. Since the
weight values can be interpreted as the expected number of additional events that will be caused a
consequence of an event, we can estimate the percentage of events on each process that were caused
by each of the other processes by multiplying the weight by the actual number of events that occurred
on the source process (e.g., Process A) and dividing by the number of events that occurred on the
destination process (e.g., Process B):
InfluenceA→B =
∑e∈events
(
WA→B ·∑Tt=1 st,A
)
∑e∈events∑Tt=1 st,B
Second, we measure the efficiency of each process in pushing events to the rest of the processes.
To do this, we normalize the influence values by the total number of events in the source process
(e.g., Process A). This metric allow us to see how much influence each process has, relative to the
number of events that are created in the process and is given by:
EfficiencyA→B =
∑e∈events
(
WA→B ·∑Tt=1 st,A
)
∑e∈events
(
∑Tt=1 st,A
)
Remarks. In this section, we described how we can use Hawkes Processes for modeling the inter-
play between multiple Web communities and how to quantify the influence that each Web commu-
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nity have to the others. To do this, we leverage Bayesian Inference techniques and data that describes
the appearances of events in a set of processes. This allow us to assess the causality of events that
happen on multiple Web communities and assess the possible root causes (i.e., the responsible Web
community for the creation of the event) for each event. Note that by tweaking what an event is, the
proposed framework can be applied to a wide variety of use cases (e.g., an event can be text referring
to a specific news story, a specific video, etc.).
Chapter 3
Literature Review
In this chapter, we provide an extensive literature review of work that focus on the false information
ecosystem on the Web. First, we present a typology of the various types and actors that are involved
in the spread of information on the Web. Then we review the following lines of work: 1) user
perception of false information; 2) propagation of false information; 3) detection and containment
of false information; 4) false information on the political stage and 5) various other studies that are
relevant.
3.1 Typology of the False Information Ecosystem
In this section we present our typology, which we believe it will provide a succinct roadmap for
future work. The typology is based on [8] and extended to build upon the existing literature. Specif-
ically, we describe the various types of false information that can be found in OSNs (Section 3.1.1),
the various types of actors that contribute in the distribution of false information (Section 3.1.2), as
well as their motives (Section 3.1.3). Note that our typology is different from concurrent work by
Kumar and Shah [193] as we provide a fine-grained distinction for the types of false information,
the actors, and their motives. Also, note that we make a best effort to cover as many aspects of the
false information as per our knowledge; however, the typology should not be treated as an exhaustive
representation of the false information ecosystem.
3.1.1 Types of False Information
False information on the Web can be found in various forms, hence we propose the categorization of
false information into eight types as listed below:
• Fabricated (F) [263]. Completely fictional stories disconnected entirely from real facts. This
type is not new and it exists since the birth of journalism. Some popular examples include
fabricated stories about politicians and aliens [125] (e.g., the story that Hillary Clinton adopted
an alien baby).
• Propaganda (P) [147]. This is a special instance of the fabricated stories that aim to harm
the interests of a particular party and usually has a political context. This kind of false news
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is not new, as it was widely used during World War II and the Cold War. Propaganda stories
are profoundly utilized in political contexts to mislead people with the overarching goal of
inflicting damage to a particular political party or nation-state. Due to this, propaganda is a
consequential type of false information as it can change the course of human history (e.g., by
changing the outcome of an election). Some recent examples of propaganda include stories
about the Syria air strikes in 2018 or about specific movements like the BlackLivesMatter
(see [219] for more examples).
• Conspiracy Theories (CT) [97]. Refer to stories that try to explain a situation or an event
by invoking a conspiracy without proof. Usually, such stories are about illegal acts that are
carried out by governments or powerful individuals. They also typically present unsourced
information as fact or dispense entirely with an “evidence” based approach, relying on leaps
of faith instead. Popular recent examples of conspiracy theories include the Pizzagate theory
(i.e., Clinton’s campaign running a pedophile ring) [314] and conspiracies around the murder
of Seth Rich [313] (e.g., Seth Rich was involved in the DNC email leaks).
• Hoaxes (H) [194]. News stories that contain facts that are either false or inaccurate and are
presented as legitimate facts. This category is also known in the research community either
as half-truth [4] or factoid [14] stories. Popular examples of hoaxes are stories that report the
false death of celebrities (e.g., the Adam Sadler death hoax [281]).
• Biased or one-sided (B). Refers to stories that are extremely one-sided or biased. In the polit-
ical context, this type is known as Hyperpartisan news [246] and are stories that are extremely
biased towards a person/party/situation/event. Some examples include the wide spread diffu-
sion of false information to the alt-right community from small fringe Web communities like
4chan’s /pol/ board [128] and Gab, an alt-right echo chamber [328].
• Rumors (R) [242]. Refers to stories whose truthfulness is ambiguous or never confirmed.
This kind of false information is widely propagated on OSNs, hence several studies have
analyzed this type of false information. Some examples of rumors include stories around the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombings like the story that the suspects became citizens on 9/11 or
that a Sandy Hook child was killed during the incident [280].
• Clickbait (CL) [72]. Refers to the deliberate use of misleading headlines and thumbnails of
content on the Web. This type is not new as it appeared years before, during the “newspaper
era,” a phenomenon known as yellow journalism [65]. However, with the proliferation of
OSNs, this problem is rapidly growing, as many users add misleading descriptors to their
content with the goal of increasing their traffic for profit or popularity [245]. This is one of the
least severe types of false information because if a user reads/views the whole content then he
can distinguish if the headline and/or the thumbnail was misleading.
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• Satire News (S) [63]. Stories that contain a lot of irony and humor. This kind of news is
getting considerable attention on the Web in the past few years. Some popular examples of
sites that post satire news are TheOnion [23] and SatireWire [17]. Usually, these sites disclose
their satyric nature in one of their pages (i.e., About page). However, as their articles are
usually disseminated via social networks, this fact is obfuscated, overlooked, or ignored by
users who often take them at face value with no additional verification.
It is extremely important to highlight that there is an overlap in the aforementioned types of false
information, thus it is possible to observe false information that may fall within multiple categories.
Here, we list two indicative examples to better understand possible overlaps: 1) a rumor may also
use clickbait techniques to increase the audience that will read the story; and 2) propaganda stories,
which are a special instance of a fabricated story, may also be biased towards a particular party.
These examples highlight that the false information ecosystem is extremely complex and the various
types of false information need to be considered to mitigate the problem.
3.1.2 False Information Actors
In this section, we describe the different types of actors that constitute the false information propa-
gation ecosystem. We identified a handful of different actors that we describe below.
• Bots [57]. In the context of false information, bots are programs that are part of a bot net-
work (Botnet) and are responsible for controlling the online activity of several fake accounts
with the aim of disseminating false information. Botnets are usually tied to a large number
of fake accounts that are used to propagate false information in the wild. A Botnet is usually
employed for profit by 3rd party organizations to diffuse false information for various mo-
tives (see Section 3.1.3 for more information on their possible motives). Note that various
types of bots exist, which have varying capabilities; for instance, some bots only repost con-
tent, promote content (e.g., via vote manipulation on Reddit or similar platforms), and others
post “original” content. However, this distinction is outside of the scope of this work, which
provides a general overview of the information ecosystem on the Web.
• Criminal/Terrorist Organizations [35]. Criminal gangs and terrorist organizations are ex-
ploiting OSNs as the means to diffuse false information to achieve their goals. A recent exam-
ple is the ISIS terrorist organization that diffuses false information in OSNs for propaganda
purposes [35]. Specifically, they widely diffuse ideologically passionate messages for recruit-
ment purposes. This creates an extremely dangerous situation for the community as there
are several examples of individuals from European countries recruited by ISIS that ended-up
perpetrating terrorist acts.
• Activist or Political Organizations. Various organizations share false information in order to
either promote their organization, demote other rival organizations, or for pushing a specific
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narrative to the public. A recent example include the National Rifle Association, a non-profit
organization that advocates gun rights, which disseminated false information to manipulate
people about guns [292]. Other examples include political parties that share false information,
especially near major elections [36].
• Governments [294]. Historically, governments were involved in the dissemination of false
information for various reasons. More recently, with the proliferation of the Internet, govern-
ments utilize the social media to manipulate public opinion on specific topics. Furthermore,
there are reports that foreign goverments share false information on other countries in or-
der to manipulate public opinion on specific topics that regard the particular country. Some
examples, include the alleged involvement of the Russian government in the 2016 US elec-
tions [272] and Brexit referendum [259].
• Hidden Paid Posters [70] and State-sponsored Trolls [332, 333]. They are a special group of
users that are paid in order to disseminate false information on a particular content or targeting
a specific demographic. Usually, they are employed for pushing an agenda; e.g., to influence
people to adopt certain social or business trends. Similar to bots, these actors disseminate
false information for profit. However, this type is substantially harder to distinguish than bots
because they exhibit characteristics similar to regular users.
• Journalists [201]. Individuals that are the primary entities responsible for disseminating in-
formation both to the online and to the offline world. However, in many cases, journalists
are found in the center of controversy as they post false information for various reasons. For
example, they might change some stories so that they are more appealing, in order to increase
the popularity of their platform, site, or newspaper.
• Useful Idiots [25]. The term originates from the early 1950s in the USA as a reference to a
particular political party’s members that were manipulated by Russia in order to weaken the
USA. Useful idiots are users that share false information mainly because they are manipulated
by the leaders of some organization or because they are naive. Usually, useful idiots are normal
users that are not fully aware of the goals of the organization, hence it is extremely difficult to
identify them. Like hidden paid posters, useful idiots are hard to distinguish and there is no
study that focuses on this task.
• “True Believers” and Conspiracy Theorists. Refer to individuals that share false informa-
tion because they actually believe that they are sharing the truth and that other people need to
know about it. For instance, a popular example is Alex Jones, which is a popular conspiracy
theorist that shared false information about the Sandy Hook shooting [316].
• Individuals that benefit from false information. Refer to various individuals that will have a
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personal gain by disseminating false information. This is a very broad category ranging from
common persons like an owner of a cafeteria to popular individuals like political persons.
• Trolls [221]. The term troll is used in great extend by the Web community and refers to users
that aim to do things to annoy or disrupt other users, usually for their own personal amusement.
An example of their arsenal is posting provocative or off-topic messages in order to disrupt
the normal operation or flow of discussion of a website and its users. In the context of false
information propagation, we define trolls as users that post controversial information in order
to provoke other users or inflict emotional pressure. Traditionally, these actors use fringe
communities like Reddit and 4chan to orcherstrate organized operations for disseminating
false information to mainstream communities like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube [331, 128].
Similarly to the types of false information, overlap may exist in actors too. Some examples
include: 1) Bots can be exploited by criminal organizations or political persons to disseminate false
information [12]; and 2) Hidden paid posters and state-sponsored trolls can be exploited by political
persons or organizations to push false information for a particular agenda [13].
3.1.3 Motives behind false information propagation
False information actors and types have different motives behind them. Below we describe the
categorization of motives that we distinguish:
• Malicious Intent. Refers to a wide spectrum of intents that drive actors that want to hurt
others in various ways. Some examples include inflicting damage to the public image of a
specific person, organization, or entity.
• Influence. This motive refers to the intent of misleading other people in order to influence their
decisions, or manipulate public opinion with respect to specific topics. This motive can be
distinguished into two general categories; 1) aiming to get leverage or followers (power) and
2) changing the norms of the public by disseminating false information. This is particularly
worrisome on political matters [230], where individuals share false information to enhance an
individuals’ public image or to hurt the public image of opposing politicians, especially during
election periods.
• Sow Discord. In specific time periods individuals or organizations share false information to
sow confusion or discord to the public. Such practices can assist in pushing a particular entity’s
agenda; we have seen some examples on the political stage where foreign governments try to
seed confusion in another country’s public for their own agenda [298].
• Profit. Many actors in the false information ecosystem seek popularity and monetary profit
for their organization or website. To achieve this, they usually disseminate false information
that increases the traffic on their website. This leads to increased ad revenue that results in
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monetary profit for the organization or website, at the expense of manipulated users. Some
examples include the use of clickbait techniques, as well as fabricated news to increase views
of articles from fake news sites that are disseminated via OSNs [245, 33]
• Passion. A considerable amount of users are passionate about a specific idea, organization, or
entity. This affects their judgment and can contribute to the dissemination of false information.
Specifically, passionate users are blinded by their ideology and perceive the false information
as correct, and contribute in its overall propagation [127].
• Fun. As discussed in the previous section, online trolls are usually diffusing false informa-
tion for their amusement. Their actions can sometimes inflict considerable damage to other
individuals (e.g., see Doxing [282]), and thus should not be taken lightly.
Again, similarly to Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, we have overlap among the presented motives. For
instance, a political person may disseminate false information for political influence and because he
is passionate about a specific idea.
3.2 User Perception of False Information
In this section, we describe work that study how users perceive and interact with false information
on OSNs. Existing work use the following methodologies in understanding how false information is
perceived by users: (i) by analyzing large-scale datasets obtained from OSNs; and (ii) by receiving
input from users either from questionnaires, interviews, or through crowdsourcing marketplaces
(e.g., Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMT [1]). Table 3.1 summarizes the studies on user perception, as
well as their methodology and the considered OSN. Furthermore, we annotate each entry in Table 3.1
with the type of false information that each work considers. The remainder of this section provides
an overview of the studies on understanding users’ perceptions on false information.
3.2.1 OSN data analysis
Previous work focuses on extracting meaningful insights by analyzing data obtained from OSNs.
From Table 3.1 we observe that previous work, leverages data analysis techniques to mainly study
how users perceive and interact with rumors and conspiracy theories.
Rumors. Kwon et al. [197] study the propagation of rumors in Twitter, while considering findings
from social and psychological studies. By analyzing 1.7B tweets, obtained from [67], they find that:
1) users that spread rumors and non-rumors have similar registration age and number of followers;
2) rumors have a clearly different writing style; 3) sentiment in news depends on the topic and not
on the credibility of the post; and 4) words related to social relationships are more frequently used
in rumors. Zubiaga et al. [344] analyze 4k tweets related to rumors by using journalists to annotate
rumors in real time. Their findings indicate that true rumors resolved faster than false rumors and
that the general tendency for users is to support every unverified rumor. However, the latter is less
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Platform OSN data analysis Questionnaires/Interviews Crowdsourcing platforms
Twitter
Kwon et al. [197] (R),
Zubiaga et al. [344] (R),
Thomson et al. [293] (R)
Morris et al. [228] (CA)
Ozturk et al. [238] (R),
McCreadie et al. [218] (R)
Facebook
Zollo et al. [342] (CT),
Zollo et al. [341] (CT),
Bessi et al. [48] (CT)
Marchi [211] (B) X
Other Dang et al. [79] (R)
Chen et al. [71] (F),
Kim and Bock [151] (R),
Feldman [96] (B),
Brewer et al. [58] (S)
Winerburg and McGrew [318] (CA)
X
Table 3.1: Studies of user perception and interaction with false information on OSNs. The table depicts the
main methodology of each paper as well as the considered OSN (if any). Also, where applicable, we report the
type of false information that is considered (see bold markers and cf. with Section 3.1.1).
prevalent to reputable user accounts (e.g., reputable news outlets) that usually share information with
evidence. Thomson et al. [293] study Twitter’s activity regarding the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant disaster in Japan. The authors undertake a categorization of the messages according
to their user, location, language, type, and credibility of the source. They observe that anonymous
users, as well as users that live far away from the disaster share more information from less credible
sources. Finally, Dang et al. [79] focus on the users that interact with rumors on Reddit by studying
a popular false rumor (i.e., Obama is a Muslim). Specifically, they distinguish users into three main
categories: the ones that support false rumors, the ones that refute false rumors and the ones that joke
about a rumor. To identify these users they built a Naive Bayes classifier that achieves an accuracy
of 80% and find that more than half of the users joked about this rumor, 25% refuted the joke and
only 5% supported this rumor.
Conspiracy Theories. Zollo et al. [342] study the emotional dynamics around conversations regard-
ing science and conspiracy theories. They do so by collecting posts from 280k users on Facebook
pages that post either science or conspiracy theories posts. Subsequently, they use Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) to identify the sentiment values of the posts, finding that sentiment is more neg-
ative on pages with conspiracy theories. Furthermore, they report that as conversations grow larger,
the overall negative sentiment in the comments increases. In another work, Zollo et al. [341] perform
a quantitative analysis of 54M Facebook users. finding the existence of well-formed communities
for the users that interact with science and conspiracy news. They note that users of each community
interact within the community and rarely outside of it. Also, debunking posts are rather inefficient
and user exposure to such content increases the overall interest in conspiracy theory posts. Similarly,
Bessi et al. [48] study how conspiracy theories and news articles are consumed on Facebook, finding
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that polarized users contribute more in the diffusion of conspiracy theories, whereas this does not
apply for news and their respective polarized users.
3.2.2 Questionnaires/Interviews
To get insights on how users perceive the various types of false information, some of the previous
work conducted questionnaires or interviews. The majority of the work aims to understand how
younger users (students or teenagers) interact and perceive false information.
Credibility Assessment. Morris et al. [228] highlight that users are influenced by several features
related to the author of a tweet like their Twitter username when assessing the credibility of informa-
tion. Winerburg and McGrew [318] study whether users with different backgrounds have differences
in their credibility assessments. To achieve this they conducted experiments with historians, fact-
checkers, and undergraduate students, finding that historians and students can easily get manipulated
by official-looking logos and domain names.
Biased. Marchi [211] focus on how teenagers interact with news on Facebook by conducting inter-
views with 61 racially diverse teenagers. The main findings of this study is that teenagers are not
very interested in consuming news (despite the fact that their parents do) and that they demonstrate a
preference to news that are opinionated when compared to objective news. Similarly, Feldman [96]
focus on biased news and conduct 3 different studies with the participants randomly exposed to 2
biased and 1 non-biased news. The participants were asked to provide information about the news
that allowed the authors to understand the perceived bias. They find that participants are capable of
distinguishing bias in news articles; however, participants perceived lower bias in news that agree
with their ideology/viewpoints.
Fabricated. Chen et al. [71] use questionnaires on students from Singapore with the goal to unveil
the reasons that users with no malicious intent share false information on OSNs. They highlight that
female students are more prone in sharing false information, and that students are willing to share
information of any credibility just to initiate conversations or because the content seems interesting.
Rumors. Kim and Bock [151] study the rumor spreading behavior in OSNs from a psychological
point of view by undertaking questionnaires on Korean students. They find that users’ beliefs results
in either positive or negative emotion for the rumor, which affects the attitude and behavior of the
users towards the rumor spreading.
Satire. Brewer et al. [58] indicate that satirical news programs can affect users’ opinion and political
trust, while at the same time users tend to have stronger opinion on matters that they have previously
seen in satirical programs.
3.2.3 Crowdsourcing platforms
Other related work leverages crowdsourcing platform to get feedback from users about false infor-
mation. We note that, to the best of our knowledge, previous work that used crowdsourcing platforms
3.3. Propagation of False Information 42
focused on rumors. Rumors. Ozturk et al. [238] study how users perceive health-related rumors and
if their are willing to share them on Twitter. For acquiring the rumors, they crawl known health-
related websites such as Discovery, Food Networks and National Institute of Health websites. To
study the user perceptions regarding these rumors, they use AMT where they query 259 participants
about ten handpicked health-related rumors. The participants were asked whether they will share
a specific rumor or a message that refutes a rumor or a rumor that had a warning on it (i.e., “this
message appeared in a rumor website”). Their results indicate that users are less likely to share a
rumor that is accompanied with a warning or a message that refutes a rumor. Through simulations,
they demonstrate that this approach can help in mitigating the spread of rumors on Twitter. Finally,
McCreadie et al. [218] use crowdsourcing on three Twitter datasets related to emergency situations
during 2014, in order to record users’ identification of rumors. Their results note that users were
able to label most of the tweets correctly, while they note that tweets that contain controversial
information are harder to distinguish.
3.2.4 User Perception - Remarks
The studies discussed in this section aim to shed light on how users perceive false information on
the Web. Overall the main take-away points from the reviewed related work are: 1) teenagers are
not interested in consuming news; 2) students share information of any credibility just to initate
conversations; 3) in most cases, adults can identify bias in news and this task is harder when the
news are biased towards the reader’s ideology; and 4) users can mostly identify rumors except the
ones that contain controversial information.
3.3 Propagation of False Information
Understanding the dynamics of false information is of paramount importance as it gives useful in-
sights regarding the problem. Table 3.2 summarizes the studies of false information propagation at
OSNs, their methodology, as well as the corresponding type of false information according to the
typology in Section 3.1.1. The research community focuses on studying the propagation by either
employing data analysis techniques or mathematical and statistical approaches. Furthermore, we
note the efforts done on providing systems that visualize the propagation dynamics of false informa-
tion. Below, we describe the studies that are mentioned in Table 3.2 by dedicating a subsection for
each type of methodology.
3.3.1 OSN Data Analysis
Rumors. Mendoza et al. [220] study the dissemination of false rumors and confirmed news on
Twitter the days following the 2010 earthquake in Chile. They analyze the propagation of tweets for
confirmed news and for rumors finding that the propagation of rumors differs from the confirmed
news and that an aggregate analysis on the tweets can distinguish the rumors from the confirmed
news. Similarly, Starbird et al. [286] study rumors regarding the 2013 Boston Bombings on Twitter
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Platform OSN data analysis Epidemic & Statistical Modeling Systems
Twitter
Mendoza et al. [220] (R),
Oh et al. [235] (R),
Andrews et al. [41] (R),
Gupta et al. [114] (F),
Starbird et al. [286] (R),
Arif et al. [42] (R),
Situngkir [276] (H),
Nadamoto et al. [229] (R),
Vosoughi et al. [302] (F)
Jin et al. [140] (R),
Doerr et al. [86] (R),
Jin et al. [141] (R)
Finn et al. [101] (R),
Shao el at. [273] (F)
Facebook
Friggeri et al. [103] (R),
Del Vicario et al. [83] (CT),
Anagnostopoulos et al. [39] (CT)
Bessi [47] (CT) X
Other
Ma and Li [209] (R),
Zannettou et al. [331] (B)
Shah et al. [271] (R),
Seo et al. [270] (R) ,
Wang et al. [307] (R)
Dang et al. [78] (R)
Sina Weibo X Nguyen et al. [232] (R) X
Table 3.2: Studies that focus on the propagation of false information on OSNs. The table summarizes the main
methodology of each paper as well as the considered OSNs. Also, we report the type of false information that
is considered (see bold markers and cf. with Section 3.1.1
and confirm both findings from Mendoza et al. [220]. In a similar notion, Nadamoto et al. [229]
analyze the behavior of the Twitter community during disasters (Great East Japan Earthquake in
2011) when compared to a normal time period; finding that the spread of rumors during a disaster
situation is different from a normal situation. That is in disaster situations, the hierarchy of tweets is
shallow whereas in normal situations the tweets follow a deep hierarchy.
Others focused on understanding how rumors can be controlled and shed light on which types
of accounts can help stop the rumor spread. Oh et al. [235] study Twitter data about the 2010 Haiti
Earthquake and find that credible sources contribute in rumor controlling, while Andrews et al. [41]
find that official accounts can contribute in stopping the rumor propagation by actively engaging in
conversations related to the rumors.
Arif et al. [42] focus on the 2014 hostage crisis in Sydney. Their analysis include three main
perspectives; (i) volume (i.e., number of rumor-related messages per time interval); (ii) exposure
(i.e., number of individuals that were exposed to the rumor) and (iii) content production (i.e., if
the content is written by the particular user or if it is a share). Their results highlight all three
perspectives are important in understanding the dynamics of rumor propagation. Friggeri et al. [103]
use known rumors that are obtained through Snopes [21], a popular site that covers rumors, to study
the propagation of rumors on Facebook. Their analysis indicates that rumors’ popularity is bursty
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and that a lot of rumors change over time, thus creating rumor variants. These variants aim to reach
a higher popularity burst. Also, they note that rumors re-shares which had a comment containing a
link to Snopes had a higher probability to be deleted by their users.
Finally, Ma and Li [209] study the rumor propagation process when considering a two-layer
network; one layer is online (e.g., Twitter) and one layer is offline (e.g., face-to-face). Their sim-
ulations indicate that rumor spread is more prevalent in a two-layer network when compared with
a single-layer offline network. The intuition is that in an offline network the spread is limited by
the distance, whereas this constraint is eliminated in a two-layer network that has an online social
network. Their evaluation indicates that in a two-layer network the spreading process on one layer
does not affect the spreading process of the other layer; mainly because the interlayer transfer rate is
less effective from an offline to an online network when compared with that from an OSN.
Fabricated. Gupta et al. [114] study the propagation of false information on Twitter regarding the
2013 Boston Marathon Bombings. To do so, they collect 7.9M unique tweets by using keywords
about the event. Using real annotators, they annotate 6% of the whole corpus that represents the 20
most popular tweets during this crisis situation (i.e., the 20 tweets that got retweeted most times).
Their analysis indicate that 29% of the tweets were false and a large number of those tweets were
disseminated by reputable accounts. This finding contradicts with the findings of Oh et al. [235],
which showed that credible accounts help stop the spread of false information, hence highlighting
that reputable accounts can share bad information too. Furthermore, they note that out of the 32K ac-
counts that were created during the crisis period, 19% of them were deleted or suspended by Twitter,
indicating that accounts were created for the whole purpose of disseminating false information.
Vosoughi et al. [302] study the diffusion of false and true stories in Twitter over the course of 11
years. They find that false stories propagate faster, farther, and more broadly when compared to true
stories. By comparing the types of false stories, they find that these effects were more intensive for
political false stories when compared to other false stories (e.g., related to terrorism, science, urban
legends, etc.).
Hoaxes. Situngkir [276] observe an empirical case in Indonesia to understand the spread of hoaxes
on Twitter. Specifically, they focus on a case where a Twitter user with around 100 followers posted
a question of whether a well-known individual is dead. Interestingly, the hoax had a large population
spread within 2 hours of the initial post and it could be much larger if a popular mainstream medium
did not publicly deny the hoax. Their findings indicate that a hoax can easily spread to the OSN if
there is collaboration between the recipients of the hoax. Again, this work highlights, similarly to
Oh et al. [235] that reputable accounts can help in mitigating the spread of false information.
Conspiracy Theories. Del Vicario et al. [83] analyze the cascade dynamics of users on Facebook
when they are exposed to conspiracy theories and scientific articles. They analyze the content of
67 public pages on Facebook that disseminate conspiracy theories and science news. Their analysis
3.3. Propagation of False Information 45
indicates the formulation of two polarized and homogeneous communities for each type of informa-
tion. Also, they note that despite the fact that both communities have similar content consumption
patterns, they have different cascade dynamics. Anagnostopoulos et al. [39] study the role of ho-
mophily and polarization on the spread of false information by analyzing 1.2M Facebook users that
interacted with science and conspiracy theories. Their findings indicate that user’s interactions with
the articles correlate with the interactions of their friends (homophily) and that frequent exposure to
conspiracy theories (polarization) determines how viral the false information is in the OSN.
Biased. Zannettou et al. [331], motivated by the fact that the information ecosystem consists of
multiple Web communities, study the propagation of news across multiple Web communities. To
achieve this, they study URLs from 99 mainstream and alternative news sources on three popular
Web communities: Reddit, Twitter, and 4chan. Furthermore, they set out to measure the influence
that each Web community has to each other, using a statistical model called Hawkes Processes. Their
findings indicate that small fringe communities within Reddit and 4chan have a substantial influence
to mainstream OSNs like Twitter.
3.3.2 Epidemic and Statistical Modeling
Rumors. Jin et al. [140] use epidemiological models to characterize cascades of news and rumors in
Twitter. Specifically, they use the SEIZ model [49] which divides the user population in four different
classes based on their status; (i) Susceptible; (ii) Exposed; (iii) Infected and (iv) Skeptic. Their
evaluation indicates that the SEIZ model is better than other models and it can be used to distinguish
rumors from news in Twitter. In their subsequent work, Jin et al. [141] perform a quantitative analysis
on Twitter during the Ebola crisis in 2014. By leveraging the SEIZ model, they show that rumors
spread in Twitter the same way as legitimate news.
Doerr et al. [86] use a mathematical approach to prove that rumors spread fast in OSNs (similar
finding with Vosoughi et al. [302]). For their simulations they used real networks that represent
the Twitter and Orkut Social Networks topologies obtained from [67] and SNAP [20], respectively.
Intuitively, rumors spread fast because of the combinations of few large-degree nodes and a large
number of small-degree nodes. That is, small-degree nodes learn a rumor once one of their adjacent
nodes knows it, and then quickly forward the rumor to all adjacent nodes. Also, the propagation
allows the diffusion of rumors between 2 large-degree nodes, thus the rapid spread of the rumor in
the network.
Several related work focus on finding the source of the rumor. Specifically, Shah et al. [271]
focus on detecting the source of the rumor in a network by defining a new rumor spreading model and
by forming the problem as a maximum likelihood estimation problem. Furthermore, they introduce
a new metric, called rumor centrality, which essentially specifies the likelihood that a particular node
is the source of the rumor. This metric is evaluated for all nodes in the network by using a simple
linear time message-passing algorithm, hence the source of the rumor can be found by selecting
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the node with the highest rumor centrality. In their evaluation, they used synthetic small-world and
scale-free real networks to apply their rumor spreading model and they show that they can distinguish
the source of a rumor with a maximum error of 7-hops for general networks, and with a maximum
error of 4-hops for tree networks. Seo et al. [270] aim to tackle the same problem by injecting
monitoring nodes on the social graph. They propose an algorithm that considers the information
received by the monitoring nodes to identify the source. They indicate that with sufficient number
of monitoring nodes they can recognize the source with high accuracy. Wang et al. [307] aim to
tackle the problem from a statistical point of view. They propose a new detection framework based
on rumor centrality, which is able to support multiple snapshots of the network during the rumor
spreading. Their evaluation based on small-world and scale-free real networks note that by using
two snapshots of the network, instead of one, can improve the source detection. Finally, Nguyen et
al. [232] aim to find the k most suspected users where a rumor originates by proposing the use of a
reverse diffusion process in conjunction with a ranking process.
Conspiracy Theories. Bessi [47] perform a statistical analysis of a large corpus (354k posts) of
conspiracy theories obtained from Facebook pages. Their analysis is based on the Extreme Value
Theory branch of statistics [6] and they find that extremely viral posts (greater than 250k shares)
follow a Poisson distribution.
3.3.3 Systems
Rumors. Finn et al. [101] propose a web-based tool, called TwitterTrails, which enables users to
study the propagation of rumors in Twitter. TwitterTrails demonstrates indications for bursty activity,
temporal characteristics of propagation, and visualizations of the re-tweet networks. Furthermore, it
offers advanced metrics for rumors such as level of visibility and community’s skepticism towards
the rumor (based on the theory of h-index [11]). Similarly, Dang et al. [78] propose RumourFlow,
which visualizes rumors propagation by adopting modeling and visualization tools. It encompasses
various analytical tools like semantic analysis and similarity to assist the user in getting a holistic
view of the rumor spreading and its various aspects. To demonstrate their system, they collect rumors
from Snopes and conversations from Reddit.
Fabricated. Shao et al. [273] propose Hoaxy, a platform that provides information about the dy-
namics of false information propagation on Twitter as well as the respective fact checking efforts.
3.3.4 Propagation of False Information - Remarks
In this section, we provided an overview of the existing work that focuses on the propagation of false
information on the Web. Some of the main take-aways from the literature review on the propagation
of false information are: 1) Accounts on social networks are created with the sole purpose of dissem-
inating false information; 2) False information is more persistent than corrections; 3) The popularity
of false information follow a bursty activity; 4) Users on Web communities create polarized com-
munities that disseminate false information; 5) Reputable or credible accounts are usually useful in
3.4. Detection and Containment of False Information 47
stopping the spread of false information; however we need to pay particular attention as previous
work (see Gupta et al. [114]) has showed that they also share false information; 6) Being able to
detect the source of false information is a first step towards stopping the spread of false information
on Web communities and several approaches exist that offer acceptable performance.
3.4 Detection and Containment of False Information
3.4.1 Detection of false information
Detecting false information is not a straightforward task, as it appears in various forms, as discussed
in Section 3.1. Table 3.3 summarizes the studies that aim to solve the false information detection
problem, as well as their considered OSNs and their methodology. Most studies try to solve the
problem using handcrafted features and conventional machine learning techniques. Recently, to
avoid using handcrafted features, the research community used neural networks to solve the problem
(i.e., Deep Learning techniques). Furthermore, we report some systems that aim to inform users
about detected false information. Finally, we also note a variety of techniques that are proposed for
the detection and containment of false information, such as epidemiological models, multivariate
Hawkes processes, and clustering. Below, we provide more details about existing work grouped by
methodology and the type of information, according to Table 3.3.
3.4.1.1 Machine Learning
Credibility Assessment. Previous work leverage machine learning techniques to assess the credibil-
ity of information. Specifically, Castillo et al. [66] analyze 2.5k trending topics from Twitter during
2010 to determine the credibility of information. For labeling their data they utilize crowdsourc-
ing tools, namely AMT, and propose the use of conventional machine learning techniques (SVM,
Decision Trees, Decision Rules, and Bayes Networks) that take into account message-based, user-
based, topic-based and propagation-based features. Gupta and Kumaraguru [112] analyze tweets
about fourteen high impact news events during 2011. They propose the use of supervised machine
learning techniques with a relevance feedback approach that aims to rank the tweets according to
their credibility score. AlRubaian et al. [37] propose the use of a multi-stage credibility assess-
ment platform that consists of a relative importance component, a classification component, and
an opinion mining component. The relative importance component requires human experts and its
main objective is to rank the features according to their importance. The classification component
is based on a Naive Bayes classifier, which is responsible for classifying tweets by taking the output
of the relative importance component (ranked features), while the opinion mining component cap-
tures the sentiment of the users that interact with the tweets. The output of the three components is
then combined to calculate an overall assessment. Ma et al. [208] observe that typically the features
of messages in microblogs vary over time and propose the use of an SVM classifier that is able to
consider the messages features in conjunction with how they vary over time. Their experimental
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Platform Machine Learning Systems Other models/algorithms
Twitter
Castillo et al. [66] (CA),
Gupta and Kumaraguru [112] (CA),
Kwon et al. [198] (R),
Yang et al. [326] (R),
Liu et al. [206] (R),
Wu et al. [322] (R),
Gupta et al. [113] (CA),
AlRubaian et al. [37] (CA),
Hamidian and Diab [118] (R),
Giasemidis et al. [106] (R) ,
Kwon et al. [196] (R),
Volkova et al. [300] (CA)
Resnick et al. [258] (R),
Vosoughi et al. [301] (R),
Jaho et al. [139] (CA)
Qazvinian et al. [251] (R)
(rumor retrieval model),
Zhao el al. [338] (R)
(clustering),
Farajtabar et al. [95] (F)
(hawkes process),
Kumar and Geethakumari [192] (F)
(algorithm with psychological cues)
Sina Weibo
Yang et al. [323] (R),
Wu et al. [321] (R),
Liang et al. [203] (R),
Zhang et al. [337] (R),
Zhou et al. [340] (CA) X
Twitter and
Sina Weibo
Ma et al. [208] (CA)
Ma et al. [207] (R)
X
Jin et al. [145] (CA)
(graph optimization)
Facebook
Tacchini et al. [289] (H),
Conti et al. [76] (CT)
X X
Wikipedia and/or
other articles
Qin et al. [252] (R),
Rubin et al. [264] (S),
Kumar et al. [194] (H),
Chen et al. [72] (CL),
Chakraborty et al. [68] (CL),
Potthast et al. [247] (CL),
Biyani et al. [50] (CL),
Wang [306] (F),
Anand et al. [40] (CL)
X
Potthast et al. [246] (B)
(unmasking)
Other
Afroz et al. [34] (H),
Maigrot et al. [210] (H),
Zannettou et al. [334] (CL)
Vukovic et al. [303] (H)
Jin et al. [143] (CA)
(hierarchical propagation model),
Chen et al. [73] (H)
(Levenshtein Distance)
Table 3.3: Studies that focus on the detection of false information on OSNs. The table demonstrates the main
methodology of each study, as well as the considered OSNs. Also, we report the type of false information that is
considered (see bold markers and cf. with Section 3.1.1, CA corresponds to Credibility Assessment and refers
to work that aim to assess the credibility of information).
evaluation, based on Twitter data provided by [66] and on a Sina Weibo dataset, indicate that the
inclusion of the time-varying features increase the performance between 3% and 10%.
All of the aforementioned work propose the use of supervised machine learning techniques. In
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contrast, Gupta et al. [113] propose a semi-supervised model that ranks tweets according to their
credibility in real-time. For training their model, they collect 10M tweets from six incidents during
2013, while they leverage CrowdFlower [3] to obtain groundtruth. Their system also includes a
browser extension that was used by approx. 1.1k users in a 3-month timespan, hence computing
the credibility score of 5.4M tweets. Their evaluation indicates that 99% of the users were able to
receive credibility scores under 6 seconds. However, feedback from users for approx. 1.2k tweets
indicate that 60% of the users disagreed with the predicted score.
Volkova et al. [300] motivated by the performance gains of deep learning techniques, propose
the use of neural networks to distinguish news into satire, hoaxes, clickbait, and propaganda news.
They collect 130k news posts from Twitter and propose the use of neural networks that use linguistic
and network features. Their findings indicate that Recurrent and Convolutional neural networks
exhibit strong performance in distinguishing news in the aforementioned categories.
Rumors. Kwon et al. [198] propose the use of Decision Trees, Random Forest, and SVM for de-
tecting rumors on Twitter. Their models leverage temporal, linguistics, and structural features from
tweets and can achieve precision and recall scores between 87% and 92%. Yang et al. [326] propose
the use of a hot topic detection mechanism that work in synergy with conventional machine learning
techniques (Naive Bayes, Logistic Regression and Random Forest). Liu et al. [206] demonstrate the
feasibility of a real-time rumoring detection system on Twitter. To achieve real-time debunking of
rumors, they propose the use of an SVM classifier that uses beliefs from the users in conjunction
with traditional rumor features from [66, 323]. Their evaluation demonstrates that for new rumors
(5-400 tweets), the proposed classifier can outperform the models from [66, 323]. Furthermore, they
compare their approach with human-based rumor debunking services (Snopes and Emergent), show-
ing that they can debunk 75% of the rumors earlier than the corresponding services. Similarly, Kwon
et al. [196] study the rumor classification task with a particular focus on the temporal aspect of the
problem, by studying the task over varying time windows on Twitter. By considering user, structural,
linguistic, and temporal features, they highlight that depending on the time window, different char-
acteristics are more important than others. For example, at early stages of the rumor propagation,
temporal and structural are not available. To this end, they propose a rumor classification algorithm
that achieves satisfactory accuracy both on short and long time windows.
Hamidian and Diab [118] propose a supevised model that is based on the Tweet Latent Vector
(TLV), which is an 100-dimensional vector, proposed by the authors, that encapsulates the seman-
tics behind a particular tweet. For the classification task, they use an SVM Tree Kernel model
that achieves 97% on two Twitter datasets. Giasemidis et al. [106] study 72 rumors in Twitter by
identifying 80 features for classifying false and true rumors. These features include diffusion and
temporal dynamics, linguistics, as well as user-related features. For classifying tweets, they use
several machine learning techniques and conclude that Decision Trees achieve the best performance
with an accuracy of 96%. Yang et al. [323] study the rumor detection problem in the Sina Weibo
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OSN. For the automatic classification task of the posts they use SVMs that take as input various fea-
tures ranging from content-based to user- and location-based features. Their evaluation shows that
the classifier achieves an accuracy of approximately 78%. Similarly to the aforementioned work,
Wu et al. [321] try to tackle the rumor detection problem in the Sina Weibo OSN by leveraging
SVMs. Specifically, they propose an SVM classifier which is able to combine a normal radial ba-
sis function, which captures high level semantic features, and a random walk graph kernel, which
captures the similarities between propagation trees. These trees encompass various details such as
temporal behavior, sentiment of re-posts, and user details. Liang et al. [203] study the problem of
rumor detection using machine learning solutions that take into account users’ behavior in the Sina
Weibo OSN. Specifically, they introduce 3 new features that are shown to provide up to 20% im-
provement when compared with baselines. These features are: 1) average number of followees per
day; 2) average number of posts per day; and 3) number of possible microblog sources. Zhang et
al. [337] propose various implicit features that can assist in the detection of rumors. Specifically,
they evaluate an SVM classifier against the Sina Weibo dataset proposed in [323] with the following
features: 1) content-based implicit features (sentiment polarity, opinion on comments and content
popularity); 2) user-based implicit features (influence of user to network, opinion re-tweet influence,
and match degree of messages) and 3) shallow message features that are proposed by the literature.
Their evaluation shows that the proposed sets of features can improve the precision and recall of
the system by 7.1% and 6.3%, respectively. Qin et al. [252] propose the use of a new set of fea-
tures for detecting rumors that aim to increase the detection accuracy; namely novelty-based and
pseudo-feedback features. The novelty-based features consider reliable news to find how similar is
a particular rumor with reliable stories. The pseudo-feedback features take into account information
from historical confirmed rumors to find similarities. To evaluate their approach, they obtain mes-
sages from the Sina Weibo OSN and news articles from Xinhua News Agency [26]. They compare
an SVM classifier, which encompasses the aforementioned set of features and a set of other features
(proposed by the literature), with the approaches proposed by [323, 206]. Their findings indicate
that their approach provides an improvement between 17% and 20% in terms of accuracy. Similarly
to [252], Wu et al. [322] propose a system that uses historical data about rumors for the detection
task. Their system consists of a feature selection module, which categorizes and selects features, and
a classifier. For constructing their dataset they use Snopes and the Twitter API to retrieve relevant
tweets, acquiring in total 10k tweets, which are manually verified by annotators. In their evaluation,
they compare their system with various baselines finding that the proposed system offers enhanced
performance in rumor detection with an increase of 12%-24% for precision, recall, and F1-score
metrics. Ma et al. [207] leverage Recurrent neural networks to solve the problem of rumor detection
in OSNs. Such techniques are able to learn hidden representations of the input without the need for
hand-crafted features. For evaluating their model, they construct two datasets; one from Twitter and
one from Sina Weibo. For the labeling of their messages they use Snopes for Twitter and the official
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rumor-busting service of Sina Weibo’s OSN. Their evaluation shows an accuracy of 91% on the Sina
Weibo dataset and 88% on the Twitter dataset.
Hoaxes. Tacchini et al. [289] study hoaxes in Facebook and argue that they can accurately discern
hoax from non-hoax posts by simply looking at the users that liked the posts. Specifically, they
propose the use of Logistic Regression that classifies posts with features based on users’ interactions.
Their evaluation demonstrate that they can identify hoaxes with an accuracy of 99%. Kumar et
al. [194] study the presence of hoaxes in Wikipedia articles by considering 20k hoax articles that are
explicitly flagged by Wikipedia editors. They find that most hoaxes are detected quickly and have
little impact, however, a small portion of these hoaxes have a significant life-span and are referenced
a lot across the Web. By comparing the ”successful” hoaxes with failed hoaxes and legitimate
articles, the authors highlight that the successful hoaxes have notable differences in terms of structure
and content. To this end, they propose the use of a Random Forest classifier to distinguish if articles
are hoaxes. Their evaluation reports that their approach achieves an accuracy of 92% and that is able
to outperform human judgments by a significant margin (20%). Maigrot et al. [210] propose the
use of a multi-modal hoax detection system that fuses the diverse modalities pertaining to a hoax.
Specifically, they take into consideration the text, the source, and the image of tweets. They observe
higher performance when using only the source or text modality instead of the combination of all
modalities.
Conspiracy Theories. Conti et al. [76] focus on identifying conspiracy theories in OSNs by consid-
ering only the structural features of the information cascade. The rationale is that such features are
difficult to be tampered by malicious users, which aim to avoid detection from classification systems.
For their dataset they use data from [48], which consist of scientific articles and conspiracy theories.
For classifying their Facebook data they propose conventional machine learning techniques and they
find that it is hard to distinguish a conspiracy theory from a scientific article by only looking at their
structural dynamics (F1 -score not exceeding 65%).
Satire. Rubin et al. [264] propose the use of satirical cues for the detection of false information on
news articles. Specifically, they propose the use of five new set of features, namely absurdity, humor,
grammar, negative affect, and punctuation. Their evaluation shows that by using an SVM algorithm
with the aforementioned set of features and others proposed by the literature, they can detect satirical
news with 90% precision and 84% recall.
Clickbait. Several studies focus on the detection of clickbait on the Web using machine learn-
ing techniques. Specifically, Chen et al. [72] propose tackling the problem using SVMs and Naive
Bayes. Also, Chakraborty et al. [68] propose the use of SVM and a browser add-on to offer a system
to users for news articles. Potthast et al. [247] proposes the use of Random Forest for detecting
clickbait tweets. Moreover, Biyani et al. [50] propose the use of Gradient Boosted Decision Trees
for clickbait detection in news articles and show that the degree of informality in the content of the
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landing page can help in finding clickbait articles. Anand et al. [40] is the first work that suggests
the use of deep learning techniques for mitigating the clickbait problem. Specifically, they propose
the use of Recurrent Neural Networks in conjunction with word2vec embeddings [222] for identify-
ing clickbait news articles. Similarly, Zannettou et al. [334] use deep learning techniques to detect
clickbaits on YouTube. Specifically, they propose a semi-supervised model based on variational
autoencoders (deep learning). Their evaluation indicates that they can detect clickbaits with satis-
factory performance and that YouTube’s recommendation engine does not consider clickbait videos
in its recommendations.
Fabricated. Wang [306] presents a dataset that consists of 12.8k manually annotated short state-
ments obtained from PolitiFact. They propose the use of Convolutional neural networks for fusing
linguistic features with metadata (e.g., who is the author of the statement). Their evaluation demon-
strates that the proposed model outperforms SVM and Logistic Regression algorithms.
3.4.1.2 Systems
Rumors. Resnick et al. [258] propose a system called RumorLens, which aims to discover rumors
in a timely manner, provide insights regarding the rumor’s validity, and visualize a rumor’s propaga-
tion. To achieve the aforementioned, RumorLens leverages data mining techniques alongside with
a visual analysis tool. However, their system raises scalability issues as it highly depends on users’
labor, which provide labeling of tweets that are subsequently used for classifying tweets related to
a particular rumor. Vosoughi et al. [301] propose a human-machine collaborative system that aims
to identify rumors by disposing irrelevant data and ranking the relevant data. Their system consists
of two components; the assertion detector and the hierarchical clustering module. The assertion de-
tector is a classifier that uses semantic and syntactic features to find tweets that contain assertions.
These tweets are then presented to the clustering module, which clusters the tweets according to
the similarity of the assertions. During their evaluation, the authors state that for a particular inci-
dent (Boston Marathon Bombings) from a dataset of 20M tweets, their system managed to discard
50% of them using the assertion detector. Furthermore, the 10M relevant tweets are clustered some-
where between 100 and 1000 clusters, something that enables users to quickly search and find useful
information easier.
Credibility Assessment. Jaho et al. [139] undertake a statistical analysis by crawling Twitter for
3 months and retrieve a dataset that includes 10M users. They propose a system that is based on
contributor-related features (e.g., reputation, influence of source, etc.), content features (e.g., popu-
larity, authenticity, etc.) and context features (e.g., coherence, cross-checking, etc.). Their system
combines all the features and outputs a single metric that corresponds to the truthfulness of the mes-
sage. Zhou et al. [340] note that calculating credibility in the granularity of message is not scalable,
therefore they propose the calculation of credibility score per event. To this end, they propose a
system that is able to collect related data from Sina Weibo using keywords and detect the credibility
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of a particular event. The credibility score is calculated by the combination of 3 sub-models; the user
model, the propagation model, and the content model. Each one of the sub-models considers one
aspect of the news and the overall score is calculated using weighted combination. The system is
trained on a dataset that contains 73 real news and 73 fake news from approximately 50k posts. Their
evaluation shows that the proposed system provides an accuracy close to 80% and that credibility
scores are calculated within 35 seconds.
Hoaxes. Vukovic et al. [303] focus on hoaxes and propose the use of a detection system for email.
The proposed system consists of a feed-forward neural network and a self-organizing map (SOM)
and it is trained on a corpus of 298 hoax and 1370 regular emails. The system achieves an accuracy
of 73% with a ratio of false positives equal to 4.9%. Afroz et al. [34] focus on detecting hoaxes
by observing changes in writing style. The intuition is that people use different linguistic features
when they try to obfuscate or change information from users. To detect hoaxes they propose the
use of an SVM classifier that takes into account the following set of features: 1) lexical features; 2)
syntactic features; 3) content features and 4) lying detection features obtained from [64, 119]. Their
evaluation on various datasets indicates that the proposed system can detect hoaxes with an accuracy
of 96%.
3.4.1.3 Other models/algorithms
Rumors. Qazvinian et al. [251] study the rumor detection problem on Twitter by retrieving tweets
regarding rumors and leveraging manual inspectors to annotate it. Specifically, the annotators were
asked whether tweets contained rumors or not and whether a user endorsed, debunked or was neu-
tral about the rumors. The resulted dataset consists of approximately 10k annotated tweets and
was analyzed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the following feature sets in identifying rumors:
1) content-based features; 2) network-based features and 3) Twitter-specific memes (hashtags and
URLs). Furthermore, the paper proposes a rumor retrieval model that achieves 95% precision. Zhao
et al. [338] are motivated by the fact that identifying false factual claims in each individual message
is intractable. To overcome this, they adapt the problem in finding whole clusters of messages that
their topic is a disputed factual claim. To do so, they search within posts to find specific phrases that
are used from users who want to seek more information or to express their skepticism. For example,
some enquiry phrases are ”Is this true?”, ”Really?” and ”What?”. Their approach uses statistical
features of the clusters in order to rank them according to the likelihood of including a disputed
claim. Their evaluations on real Twitter data indicate that among the top 50 ranked clusters, 30% of
them are confirmed rumors.
Fabricated. Farajtabar et al. [95] propose a framework for tackling false information that combines
a multivariate Hawkes process and reinforcement learning. Their evaluation highlights that their
model shows promising performance in identifying false information in real-time on Twitter. Kumar
and Geethakumari [192] measure the diffusion of false information by exploiting cues obtained from
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cognitive psychology. Specifically, they consider the consistency of the message, the coherency of
the message, the credibility of the source, and the general acceptability of the content of the message.
These cues are fused to an algorithm that aims to detect the spread of false information as soon as
possible. Their analysis on Twitter reports that the proposed algorithm has a 90% True positive rate
and a False positive rate less than 10%.
Credibility Assessment. Jin et al. [145] aim to provide verification of news by considering conflict-
ing viewpoints on Twitter and Sina Weibo. To achieve this, they propose the use of a topic model
method that identifies conflicting viewpoints. Subsequently they construct a credibility network with
all the viewpoints and they formulate the problem as a graph optimization problem, which can be
solved with an iterative approach. They compare their approach with baselines proposed in [66, 198],
showing that their solution performs better. Jin et al. [143] propose a hierarchical propagation model
to evaluate information credibility in microblogs by detecting events, sub-events, and messages. This
three-layer network assists in revealing vital information regarding information credibility. By form-
ing the problem as a graph optimization problem, they propose an iterative algorithm, that boosts the
accuracy by 6% when compared to an SVM classifier that takes into account only features obtained
from the event-level network only.
Biased. Potthast et al. [246] study the writing style of hyperpartisan news (left-wing and right-wing)
and mainstream news and how this style can be applied in hyperpartisan news detection. Their
dataset consists of 1.6k news articles from three right-wing, three left-wings, and three mainstream
news sites. For annotating the dataset they used journalists from Buzzfeed, who rated each article
according to its truthfulness. By leveraging the Unmasking approach [190], the paper demonstrates
that right-wing and left-wing hyperpartisan news exhibit similar writing style that differentiates from
the mainstream news. To this end, they propose the use of Random Forest classifier that aims to dis-
tinguish hyperpartisanship. Their evaluation indicates that their style-based classifier can distinguish
hyperpartisan news with an accuracy of 75%. However, when the same classifier is used to discern
fake or real news, then the accuracy is 55%.
Hoaxes. Chen et al. [73] propose an email hoax detection system by incorporating a text matching
method using the Levenshtein distance measure. Specifically, their system maintains a database of
hoaxes that is used to calculate the distance between a potential hoax email and the stored hoaxes.
3.4.2 Containment of false information
Several studies focus on containing the diffusion of false information. Our literature review reveals
that the majority of previous work on containment of rumors, while we also find one that focus on
Hoaxes (see Tambuscio et al. [290]). Below we provide a brief overview of the studies that try to
contain the spread of false information, while ensuring that the solutions are scalable.
Rumors. Tripathy et al. [297] propose a process, called ”anti-rumor”, which aims to mitigate the
spreading of a rumor in a network. This process involves the dissemination of messages, which
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contradict with a rumor, from agents. The authors make the assumption that once a user receives
an anti-rumor message, then he will never believe again the rumor, thus the spreading of a rumor is
mitigated. Their evaluation, based on simulations, indicates the efficacy of the proposed approach.
Budak et al. [60] formulate the problem of false information spreading as an optimization problem.
Their aim is to identify a subset of the users that need to be convinced to spread legitimate messages
in contrast with the bad ones that spread rumors. The paper shows that this problem is NP-hard
and they propose a greedy solution as well as some heuristics to cope with scalability issues. Fan et
al. [94] try to tackle the problem of false information propagation under the assumption that rumors
originate from a particular community in the network. Similarly to other work, the paper tries to
find a minimum set of individuals, which are neighbors with the rumor community to stop the rumor
diffusion in the rest of the network. To achieve this, they propose the use of two greedy-based algo-
rithms, which are evaluated in two real-world networks (Arxiv Hep and Enron). Their experimental
results show that the proposed algorithms outperform simple heuristics in terms of the number of
infected nodes in the network. However, as noted, the greedy algorithms are time consuming and are
not applicable in large-scale networks. Kotnis et al. [191] propose a solution for stopping the spread
of false information by training a set of individuals in a network that aim to distinguish and stop the
propagation of rumors. This set of individuals is selected based on their degree in the network with
the goal to minimize the overarching training costs. For evaluating their solution they create a syn-
thetic network, which takes into account a calculated network degree distribution, based on [225].
Ping et al. [243] leverage Twitter data to demonstrate that sybils presence in OSNs can decrease the
effectiveness of community-based rumor blocking approaches by 30%. To this end, they propose
a Sybil-aware rumor blocking approach, which finds a subset of nodes to block by considering the
network structure in conjunction with the probabilities of nodes being sybils. Their evaluation, via
simulations on Twitter data, show that the proposed approach significantly decreases the number
of affected nodes, when compared to existing approaches. He et al. [122] argue that existing false
information containment approaches have different costs and efficiencies in different OSNs. To this
end, they propose an optimization method that combines the spreading of anti-rumors and the block
of rumors from influential users. The goal of their approach is to minimize the overarching cost
of the method while containing the rumor within an expected deadline. To achieve this, they use
the Pontryagin’s maximum principle [189] on the Digg2009 dataset [129]. They find that spreading
the truth plays a significant role at the start of the rumor propagation, whereas close to the deadline
of containment the blocking of rumors approach should be used extensively. Huang et al. [133]
aim to contain the false information spread by finding and decontaminating with good information,
the smallest set of influential users in a network. To do so, they propose a greedy algorithm and
a community-based heuristic, which takes into consideration the community structure of the un-
derlying network. For evaluating their approach, they used traces from three networks; NetHEPT,
NetHEPT WC and Facebook. Previous studies on false information containment [60, 233] assumed
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that when true and false information arrive the same time at a particular node, then the true infor-
mation dominates. Wang et al. [305] state that the dominance of the information should be based
on the influence of the neighbors in the network. With this problem formulation in mind, the paper
proposes two approaches to find the smallest number of nodes that are required to stop the false
information spread. Their evaluation is based on three networks obtained from Twitter, Friend-
ster, and a random synthetic network. Evaluation comparisons with simple heuristics (random and
high degree) demonstrate the performance benefits of the proposed approaches. In a similar notion,
Tong et al. [295] aim to increase performance motivated by the fact that greedy solutions, which
include Monte Carlo simulations, are inefficient as they are computationally intensive. To over-
come this, the paper proposes a random-based approach, which utilizes sampling with the aim to be
both effective and efficient. The performance evaluations on real-world (obtained from Wikipedia
and Epinions [5]) and synthetic networks demonstrate that the proposed solution can provide a 10x
speed-up without compromising performance when compared to state-of-the-art approaches. Wang
et al. [304] propose a model, called DRIMUX, which aims to minimize the influence of rumors by
blocking a subset of nodes while considering users’ experience. User experience is defined as a time
threshold that a particular node is willing to wait while being blocked. Their model utilizes survival
theory and takes into account global rumor popularity features, individual tendencies (how likely is
a rumor to propagate between a pair of nodes) as well as the users’ experience. Their evaluations
on a Sina Weibo network, which consists of 23k nodes and 183k edges, indicate that the proposed
model can reduce the overarching influence of false information.
Hoaxes. Tambuscio et al. [290] simulate the spread and debunking of hoaxes on networks. Specif-
ically, they model the problem as a competition between believers (acknowledge the hoax) and fact
checkers which reveal the hoax with a specific probability. To study their model they performed
simulations on scale-free and random networks finding that a specific threshold for the probability
of fact checkers exists and this indicates that the spread can be stopped with a specific number of
fact checkers. However, the paper oversimplifies the problem by assuming all the nodes to have the
same probability.
3.4.3 Detection and Containment of False Information - Remarks
The main findings from the literature review of the detection and containment of false information
are: 1) Machine learning techniques can assist in identifying false information. However, they heav-
ily rely on handcrafted set of features and it is unclear if they generalize well on other datasets;
2) Containment of false information can be achieved by adding a set of good nodes that dissem-
inate good information or information that refute false; and 3) The problem of detection of false
information requires human-machine collaboration for effectively mitigating it.
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3.5 False Information in the political stage
Recently, after the 2016 US elections, the problem of false information dissemination got extensive
interest from the community. Specifically, Facebook got openly accused for disseminating false
information and that affected the outcome of the elections [7]. It is evident that dissemination of
false information on the Web is used a lot for political influence. Therefore in this section we review
the most relevant studies on the political stage. Table 3.4 reports the reviewed work as well as the
main methodology and considered OSN.
3.5.1 Machine Learning
Propaganda. Ratkiewicz et al. [256] study political campaigns on Twitter that use multiple con-
trolled accounts to disseminate support for an individual or opinion. They propose the use of a
machine learning-based framework in order to detect the early stages of the spreading of political
false information on Twitter. Specifically, they propose a framework that takes into consideration
topological, content-based and crowdsourced features of the information diffusion in Twitter. Their
experimental evaluation demonstrates that the proposed framework achieves more than 96% accu-
racy in the detection of political campaigns for data pertaining to the 2010 US midterm elections.
Conover et al. [75] study Twitter on a six-week period leading to the 2010 US midterm elections
and the interactions between right and left leaning communities. They leverage clustering algo-
rithms and manually annotated data to create the re-tweets and mentions networks. Their findings
indicate that the re-tweet network has limited connectivity between the right and left leaning com-
munities, whereas this is not the case in the mentions networks. This is because, users try to inject
different opinions on users with different ideologies, by using mentions on tweets, so that they
change their stance towards a political individual or situation. Ferrara et al. [99] propose the use of
a k-nearest neighbor algorithm with a dynamic warping classifier in order to capture promoted cam-
paigns in Twitter. By extracting a variety of features (user-related, timing-related, content-related
and sentiment-related features) from a large corpus of tweets they demonstrate that they can distin-
guish promoted campaigns with an AUC score close to 95% in a timely manner.
Biased. Zhou et al. [339] study Digg, a news aggregator site, and aim to classify users and articles
to either liberal or conservative. To achieve this, they propose three semi-supervised propagation
algorithms that classify users and articles based on users’ votes. The algorithms make use of a few
labeled users and articles to predict a large corpus of unlabeled users and articles. The algorithms
are based on the assumption that a liberal user is more likely to vote for a liberal article rather than
a conservative article. Their evaluations demonstrate that the best algorithm achieves 99% and 96%
accuracy on the dataset of users and articles, respectively. Budak et al. [61] use Logistic Regression
to identify articles regarding politics from a large corpus of 803K articles obtained from 15 major
US news outlets. Their algorithm filtered out 86% of the articles as non-political related, while
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Platform Machine Learning OSN Data Analysis Other models/algorithms
Twitter
Ratkiewicz et al. [256] (P),
Conover et al.[75] (P),
Ferrara et al.[99] (P)
Wong et al. [319] (B),
Golbeck and Hansen [109] (B),
Jackson and Welles [137] (P),
Hegelich and Janetzko[123] (P),
Zannettou et al. [332] (P)
Howard and Kollanyi[132] (P),
Shin et al.[275] (R)
An et al. [38] (B)
(distance model),
Al-khateeb and Agarwal [35] (P)
(social studies)
Ranganath et al.[255] (P)
(exhaustive search),
Jin et al. [142] (R)
(text similarity),
Yang et al. [324] (B)
(agenda-setting tool)
Digg Zhou et al.[339] (B) X X
Sina Weibo X
King et al. [152] (P),
Yang et al. [325] (P)
X
News articles Budak et al. [61] (B) Woolley[320] (P) X
Facebook X Allcot and Gentzkow[36] (P) X
Table 3.4: Studies on the false information ecosystem on the political stage. The table demonstrates the main
methodology of each study as well as the considered OSNs.
a small subset of the remainder (approx. 11%) were presented to workers on AMT. The workers
were asked to answer questions regarding the topic of the article, whether the article was descriptive
or opinionated, the level of partisanship, and the level of bias towards democrats or republicans.
Their empirical findings are that on these articles there are no clear indications of partisanship, some
articles within the same outlet are left-leaning and some have right-leaning, hence reducing the
overall outlet bias. Also, they note that usually bias in news articles is expressed by criticizing the
opposed party rather than promoting the supporting party.
3.5.2 OSN Data Analysis
Biased. Wong et al. [319] collect and analyze 119M tweets pertaining to the 2012 US presidential
election to quantify political leaning of users and news outlets. By formulating the problem as an
ill-posed linear inverse problem, they propose an inference engine that considers tweeting behavior
of articles. Having demonstrated their inference engine, the authors report results for the political
leaning scores of news sources and users on Twitter. Golbeck and Hansen [109] provide a technique
to estimate audience preferences in a given domain on Twitter, with a particular focus on political
preferences. Different from methods that assess audience preference based on citation networks of
news sources as a proxy, they directly measure the audience itself via their social network. Their
technique is composed of three steps: 1) apply ground truth scores (they used Americans for Demo-
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cratic Action reports as well as DW-Nominate scores) to a set of seed nodes in the network, 2) map
these scores to the seed group’s followers to create “P-scores”, and 3) map the P-scores to the target
of interest (e.g., government agencies or think tanks). One important take away from this work is
that Republicans are over-represented on Twitter with respect to their representation in Congress,
at least during the 2012 election cycle. To deal with this, they built a balanced dataset by randomly
sampling from bins formed by the number of followers a seed group account had.
Propaganda. Jackson and Welles [137] demonstrate how Twitter can be exploited to organize and
promote counter narratives. To do so, they investigate the misuse of a Twitter hashtag (#myNYPD)
during the 2014 New York City Police Department public relations campaign. In this campaign, this
hashtag was greatly disseminated to promote counter narratives about racism and police misconduct.
The authors leverage network and qualitative discourse analysis to study the structure and strategies
used for promoting counterpublic narratives.
Hegelich and Janetzko [123] investigate whether bots on Twitter are used as political actors.
By exposing and analyzing 1.7K bots on Twitter, during the Russian/Ukrainian conflict, they find
that the botnet has a political agenda and that bots exhibit various behaviors. Specifically, they find
that bots try to hide their identity, to be interesting by promoting topics through the use of hashtags
and retweets. Howard and Kollanyi [132] focus on the 2016 UK referendum and the role of bots in
the conversations on Twitter. They analyze 1.5M tweets from 313K Twitter accounts collected by
searching specific hashtags related to the referendum. Their analysis indicates that most of the tweets
are in favor of exiting the EU, there are bots with different levels of automation and that 1% of the
accounts generate 33% of the overall messages. They also note that among the top sharers, there are
a lot of bot accounts that are mostly retweeting and not generating new content. In a similar work,
Howard et al. [131] study Twitter behavior during the second 2016 US Presidential Debate. They
find that Twitter activity is more pro-Trump and that a lot of activity is driven by bots. However,
they note that a substantial amount of tweets is original content posted from regular Twitter users.
Woolley [320] analyzes several articles regarding the use of bots in OSNs for political purposes.
Specifically, he undertakes a qualitative content analysis on 41 articles regarding political bots from
various countries obtained from the Web. One of his main findings is that the use of bots varies from
country to country and that some countries (e.g., Argentina, China, Russia, USA, etc.) use political
bots on more than one type of event. For example, they report the use of Chinese political bots for
elections, for protests and for security reasons.
In the Chinese political stage, during December 2014, an anonymous blogger released an
archive of emails pertaining to the employment of Wumao, a group of people that gets paid to
disseminate propaganda on social media, from the Chinese government. King et al. [152] analyzed
these leaks and found out 43K posts that were posted by Wumao. Their main findings are: 1) by
analyzing the time-series of these posts, they find bursty activity, hence signs of coordination of the
posters; 2) most of the posters are individuals working for the government; and 3) by analyzing
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the content of the message, they note that posters usually post messages for distraction rather than
discussions of controversial matters (i.e., supporting China’s regime instead of discussing an event).
Similarly to the previous work, Yang et al. [325] study the Wumao by analyzing 26M posts from
2.7M users on the Sina Weibo OSN, aiming to provide insights regarding the behavior and the size of
Wumao. Due to the lack of ground truth data, they use clustering and topic modeling techniques, in
order to cluster users that post politics-related messages with similar topics. By manually checking
the users on the produced clusters, they conclude that users that post pro-government messages are
distributed across multiple clusters, hence there is no signs of coordination of the Wumao on Sina
Weibo for the period of their dataset (August 2012 and August 2013).
Zannettou et al. [332] study Russian state-sponsored troll accounts and measure the influence
they had on Twitter and other Web communities. They find that Russian trolls were involved in the
discussion of political events, and that they exhibit different behavior when compared to random
users. Finally, they show that their influence was not substantial, with the exception of the dissem-
ination of articles from state-sponsored Russian news outlets like Russia Today (RT). Allcot and
Gentzkow [36] make a large scale analysis on Facebook during the period of the 2016 US election.
Their results provide the following interesting statistics about the US election: 1) 115 pro-Trump
fake stories are shared 30M times, whereas 41 pro-Clinton fake stories are shared 7.6M times. This
indicates that fake news stories that favor Trump are more profound in Facebook. 2) The afore-
mentioned 37.6M shares translates to 760M instances of a user clicking to the news articles. This
indicates the high reachability of the fake news stories to end-users. 3) By undertaking a 1200-
person survey, they highlight that a user’s education, age and overall media consumption are the
most important factors that determine whether a user can distinguish false headlines.
Rumors. Shin et al. [275] undertake a content-based analysis on 330K tweets pertaining to the 2012
US election. Their findings agree with existing literature, noting that users that spread rumors are
mostly sharing messages against a political person. Furthermore, they highlight the resilience of
rumors despite the fact that rumor debunking evidence was disseminated in Twitter; however, this
does not apply for rumors that originate from satire websites.
3.5.3 Other models/algorithms
Biased. An et al. [38] study the interactions of 7M followers of 24 US news outlets on Twitter,
in order to identify political leaning. To achieve this, they create a distance model, based on co-
subscription relationships, that maps news sources to a dimensional dichotomous political spectrum.
Also, they propose a real-time application, which utilizes the underlying model, and visualizes the
ideology of the various news sources. Yang et al. [324] investigate the topics of discussions on
Twitter for 51 US political persons, including President Obama. The main finding of this work is that
Republicans and Democrats are similarly active on Twitter with the difference that Democrats tend
to use hashtags more frequently. Furthermore, by utilizing a graph that demonstrates the similarity
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of the agenda of each political person, they highlight that Republicans are more clustered. This
indicates that Republicans tend to share more tweets regarding their party’s issues and agenda.
Propaganda. Al-khateeb and Agarwal [35] study the dissemination of propaganda on Twitter from
terrorist organizations ( namely ISIS). They propose a framework based on social studies that aim to
identify social and behavioral patterns of propaganda messages disseminated by a botnet. Their main
findings are that bots exhibit similar behaviors (i.e., similar sharing patterns, similar usernames, lot
of tweets in a short period of time) and that they share information that contains URLs to other sites
and blogs. Ranganath et al. [255] focus on the detection of political advocates (individuals that use
social media to strategically push a political agenda) on Twitter. The authors note that identifying
advocates is not a straightforward task due to the nuanced and diverse message construction and
propagation strategies. To overcome this, they propose a framework that aims to model all the
different propagation and message construction strategies of advocates. Their evaluation on two
datasets on Twitter regarding gun rights and elections demonstrate that the proposed framework
achieves good performance with a 93% AUC score.
Rumors. Jin et al. [142] study the 2016 US Election through the Twitter activity of the follow-
ers of the two presidential candidates. For identifying rumors, they collect rumor articles from
Snopes and then they use text similarity algorithms based on: 1) Term frequency-inverse document
frequency (TF-IDF); 2) BM25 proposed in [260] 3) Word2Vec embeddings [222]; 4) Doc2Vec em-
beddings [199]; 5) Lexicon used in [338]. Their evaluation indicates that the best performance is
achieved using the BM25-based approach. This algorithm is subsequently used to classify the tweets
of the candidates’ followers. Based on the predictions of the algorithm, their main findings are: 1)
rumors are more prevalent during election period; 2) most of the rumors are posted by a small group
of users; 3) rumors are mainly posted to debunk rumors that are against their presidential candidate,
or to inflict damage on the other candidate; and 4) rumor sharing behavior increases in key points of
the presidential campaign and in emergency events.
3.5.4 False information in political stage - Remarks
The main insights from the review of work that focus on the political stage are: 1) Temporal analy-
sis can by leveraged to assess coordination of bots, state-sponsored actors, and orchestrated efforts
on disseminating political false information; 2) Bots are extensively used for the dissemination of
political false information; 3) Machine learning techniques can assist in detecting political false in-
formation and political leaning of users. However, there are concerns about the generalization of
such solutions on other datasets/domains; and 4) Political campaigns are responsible for the sub-
stantial dissemination of political false information in mainstream Web communities.
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3.6 Other related work
In this section we shall present work that is relevant to the false information ecosystem that does
not fit in the aforementioned lines of work. Specifically, we group these studies in the following
categories: 1) General Studies; 2) Systems; and 3) Use of images on the false information ecosystem.
3.6.1 General Studies
Credibility Assessment. Buntain and Golbeck [62] compare the accuracy of models that use fea-
tures based on journalists assessments and crowdsourced assessments. They indicate that there is
small overlap between the two features sets despite the fact that they provide statistically correlated
results. This indicates that crowdsourcing workers discern different aspects of the stories when com-
pared to journalists. Finally, they demonstrate that models that utilize features from crowdsourcing
outperform the models that utilize features from journalists. Zhang et al. [336] present a set of in-
dicators that can used to assess the credibility of articles. To find these indicators they use a diverse
set of experts (coming from multiple disciplines), which analyzed and annotated 40 news articles.
Despite the low number of annotated articles, this inter-disciplinary study is important as it can help
in defining standards for assessing the credibility of content on the Web. Mangolin et al. [212] study
the interplay between fact-checkers and rumor spreaders on social networks finding that users are
more likely to correct themselves if the correction comes from a user they follow when compared to
a stranger.
Conspiracy Theories. Starbird [285] performs a qualitative analysis on Twitter regarding shooting
events and conspiracy theories. Using graph analysis on the domains linked from the tweets, she
provides insight on how various websites work to promote conspiracy theories and push political
agendas.
Fabricated. Horne and Adah [130] focus on the headline of fake and real news. Their analysis on
three datasets of news articles highlight that fake news have substantial differences in their structure
when compared with real news. Specifically, they report that generally the structure of the content
and the headline is different. That is, fake news are smaller in size, use simple words, and use longer
and “clickbaity” headlines. Potts et al. [248] study Reddit and 4chan and how their interface is a part
of their culture that affects their information sharing behavior. They analyze the information shared
on these two platforms during the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. Their findings highlight that
users on both sites tried to find the perpetrator of the attack by creating conversations for the attack,
usually containing false information. Bode and Vraga [54] propose a new function on Facebook,
which allow users to observe related stories that either confirm or correct false information; they
highlight that using this function users acquire a better understanding of the information and its
credibility. Finally, Pennycook and Rand [241] highlight that by attaching warnings to news articles
can help users to better assess the credibility of articles, however news articles that are not attached
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with warnings are considered as validated, which is not always true, hence users are tricked.
Propaganda. Chen et al. [70] study the behavior of hidden paid posters on OSNs. To better under-
stand how these actors work, an author of this work posed as a hidden paid poster for a site[18] that
gives users the option to be hidden paid posters. This task revealed valuable information regarding
the organization of such sites and the behavior of the hidden paid posters, who are assigned with
missions that need to be accomplished within a deadline. For example, a mission can be about post-
ing articles of a particular content on different sites. A manager of the site can verify the completion
of the task and then the hidden paid poster gets paid. To further study the problem, they collect data
,pertaining to a dispute between two big Chinese IT companies, from users of 2 popular Chinese
news sites (namely Sohu [22] and Sina [19]). During this conflict there were strong suspicions that
both companies employed hidden paid posters to disseminate false information that aimed to inflict
damage to the other company. By undertaking statistical and semantic analysis on the hidden paid
posters’ content they uncover a lot of useful features that can be used in identifying hidden paid
posters. To this end, they propose the use of SVMs in order to detect such users by taking into
consideration statistical and semantic features; their evaluation show that they can detect users with
88% accuracy.
Rumors. Starbird et al. [287] study and identify various types of expressed uncertainty within
posts in OSN during a rumor’s lifetime. To analyze the uncertainty degree in messages, the paper
acquires 15M tweets related to two crisis incidents (Boston Bombings and Sydney Siege). They
find that specific linguistic patterns are used in rumor-related tweets. Their findings can be used
in future detection systems in order to detect rumors effectively in a timely manner. Zubiaga et
al. [343] propose a different approach in collecting and preparing datasets for false information
detection. Instead of finding rumors from busting websites and then retrieving data from OSNs, they
propose the retrieval of OSN data that will subsequently annotated by humans. In their evaluation,
they retrieve tweets pertaining to the Ferguson unrest incident during 2014. They utilize journalists
that act as annotators with the aim to label the tweets and their conversations. Specifically, the
journalists annotated 1.1k tweets, which can be categorized into 42 different stories. Their findings
show that 24.6% of the tweets are rumorous. FInally, Spiro et al. [283] undertake a quantitative
analysis on tweets pertaining to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. They note that media coverage
increased the number of tweets related to the disaster. Furthermore, they observe that retweets are
more commonly transmitted serially when they have event-related keywords.
3.6.2 Systems
Biased. Park et al. [239] note that biased information is profoundly disseminated in OSNs. To
alleviate this problem, they propose NewsCube: a service that aims to provide end-users with all
the different aspects of a particular story. In this way, end-users can read and understand the stories
from multiple perspectives hence assisting in the formulation of their own unbiased view for the
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story. To achieve this, they perform structure-based extraction of the different aspects that exist in
news stories. These aspects are then clustered in order to be presented to the end-users. To evaluate
the effectiveness of their system, they undertake several user studies that aim to demonstrate the
effectiveness in terms of the ability of the users to construct balanced views when using the platform.
Their results indicate that 16 out of 33 participants stated that the platform helped them formulate a
balanced view of the story, 2 out of 33 were negative, whereas the rest were neutral.
Credibility Assessment. Hassan et al. [120] propose FactWatcher, a system that reports facts that
can be used as leads in stories. Their system is heavily based on a database and offers useful features
to it’s users such as ranking of the facts, keyword-based search and fact-to-statement translation.
Ennals et al. [90] describe the design and implementation of Dispute Finder, which is a browser
extension that allows users to be warned about claims that are disputed by sources that they might
trust. Dispute Finder maintains a database with well-known disputed claims which are used to inform
end-users in real-time while they are reading stories. Users are also able to contribute to the whole
process by explicitly flagging content as disputed, or as evidence to dispute other claims. In the case
of providing evidence, the system requires a reference to a trusted source that supports the user’s
actions, thus ensuring the quality of user’s manual annotations. Mitra and Gilbert [223] propose
CREDBANK that aims to process large datasets by combining machine and human computations.
The former is used to summarize tweets in events, while the latter is responsible for assessing the
credibility of the content. Pirolli et al. [244] focus on Wikipedia and develop and system that presents
users an interactive dashboard, which includes the history of article content and edits. The main
finding is that users can better judge the credibility of an article, given that they are presented with
the history of the article and edits through an interactive dashboard.
3.6.3 Use of images on the false information ecosystem
Information can be disseminated via images on the Web. The use of images increases the credibility
of the included information, as users tend to believe more information that is substantiated with an
image. However, nowadays, images can be easily manipulated, hence used for the dissemination of
false information. In this section, we provide an overview of the papers that studied the problem of
false information on the Web, while considering images.
Fabricated. Boididou et al. [56, 55] focus on the use of multimedia in false information spread in
OSNs. In [55] they prepare and propose a dataset of 12K tweets, which are manually labeled as
fake, true, or unknown. A tweet is regarded as true if the image is referring to a particular event and
fake if the image is not referring to a particular event. The authors argue that this dataset can help
researchers in the task of automated identification of fake multimedia within tweets. In [56] they
study the challenges that exist in providing an automated verification system for news that contain
multimedia. To this end, they propose the use of conventional classifiers with the aim to discern fake
multimedia pertaining to real events. Their findings demonstrate that generalizing is extremely hard
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as their classifiers perform poorly (58% accuracy) when they are trained with a particular event and
they are tested with another. Diego Saez-Trumper [268] proposes a Web application, called Fake
Tweet Buster, that aims to warn users about tweets that contain false information through images or
users that habitually diffuse false information. The proposed approach is based on the reverse image
search technique (using Google Images) in order to determine the origin of the image, its age and
its context. Furthermore, the application considers user attributes and crowdsourcing data in order
to find users that consistently share tweets that contain false information on images. Pasquini et
al. [240] aim to provide image verification by proposing an empirical system that seeks visually and
semantically related images on the web. Specifically, their system utilizes news articles metadata
in order to search, using Google’s search engine, for relevant news articles. These images are then
compared with the original’s article images in order to identify whether the images were tampered.
To evaluate their approach, they created dummy articles with tampered images in order to simulate
the whole procedure.
Jin et al. [146] emphasize the importance of images in news articles for distinguishing its truth-
fulness. They propose the use of two sets of features extracted from images in conjunction with
features that are proposed by [66, 198]. For the image features, they define a set of visual charac-
teristics as well as overall image statistics. Their data is based on a corpus obtained from the Sina
Weibo that comprises 50K posts and 26K images. For evaluating the image feature set, they use
conventional machine learning techniques: namely SVM, Logistic Regression, KStar, and Random
Forest. They find that the proposed image features increase the accuracy by 7% with an overall ac-
curacy of 83%. In a follow-up work, Jin et al. [144] leverage deep neural networks with the goal of
distinguishing the credibility of images. They note that this task is extremely difficult as images can
be misleading in many ways. Specifically, images might be outdated (i.e., old images that are falsely
used to describe a new event), inaccurate, or even manipulated. To assess the image credibility, they
train a Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) using a large-scale auxiliary dataset that comprises
600K labeled fake and real images. Their intuition is that the CNN can extract useful hyperparam-
eters that can be used to detect eye-catching and visually striking images, which are usually used
to describe false information. Their evaluation indicates that the proposed model can outperform
several baselines in terms of the precision, recall, F1, and accuracy scores. Gupta et al. [115] focus
on the diffusion of fake images in Twitter during Hurricane Sandy in 2012. They demonstrate that
the use of automated techniques (i.e., Decision Trees) can assist in distinguishing fake images from
real ones. Interestingly, they note that the 90% of the fake images came from the top 0.3% of the
users.
Chapter 4
Understanding the Spread Of Information
Through The Lens Of Multiple Web
Communities
In this chapter, we present our work that helps in better understanding the spread of information
across the Web and how web communities influence each other. We focus on understanding the
spread of news and image-based memes across multiple Web communities, namely, Twitter, Reddit,
4chan, and Gab.
4.1 Understanding How Web Communities Influence Each
Other Through the Lens of News Sources
4.1.1 Motivation
Over the past few years, several conspiracy theories and false stories have spread on the Web. Some
examples include the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, where a large number of tweets started to
claim that the bombings were a “false flag” perpetrated by the goverment of the United States. More
recently, the Pizzagate conspiracy [314] a debunked theory connecting a restaurant and members of
the US Democratic Party to a child sex ring led to a shooting in a Washinghton DC restaurant [116].
These stories were all propagated, in no small part, via the use of “alternative” news sites like
Infowars and “fringe” Web communities like 4chan. This is mainly because the barrier of entry
for such alternative news sources has been greatly reduced by the Web and large social networks.
Due to the negligible cost of distributing information over social media, fringe sites can quickly gain
traction with large audiences.
Although previous works have studied the dissemination of false information on the Web, as
discussed in Chapter 3, very little work provides a holistic view of the modern information ecosys-
tem. This knowledge, however, is crucial for understanding the alternative news world and for
designing appropriate detection and mitigation strategies. Anecdotal evidence and press coverage
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suggest that alternative news dissemination might start on fringe sites, eventually reaching main-
stream online social networks and news outlets [309, 224]. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not
been measured and no thorough analysis has focused on how news moves from one online service
to another, sort of forming an interconnected centipede of Web Communities.
In this work, we address this gap by performing the first thorough large-scale measurement
on how mainstream and alternative news flows through three Web Communities; namely Twitter,
Reddit, and 4chan. We focus on these three platforms because of: 1) they are fundamentally different
and they drive substantial portions of the online world; 2) there is anecdotal evidence that suggests
that specific communities within Reddit and 4chan act as generators [309] and incubators [136] of
false information; and 3) they are able to have a substantial impact in forming and manipulating
peoples’ opinions by constantly circulating false information [116].
Contributions. First, we undertake a large-scale measurement and comparison of the occurrence
of mainstream and alternative news sources across three social media platforms (4chan, Reddit, and
Twitter). Then, we provide an understanding of the temporal dynamics of how URLs from news
sites are posted on the different social networks. Finally, we present a measurement of the influence
between the platforms that provides insight into how information spreads throughout the greater
Web. Overall, our findings indicate that Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan are used quite extensively for
the dissemination of both alternative and mainstream news. Using a statistical model for influence
namely, Hawkes processes we show that each of the platforms have varying degrees of in influence
on each other, and this influence differs with respect to mainstream and alternative news sources.
4.1.2 Datasets
Our analysis uses a set of news websites that can confidently be labeled as either “mainstream” or
“alternative” news. More specifically, we create a list of 99 news sites including 45 mainstream
and 54 alternative ones.1 For the former, we select 45 from the Alexa top 100 news sites, leaving
out those based on user-generated content, those serving specialized content (e.g., finance news),
as well as non-English sites. For the latter, we use Wikipedia [312] and FakeNewsWatch [9]. We
also add two state-sponsored alternative news domains: sputniknews.com and rt.com, as
they have recently attracted public attention due to their posting of controversial, and seemingly
agenda-pushing stories [82].
We gather information from posts, threads, and comments on Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan that
contain URLs from the 99 news sites. With a few gaps (see below), our datasets cover activity
on the three platforms between June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017. Table 4.1 shows the total
number of posts/comments crawled and the percentage of posts that contains links to URLs from
the aforementioned news domains. We observe that mainstream news URLs are present in a greater
1The complete list of the 99 sites is available at https://drive.google.com/open?id=0ByP5a_
_khV0dM1ZSY3YxQWF2N2c
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percentage of posts on 4chan and Reddit than on Twitter, while alternative ones are about twice as
likely to appear in posts on 4chan than on Twitter or Reddit. Table 4.2 provides a summary of our
datasets, which we present in more detail below. Note that we break Reddit and 4chan datasets into
two different instances, as further discussed.
Platform Total Posts % Alt. % Main.
Twitter 587M 0.022% 0.070%
Reddit (posts + comments) 332M 0.023% 0.181%
4chan 42M 0.050% 0.197%
Table 4.1: Total number of posts crawled and percentage of posts that contain URLs to our list of alternative
and mainstream news sites.
Platform Posts/Comments Alt. URLs Main. URLs
Twitter 486,700 42,550 236,480
Reddit (six selected subreddits) 620,530 40,046 301,840
Reddit (all other subreddits) 1,228,105 24,027 726,948
4chan (/pol/) 90,537 8,963 40,164
4chan (/int/, /sci/, /sp/) 7,131 615 5,513
Table 4.2: Overview of our datasets with the number of posts/comments that contain a URL to one of our
information sources, as well as the number of unique URLs linking to alternative and mainstream news sites in
our list.
Twitter. We collect the 1% of all publicly available tweets with URLs from the aforementioned
news domains between June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017 using the Twitter Streaming API [24].
In total, we gather 487K tweets containing 279K unique URLs pointing to mainstream or alternative
news sites. Since tweets are retrieved at the time they are posted, we do not get information such as
the number of times they are re-tweeted or liked. Therefore, between March and May 2017, we re-
crawled each tweet to retrieve this data. Basic statistics are summarized in Table 4.3. Due to a failure
in our collection infrastructure, we have some gaps in the Twitter dataset, specifically between Oct
28–Nov 2 and Nov 5–16, 2016, as well as Nov 22, 2016 – Jan 13, 2017, and Feb 24–28, 2017.
Tweets Retrieved (%) Avg. Retweets Avg. Likes
Alternative 110,629 92,104 (83.2%) 341 ± 1,228 0.82 ± 15.6
Mainstream 376,071 329,950 (87.7%) 404 ± 2,146 0.96 ± 55.6
Table 4.3: Basic statistics of the occurrence of alternative and mainstream news URLs in the tweets in our
dataset.
Reddit. We obtain all posts and comments on Reddit between June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017,
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Subreddit (Alt.) (%) Subreddit (Alt.) (%) Subreddit (Main.) (%) Subreddit (Main.) (%)
The Donald 35.37 % KotakuInAction 1.04 % politics 12.9 % EnoughTrumpSpam 1.20 %
politics 8.21 % HillaryForPrison 0.94 % worldnews 6.24 % NoFilterNews 1.16 %
news 3.85 % TheOnion 0.94 % The Donald 4.53 % BreakingNews24hr 1.07 %
conspiracy 3.84 % AskTrumpSupporters 0.84 % news 4.23 % conspiracy 0.89 %
Uncensored 2.66 % POLITIC 0.81 % TheColorIsBlue 3.06 % todayilearned 0.83 %
Health 2.10 % rss theonion 0.67 % TheColorIsRed 2.48 % thenewsrightnow 0.78 %
PoliticsAll 1.54 % the Europe 0.67 % willis7737 news 2.27 % europe 0.77 %
Conservative 1.45 % new right 0.6 % news etc 1.94 % ReddLineNews 0.75 %
worldnews 1.41 % AskReddit 0.59 % AskReddit 1.37 % hillaryclinton 0.73 %
WhiteRights 1.21 % AnythingGoesNews 0.51 % canada 1.31 % nottheonion 0.73 %
Table 4.4: Top 20 subreddits w.r.t. mainstream and alternative news URLs occurrence and their percentage in
Reddit (all subreddits).
using data made available on Pushshift [16]. We collect approximately 42M posts, 390M comments,
and 300K subreddits. Once again, we filter posts and comments that contain URLs from one of the
99 news sites, which yields a dataset of 1.8M posts/comments and approximately 1.1M URLs.
4chan. For 4chan, we use all threads and posts made on the Politically Incorrect (/pol/) board,
as well as /sp/ (Sports), /int/ (International), and /sci/ (Science) boards for comparison, using the
same methodology as [128]. We opt to select both not safe for work boards (i.e., /pol/) and safe
for work boards (i.e., /sp/, /int/, and /sci/) to observe how these compare to each other with respect
to the dissemination of news. The resulting dataset includes 97K posts and replies, including 56K
alternative and mainstream news URLs, between June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017. We have
some small gaps due to our crawler failing, specifically, Oct 15–16 and Dec 16–25, 2016 as well as
Jan 10–13, 2017.
4.1.3 General Characterization
In this section, we present a general characterization of the mainstream and alternative news URLs
found on the three platforms.
Reddit. We start by identifying news and politics communities. In Table 4.4, we report the top
20 subreddits with the most URLs, along with their percentage. Note that we omit automated ones
(e.g., /r/AutoNewspaper/) where news articles are posted without user intervention. Many of the
subreddits are indeed related to news and politics – e.g., ‘The Donald’ is mostly a community of
Donald Trump supporters, while ‘worldnews’ is focused around globally relevant events. We also
find the presence of the ‘conspiracy’ subreddit, which has been involved in disinformation campaigns
including Pizzagate, as well as ‘AskReddit,’ where both mainstream and alternative news sources
are used to answer questions submitted by users. Although the latter is intended for open-ended
questions that spark discussion, it is evident that commenters often try to push their agenda even
in non-political threads. In the end, based on their propensity to include news URLs of both types,
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we single out the follow top six subreddits for further exploration: The Donald, politics, conspiracy,
news, worldnews, and AskReddit.
Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%)
breitbart.com 55.58 % prntly.com 0.49 % nytimes.com 14.07 % nbcnews.com 2.86 %
rt.com 19.18 % dccclothesline.com 0.4 % cnn.com 11.23 % time.com 2.57 %
infowars.com 8.99 % worldnewsdailyreport.com 0.36 % theguardian.com 8.86 % washinghtontimes.com 2.52 %
sputniknews.com 3.95 % therealstrategy.com 0.3 % reuters.com 6.67 % bloomberg.com 2.5 %
beforeitsnews.com 2.34 % disclose.tv 0.23 % huffingtonpost.com 5.67 % wsj.com 2.31 %
lifezette.com 2.28 % clickhole.com 0.2 % thehill.com 5.15 % cbsnews.com 2.26 %
naturalnews.com 1.54 % libertywritersnews.com 0.2 % foxnews.com 4.89 % thedailybeast.com 2.05 %
activistpost.com 1.45 % worldtruth.tv 0.14 % bbc.com 4.76 % forbes.com 1.87 %
veteranstoday.com 1.11 % thelastlineofdefence.org 0.07 % abcnews.go.com 2.94 % nypost.com 1.85 %
redflagnews.com 0.63 % nodisinfo.com 0.05 % usatoday.com 2.87 % cncb.com 1.54 %
Table 4.5: Top 20 mainstream and alternative domains and their percentage in the six selected subreddits.
In order to get a better view of the popularity of news sites on the six subreddits, we study
the occurrence of each news outlet. Specifically, we find 76K URLs (40K unique) from alterna-
tive news and 600K (301K unique) from mainstream news domains. Table 4.5 reports the top 20
mainstream/alternative news sites and their percentage in the six subreddits. The top 20 domains
for mainstream news account for 89% of all mainstream news URLs in our data, while for alter-
native domains the percentage is 99%. Known alt-right news outlets, such as breitbart.com
and infowars.com, are predominantly present, as well as state-sponsored alternative domains
like sputniknews.com and rt.com, which have recently been in the spotlight for disseminat-
ing false information and propaganda [82]. The fact that many such URLs appear in our dataset
may indeed be an indication that the six subreddits significantly contribute to the dissemination of
controversial stories.
Twitter. In our Twitter dataset, we find 129K (42K unique) URLs of alternative news domains and
413K (236K unique) URLs of mainstream ones. Recall that we re-crawl tweets to get the number of
retweets and likes, and a small percentage of them are no longer available as they were either deleted
or the associated account was suspended. This percentage is slightly higher for tweets with URLs
from alternative news, possibly due to the fact that some users tend to remove controversial content
when a particular false story is debunked [103]. Also, alternative and mainstream news tend to get a
significant number of retweets, at about the same rate (on average, 404 and 341 retweets per tweet,
respectively). A similar pattern is observed for likes (see Table 4.3).
In Table 4.6, we report the top 20 mainstream and alternative news domains, and their percent-
age, in our Twitter dataset. These cover, respectively, 86% and 99% of all URLs. Similar to Reddit,
there are many popular alt-right and state-sponsored news outlets.
4chan. In our /pol/ dataset, we find 21K (9K unique) URLs to alternative news outlets and 82K (40K
unique) to mainstream news. Table 4.7 reports the percentage of URLs of the top 20 domains for each
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Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%)
breitbart.com 46.04 % activistpost.com 0.41 % theguardian.com 19.04 % usatoday.com 2.02 %
rt.com 17.56 % disclose.tv 0.39 % nytimes.com 10.07 % thedailybeast.com 2.02 %
infowars.com 17.25 % prntly.com 0.26 % bbc.com 8.99 % nbcnews.com 1.96 %
therealstrategy.com 5.63 % worldtruth.tv 0.25 % forbes.com 6.24 % nypost.com 1.95 %
sputniknews.com 4.11 % libertywriternews.com 0.15 % thehill.com 4.95 % cbsnews.com 1.89 %
beforeitsnews.com 2.26 % worldnewsdailyreport.com 0.06 % cbc.ca 4.82 % abcnews.go.com 1.78 %
redflagnews 2.04 % mediamass.net 0.04 % foxnews.com 4.79 % time.com 1.71 %
dccclothesline.com 1.37 % newsbiscuit.com 0.03 % wsj.com 4.04 % cnbc.com 1.40 %
naturalnews.com 1.29 % react365.com 0.02 % bloomberg.com 3.48 % washingtontimes.com 1.34 %
clickhole.com 0.53 % the-daily.buzz 0.02 % reuters.com 2.85 % washingtonexaminer.com 1.33 %
Table 4.6: Top 20 mainstream and alternative news sites in the Twitter dataset and their percentage.
Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%)
breitbart.com 53.00 % activistpost.com 0.38 % theguardian.com 14.10 % wsj.com 2.82 %
rt.com 28.22 % dccclothesline.com 0.29 % nytimes.com 10.07 % washinghtontimes.com 2.77 %
infowars.com 9.12 % redflagnews.com 0.20 % cnn.com 9.90 % bloomberg.com 2.75 %
sputniknews.com 3.36 % libertywritersnews.com 0.16 % bbc.com 5.45 % cbc.ca 2.66 %
veteranstoday.com 1.07 % therealstrategy.com 0.16 % foxnews.com 5.35 % nypost.com 2.65 %
beforeitsnews.com 0.91 % clickhole.com 0.11 % reuters.com 5.10 % cbsnews.com 2.44 %
lifezette.com 0.86 % disclose.tv 0.10 % time.com 3.42 % nbcnews.com 2.32 %
naturalnews.com 0.61 % now8news.com 0.06 % abcnews.go.com 3.40 % usatoday.com 2.25 %
worldnewsdailyreport.com 0.46 % firebrandleft.com 0.05 % huffingtonpost.com 3.29 % cnbc.com 2.13 %
prntly.com 0.41 % nodisinfo.com 0.05 % thehill.com 3.04 % forbes.com 1.68 %
Table 4.7: Top 20 mainstream and alternative news sites in the /pol/ dataset and their percentage.
type of news. These cover 87% and 99% of mainstream and alternative news URLs, respectively.
Again, we observe that, by far, the most popular alternative news domains are breitbart.com,
rt.com, infowars.com, and sputniknews.com. For the mainstream news, we observe that
theguardian.com is the most frequently posted, followed by nytimes.com, cnn.com, and
bbc.com. We also obtained similar statistics for domain popularity in the other boards of 4chan,
but we omit them for brevity.
To get a better view of the platforms’ URL posting behavior, Fig. 4.1 plots the CDF of URL
appearances (i.e., how many times a specific URL appears) within a particular platform. We observe
that a substantial portion of the URLs appear only once for both alternative and mainstream news,
and that, on Twitter, alternative news tends to appear more times than mainstream news. For /pol/
and the six subreddits, we observe a similar behavior for both mainstream and alternative news.
Next, in Fig. 4.2, we compare how popular domains, in both categories, appear on the three
platforms (i.e., Twitter, the six subreddits, and /pol/). We find that the top 4 alternative domains
– breitbart.com, rt.com, infowars.com, sputniknews.com – influence the three
platforms more or less in the same way. However, some outlets appear predominantly in some
platforms but not in others; e.g., therealstrategy.com is popular only on Twitter, while
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Figure 4.1: CDF of the counts of URL appearance within a particular platform: (a) alternative news and (b)
mainstream news.
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Figure 4.2: Top 20 domains and each platform’s fraction for (a) alternative and (b) mainstream news.
lifezette.com and veteranstoday.com are popular on the 6 subreddits and /pol/, but not
on Twitter. We believe the primary reason for this has to do with Twitter bots. We cannot exclude
with certainty that bots do not exist on 4chan, while bots are actually acceptable on Reddit (as long
as they follow the rules of Reddit’s API [308]), however, they are certainly more prevalent on Twit-
ter. Thus, if a particular domain is popular on Twitter because of the influence of bots, then it might
not be popular on Reddit and 4chan. We have also considered ways to factor out posting behavior
from bots, especially for Twitter, such as the one proposed in [80]. However, we have not removed
this activity due to: 1) posting behavior from bots can affect real users’ posting behavior, hence this
activity is part of the overall news dissemination ecosystem and needs to be accounted for; and 2)
the satisfactory performance of such approaches is yet to be proven.
We also measure the fraction of news URLs that are alternative, per user, in Fig. 4.3. We
report this fraction only for Reddit and Twitter users, since on 4chan posts are anonymous. We find
that 80% of the users of both platforms share only URLs from mainstream news, while, 13% of
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Figure 4.3: CDF of the fraction of URLs from alternative news and overall news URLs for (a) all users in our
Twitter and Reddit datasets, and (b) users that shared URLs from both mainstream and alternative news.
Twitter users – which are likely bots [299] – exclusively post URLs to alternative news. We observe
from Fig. 4.3(b), which shows the fraction for users sharing URLs from both categories, that there
is a wide distribution, especially on the six selected subreddits, between people that rarely share
alternative news (fraction close to 0) and those who share them almost all the time (fraction close to
1). Moreover, we find that Twitter users share more alternative news: just 5% of these users have a
fraction below 0.2, which might be also attributed to the presence of bots.
4.1.4 Temporal Analysis
In this section, we present the results of a cross-platform temporal analysis of the way news are
posted on Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan.
4.1.4.1 URL Occurrence
In Fig. 4.4, we measure the daily occurrence of news URLs over the three platforms normalized by
the average daily number of URLs shared in each community.2 We find that /pol/ and the six selected
subreddits exhibit a much higher percentage of occurrences of alternative news compared to the
other communities (Fig. 4.4(a)), whereas, for mainstream news, the sharing behavior is more similar
across platforms (Fig. 4.4(b)). There are also some interesting spikes, likely related to the 2016 US
elections, on the date of the first presidential debate and election day itself. These findings indicate
that the selected sub-communities are heavily utilized for the dissemination of alternative news. We
also study the fraction of alternative news URLs with respect to overall news URLs (Fig. 4.4(c)),
highlighting that mainstream news URLs are overall more “popular” than the alternative news URLs.
Note that the Twitter spike in Fig. 4.4(c) appears to be an artifact of a failure in our collection
infrastructure.
As some users repost the same URL many times within the same platform, we next study such
reposting behavior and extract insights while comparing platforms. In Fig. 4.5, we plot the CDF
2Gaps in the plot correspond to gaps in our dataset due to crawler failure.
4.1. How Web Communities Influence Each Other Through the Lens of News Sources 74
Jul
 16
Au
g 1
6
Se
p 1
6
Oc
t 1
6
No
v 1
6
De
c 1
6
Jan
 17
Feb
 17
Ma
r 1
7
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
Oc
cu
rre
nc
e 
of
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
ne
ws
4chan (/pol/)
4chan (other boards)
Reddit (6 selected subreddits)
Reddit (other subreddits)
Twitter
(a)
Jul
 16
Au
g 1
6
Se
p 1
6
Oc
t 1
6
No
v 1
6
De
c 1
6
Jan
 17
Feb
 17
Ma
r 1
7
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Oc
cu
rre
nc
e 
of
 m
ai
ns
tre
am
 n
ew
s
4chan (/pol/)
4chan (other boards)
Reddit (6 selected subreddits)
Reddit (other subreddits)
Twitter
(b)
Jul
 16
Au
g 1
6
Se
p 1
6
Oc
t 1
6
No
v 1
6
De
c 1
6
Jan
 17
Feb
 17
Ma
r 1
7
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
ne
ws
 fr
ac
tio
n
4chan (/pol/)
4chan (other boards)
Reddit (6 selected subreddits)
Reddit (other subreddits)
Twitter
(c)
Figure 4.4: Normalized daily occurrence of URLs for (a) alternative news, (b) mainstream news, and (c)
fraction of alternative news over all news.
of the time difference between the first occurrence of a URL and its next occurrences on the same
platform. Both alternative and mainstream news URLs are recycled over time within the platform
(even after several months), but Twitter exhibits a smaller lag between the first occurrence and later
ones compared to the other two platforms. In all three platforms, there is an inflection point at the 24h
period, which probably signifies the day-to-day behavior of news propagation within a platform, and
this is true for both alternative and mainstream news. Finally, mainstream news seem to propagate
faster in these platforms than alternative news, especially on the six subreddits; for Twitter and /pol/
the difference is not evident.
We also study the inter-arrival time of reposted URLs. Fig. 4.6 shows the CDF of the mean
inter-arrival time of URLs that appear more than one time in each platform. Each platform exhibits
unique behavior, confirmed by a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showing significant differ-
ences between the distributions (p < 0.01 for each pairwise comparison). However, /pol/ and the six
subreddits exhibit similar time-related sharing behavior for both mainstream and alternative news
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Figure 4.5: CDF of time difference (in hours) between the first occurrence of a URL and its next occurrences
on each platform for (a) alternative and (b) mainstream news.
Comparison Type of News
#URLs where
platform 1 is faster
#URLs where
platform 2 is faster
Reddit vs Twitter Mainstream 18,762 11,416
Alternative 5,232 4,301
/pol/ vs Twitter Mainstream 2,938 4,700
Alternative 778 2,099
/pol/ vs Reddit Mainstream 5,382 14,662
Alternative 1,455 3,695
Table 4.8: Statistics of URLs for the comparisons of time difference between platforms. Reddit refers to the
six selected subreddits.
URLs, and Twitter has smaller mean inter-arrival time overall. Interestingly, the six subreddits ap-
pear to have a duality in reposting behavior: for URLs with small inter-arrival time, it follows the
faster pace of Twitter, whereas, for URLs with longer inter-arrival times, it follows /pol/.
4.1.4.2 Cross Platform Analysis
We now look at URLs that appear on more than one platform and study the time at which they
are shared. Fig. 4.7 plots the CDF of the time difference (in seconds) between the first occurrence
of a URL on pairs of platforms, while Table 4.8 reports the numbers of URLs involved in each
comparison.
We make the following observations: first, when comparing pairs of distributions for a given
category of URLs, they are statistically different (a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects
the null hypothesis with p < 10−4). Second, alternative news appear on multiple platforms faster
than mainstream news. This is consistent regardless of the pair of platforms we consider, and the
sequence of appearances (i.e., first in platform A and then B, vs. first in B and then in A). Third, we
notice the presence of a “turning point” with respect to the delay between URL appearance on each
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Figure 4.6: CDF for mean inter-arrival time for the URLs that occur more than once for (a) common alternative
news URLs; (b) common mainstream news URLs; (c) all alternative news URLs, and (d) all mainstream news
URLs.
platform, which seems to be consistent across all pairs of platforms and types of news, and matches
the 24h period observed earlier. Finally, there is a cross point when comparing URLs first posted
on platform A and then on B, and URLs which were posted first in B and then on A (i.e., when
the lines for the same type of URLs cross). Such a point represents which portion of URLs appear
faster in one platform than the other. For the Twitter-six selected subreddits comparison, alternative
(mainstream) news appear faster on Twitter than the six subreddits 80% of the time (50%), with these
URLs exhibiting slower propagation, since the turning point is at ∼1 hour (5 hours). Similarly, for
the Twitter-/pol/ comparison, alternative (mainstream) news appear faster on Twitter than /pol/ 70%
(5%) of the time, with the turning point at 1 day (2 days). Finally, for the six selected subreddits-
/pol/ comparison, alternative (mainstream) news appear faster on the six subreddits than /pol/ for
65% (40%) of the time, with the turning point around 18 hours (12 hours).
Next, given the set of unique URLs across all platforms and the time they appear for the first
time, we analyze their appearance in one, two, or three platforms, and the order in which this
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Figure 4.7: CDF of the difference between the first occurrence of a URL between (a) six selected subreddits
and Twitter, (b) /pol/ and Twitter, and (c) /pol/ and six selected subreddits.
happens. For each URL, we find the first occurrence on each platform and build corresponding
“sequences,” e.g., if a URL first appears on the six subreddits (Reddit) and subsequently on /pol/
(4chan), the sequence is Reddit→ 4chan (R→4). Table 4.9 reports the distribution of the sequences
of appearances considering only the first hop, i.e., up to the first two platforms in the sequence. The
majority of URLs only appear on one platform: 82% of alternative URLs and 89% of mainstream
news URLs. Also, both alternative and mainstream news URLs tend to appear on the six subreddits
first and later appear on either Twitter or /pol/, and on Twitter before /pol/.
We also study the temporal dynamics of URLs that appear on all three platforms, with triplets
of sequences. Table 4.10 reports the distribution of these sequences. The most common sequences
are similar for both alternative and mainstream news URLs: R→T→4, R→4→T, and T→R→4 are
the top three sequences. As already mentioned, the six selected subreddits “outperform” both other
platforms in terms of the speed of sharing mainstream and alternative news URLs, as evidenced by
the fact that it is at the head of the sequence for 51% and 59% of alternative and mainstream news
URLs, respectively.
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Sequence Alternative (%) Mainstream (%)
4 only 3,236 (4.4%) 18,654 (3.7%)
4→R 1,118 (1.5%) 4,606 (0.9%)
4→T 315 (0.5%) 861 (0.17%)
R only 24,292 (33.3%) 230,602(46.1%)
R→4 2,181 (3.0%) 11,307 (2.3%)
R→T 4,769 (6.5%) 16,685 (3.35%)
T only 32,443 (44.5%) 204,836 (41%)
T→4 585 (0.8%) 1,345 (0.26%)
T→R 3,964 (5.5%) 10,640 (2.12%)
Table 4.9: Distribution of URLs according to the sequence of first appearance within platforms for all URLs,
considering only the first hop. “4” stands for /pol/ (4chan), “R” for the six selected subreddits (Reddit), and
“T” for Twitter.
Sequence Alternative (%) Mainstream (%)
4→R→T 128 (5.5%) 552 (8.9%)
4→T→R 145 (6.2%) 290 (4.7%)
R→4→T 335 (14.4%) 1,525 (24.5%)
R→T→4 841 (36.3%) 2,189 (35.3%)
T→4→R 192 (8.2%) 486 (7.8%)
T→R→4 673 (29%) 1,166 (18.8%)
Table 4.10: Distribution of URLs according to the sequence of first appearance within a platform for URLs
common to all platforms. “4” stands for /pol/ (4chan), “R” for the six selected subreddits (Reddit), and “T” for
Twitter.
Finally, we analyze the source of the URLs for each of the three platforms, as follows. We
create two directed graphs, one for each type of news, G = (V ,E), where V represents alternative or
mainstream domains, as well as the three platforms, and E the set of sequences that consider only
the first-hop of the platforms. For example, if a breitbart.com URL appears first on Twitter and
later on the six selected subreddits, we add an edge from breitbart.com to Twitter, and from
Twitter to the six selected subreddits. We also add weights on these edges based on the number of
such unique URLs. By examining the paths we can discern which domains’ URLs tend to appear
first on each of the platforms.
Fig. 4.8 shows the graphs built for alternative and mainstream domains. Comparing the thick-
ness of the outgoing edges, one can see that breitbart.com URLs appear first in the six selected
subreddits more often than on Twitter and more frequently than on /pol/. However, for other popular
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Figure 4.8: Graph representation of news ecosystem (a) alternative news domains and (b) mainstream news
domains. Edges are colored the same as their source node.
alternative domains, such as infowars.com, rt.com, and sputniknews.com, URLs appear
first on Twitter more often than the six selected subreddits and /pol/. Also, /pol/ is rarely the plat-
form where a URL first shows up. For the mainstream news domains, we note that URLs from
nytimes.com and cnn.com tend to appear first more often on the selected subreddits than Twit-
ter and /pol/, however, URLs from other domains like bbc.com and theguardian.com tend to
appear first more often on Twitter than the selected subreddits. Similar to the alternative domains
graph, there is no domain where /pol/ dominates in terms of first URL appearance.
4.1.5 Influence Estimation
Thus far, our measurements have shown relative differences in how news media is shared on Reddit,
Twitter, and 4chan. In this section, we provide meaningful evidence of how the individual platforms
influence the media shared on other platforms. We do so by using a mathematical technique known
as Hawkes processes. These statistical models can be used for modeling the dissemination of in-
formation in Web communities [95] as well as measuring social influence [111]. For more details
regarding the Hawkes Processes and the general methodology used we refer the interested reader to
Section 2.2.
4.1.5.1 Methodology
We now provide more details about our experiments, once again, considering 4chan (/pol/), Twitter,
and the six subreddits. We study Hawkes processes at the subreddit granularity to get a better
understanding of the various platforms and particular subreddits.
We aim to examine how these platforms and subreddits influence each other, so we model the
arrival of URLs, in posts or tweets, with a Hawkes model with K = 8 point processes—one for
Twitter, one for /pol/, and one for each of the subreddits. The model is fully connected, i.e., it
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is possible for each process to influence all the others, as well as itself, which describes behavior
where participants on a platform see a URL and re-post it on the same platform.
We select URLs that have at least one event in Twitter, /pol/, and at least one of the subreddits,
and we model each URL individually. The missing Twitter data affects 3,1K (37%) URLs. One
way to mitigate the impact of this missing data is to remove events for which it has a larger impact.
E.g., if an event spans 100 days, the missing Twitter data has less of an effect than if the event
only spanned two days. Thus, we examine URLs from other platforms that overlap with any of the
missing days and remove the 10% of URLs (895) with the shortest total duration from the first event
recorded until the last event recorded. This results in the missing data making up a smaller portion
of the overall duration of the events.
The Donald worldnews politics news conspiracy AskReddit /pol/ Twitter
URLs Mainstream 3,097 2,523 3,578 2,584 907 841 5,589 5,589
Alternative 2,008 252 813 362 321 100 2,136 2,136
Total 5,105 2,775 4,391 2,946 1,228 941 7,725 7,725
Events Mainstream 12,312 7,517 26,160 5,794 1,995 2,302 19,746 36,250
Alternative 7,797 458 2,484 586 497 176 7,322 23,172
Total 20,109 7,975 28,644 6,380 2,492 2,478 27,068 59,422
Mean λ0 Mainstream 0.001502 0.001382 0.001265 0.001392 0.000501 0.000107 0.001564 0.002330
Alternative 0.001627 0.000619 0.000696 0.000553 0.000423 0.000034 0.001525 0.002803
Table 4.11: Total URLs with at least one event in Twitter, /pol/, and at least one of the subreddits; total events
for mainstream and alternative URLs, and the mean background rate (λ0) for each platform/subreddit.
The number of remaining URLs and events included for each platform are shown in Table 6.15.
Next, we fit a Hawkes model for each URL and calculate the influence results using the approach
described in Section 2.2.
4.1.5.2 Results
Looking at the number of URLs in Table 4.11, we note that there are substantially more events for
mainstream than alternative news URLs. However, for Twitter, /pol/, and The Donald, the ratios of
events to URLs for alternative news URLs are similar to or greater than the ratios for mainstream
ones. These high ratios explain the high background rates (see Table 4.11) for alternative news URLs
for these platforms despite the lower number of events.
From the Hawkes models for each URL, we obtain the weight matrix W which specifies the
strength of the connections between the different platforms and subreddits. The mean weight values
over all URLs for alternative and mainstream news URLs, as well as the percentage difference
between them are presented in Fig. 4.9. First, we look at Twitter. Background rates are high for
both mainstream and alternative news URLs, which is not surprising given the large number of users
on the platform. The values for WTwitter→Twitter are also substantially higher than all other weights:
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13.8% **
A: 0.0652
M: 0.0621
5.1%
A: 0.0526
M: 0.0551
-4.6%
A: 0.0549
M: 0.0561
-2.2%
A: 0.0562
M: 0.0556
1.2%
A: 0.0592
M: 0.0622
-4.8% **
A: 0.0549
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-2.5%
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A: 0.0647
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7.3%
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M: 0.0593
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A: 0.0665
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A: 0.0584
M: 0.0521
12.1% **
A: 0.0715
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M: 0.0610
3.2%
A: 0.0547
M: 0.0559
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A: 0.0579
M: 0.0571
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-6.2%
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A: 0.0589
M: 0.0587
0.4%
A: 0.0578
M: 0.0591
-2.3%
A: 0.0623
M: 0.0626
-0.4%
A: 0.0558
M: 0.0555
0.7%
A: 0.0566
M: 0.0600
-5.7%
A: 0.0570
M: 0.0588
-3.0%
A: 0.0634
M: 0.0603
5.2%
A: 0.0494
M: 0.0598
-17.4%
A: 0.0623
M: 0.0573
8.8%
A: 0.0534
M: 0.0637
-16.2%
A: 0.0546
M: 0.0563
-3.1%
A: 0.0607
M: 0.0521
16.7%
A: 0.0624
M: 0.0585
6.7%
A: 0.0644
M: 0.0558
15.5%
A: 0.0680
M: 0.0550
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0.6%
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-1.6%
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M: 0.0561
-5.2%
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M: 0.0569
-3.2%
A: 0.0577
M: 0.0580
-0.6%
A: 0.0554
M: 0.0576
-3.9% *
A: 0.0598
M: 0.0588
1.7%
A: 0.1554
M: 0.1096
41.9% **
A: 0.0579
M: 0.0606
-4.6%
A: 0.0440
M: 0.0506
-12.9% **
A: 0.0454
M: 0.0501
-9.4% **
A: 0.0459
M: 0.0533
-13.8% **
A: 0.0471
M: 0.0575
-18.1% **
A: 0.0443
M: 0.0536
-17.5% **
A: 0.0583
M: 0.0558
4.4% *
Mean Weights - Pct. Increase/Decrease of Alternative over Mainstream URLs
Figure 4.9: The mean weights for alternative URLs (A), the mean weights for mainstream URLs (M), and
the percent increase/decrease between mainstream and alternative (also indicated by the coloration). The stars
on the cells indicate the level of statistical significance (p-value) between the weight distributions: no stars
indicate no statistical significance, whereas * and ** indicate statistical significance with p < 0.05 and p < 0.01
respectively.
0.1096 for mainstream news URLs and 0.1554 for alternative news URLs. This reflects the ease
and common practice of re-tweeting: a URL in a tweet is likely to generate other events as users re-
tweet it. There are different possible explanations for why the Twitter to Twitter rate for alternative
news URLs is much greater than the rate for mainstream news URLs. The first is bot activity—if
automated Twitter bots are used to spread alternative news URLs, it could result in a much higher
rate of tweeting and re-tweeting. Another possible explanation is the behavior of users who read
news stories from alternative sources; they might be more inclined to re-tweet the URL [115].
Looking at the weights for Twitter to the other platforms, except The Donald, they are all
greater for mainstream news URLs, meaning that the average tweet containing a mainstream URL
is more likely to cause a subsequent post on the other platforms than the average tweet containing
an alternative URL. The next communities most likely to cause events on others are The Donald
and /pol/. It is worth noting that The Donald is the only platform/subreddit that has greater alter-
native URL weights for all of its inputs. Assuming that the population of The Donald users that
also read, say, worldnews is the same for both alternative and mainstream news URLs—which is
reasonable—then the difference in weights implies that the users have a stronger preference for re-
posting alternative news URLs back to The Donald than for mainstream news URLs. The opposite
can be seen for worldnews and politics, where most of the input weights are stronger for main-
stream news. However, despite the higher weights for alternative news URLs, The Donald is also,
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9.13
A: 37.07%
M: 15.64%
21.43
A: 34.28%
M: 15.15%
19.13
A: 18.95%
M: 6.00%
12.94
A: 27.67%
M: 9.28%
18.39
A: 14.32%
M: 10.79%
3.53
Pct. of Alternative URLs - Pct. of Mainstream URLs
Figure 4.10: The estimated mean percentage of alternative URL events caused by alternative news URL events
(A), the estimated mean percentage of mainstream news URL events caused by mainstream news URL events
(M), and the difference between alternative and mainstream news (also indicated by the coloration).
interestingly, influenced more strongly by mainstream news URLs than alternative news URLs on
all platforms, with the exception of Twitter. This is in part because of the greater number of main-
stream URL events, but The Donald also has a higher background rate for alternative news URLs
than mainstream news URLs, which implies that a lot of the alternative news URLs on the platform
are coming from other sources.
To assess the statistical significance of the results, we perform two sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests on the weight distributions of mainstream and alternative news URLs for each source-
destination pair (depicted as stars in Fig. 4.9). This allow us to assess whether the distributions of the
weights for mainstream and alternative news URLs have statistically significant differences, hence
indicating whether mainstream news URLs spread differently compared to alternative news URLs
across the Web communities we study. Unsurprisingly, many of the source-destination pairs have
no significant difference. However, in most cases where Twitter is the source community there is a
significant statistical difference with p < 0.01. I.e., for some communities, Twitter is used not just
to disseminate news, but to disseminate news from a specific type of source.
Fig. 4.10 illustrates the estimated total influence of the different platforms on each other, for
both mainstream and alternative news URLs. Twitter contributes heavily to both types of events on
the other platforms—and is in fact the most influential single source for most of the other platforms.
Despite Twitter’s lower weights for alternative news URLs, it actually has a greater influence on
alternative than mainstream news URLs, in terms of percentage of events caused, on all the other
platforms/subreddits. This is due to the fact that, even though it has lower weights, the largest pro-
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portion of alternative URL events are on Twitter. After Twitter, The Donald and /pol/ also have a
strong influence on the alternative news URLs that get posted on other platforms. The Donald has
a stronger effect for alternative news URLs on all platforms except Twitter—although it still has
the largest alternative influence on Twitter, causing an estimated 2.72% of alternative news URLs
tweeted. Interestingly, The Donald causes 8% of /pol/’s alternative news URLs, while /pol/’s influ-
ence on The Donald is less, at 5.7%. For the mainstream news URLs the strength of influence is
reversed. Specifically, /pol/’s influence on The Donald is 8.61% whereas The Donald’s influence on
/pol/ is 6.13%.
In descending order, the influences on Twitter for mainstream news URLs are politics (4.29%),
/pol/ (3.01%), The Donald (2.97%), worldnews (2.74%), news (1.81%), AskReddit (1.34%), and
conspiracy (1.04%). The strongest influences for alternative news URLs are, unsurprisingly,
The Donald (2.72%) and /pol/ (1.96%), followed by politics (1.10%), worldnews (0.60%), AskRed-
dit (0.55%), news (0.50%), and conspiracy (0.46%). Twitter influences the alternative news URLs on
other platforms to a large degree—but the largest alternative URL inputs to Twitter are The Donald
and /pol/. While we are only looking at a closed system of 8 different platforms and subreddits, we
note that Twitter is undoubtedly effective at propagating information. Thus the influence these two
communities have on Twitter is likely to have a disproportional impact on the greater Web compared
to their relatively minuscule userbase.
4.1.6 Remarks
In this work, we explored how mainstream and fringe Web communities share mainstream and alter-
native news sources with a particular focus on how communities influence each other. We collected
millions of posts from Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan, and analyzed the occurrence and temporal dy-
namics of news shared from 45 mainstream and 54 alternative news sites. We found that users on
various platforms prefer distinct news sources, especially when it comes to alternative ones. We also
explored complex temporal dynamics and we discovered, for example, that Twitter and Reddit users
tend to post the same stories within a relatively short period of time, with 4chan posts lagging behind
both of them. However, when a story becomes popular after a day or two, it is usually the case it
was posted on 4chan first, lending some credence to 4chan’s supposed influence on the Web.
Using Hawkes processes, we also modeled the influence the individual platforms have on each
other, while also taking into account influence that comes from external sources of information. We
found that the interplay between platforms manifests in subtle, yet meaningful ways. For example,
of all the platforms and subreddits, Twitter by far has the most influence in terms of the number of
URLs it causes to be posted to other platforms, and contributes to the share of alternative news URLs
on the other platforms to a much greater degree than to the share of mainstream news URLs. After
Twitter, The Donald subreddit and /pol/ are the next most influential when it comes to alternative
news URLs. For such URLs, The Donald is less influenced by the other platforms than /pol/, and
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has a higher background rate, i.e., more of the URLs posted there come from other sources.
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis constitutes the first attempt to characterize the dis-
semination of mainstream and alternative news across multiple social media platforms, and to es-
timate a quantifiable influence between them. Overall, our findings shed light on how Web com-
munities influence each other and can be extremely useful to better understand and detect false
information as well as informing the design of systems that aim to trace the origins of fake stories
and mitigate their dissemination.
4.2 Detecting and Understanding the Spread of Memes Across
Multiple Web Communities
4.2.1 Motivation
The Web has become one of the most impactful vehicles for the propagation of ideas and culture.
Images, videos, and slogans are created and shared online at an unprecedented pace. Some of these,
commonly referred to as memes, become viral, evolve, and eventually enter popular culture. The
term “meme” was first coined by Richard Dawkins [81], who framed them as cultural analogues
to genes, as they too self-replicate, mutate, and respond to selective pressures [110]. Numerous
memes have become integral part of Internet culture, with well-known examples including the Troll-
face [183], Bad Luck Brian [156], and Rickroll [178].
While most memes are generally ironic in nature, used with no bad intentions, others have
assumed negative and/or hateful connotations, including outright racist and aggressive under-
tones [327]. These memes, often generated by fringe communities, are being “weaponized” and even
becoming part of political and ideological propaganda [237]. For example, memes were adopted by
candidates during the 2016 US Presidential Elections as part of their iconography [117]; in October
2015, then-candidate Donald Trump retweeted an image depicting him as Pepe The Frog, a con-
troversial character considered a hate symbol [200]. In this context, polarized communities within
4chan and Reddit have been working hard to create new memes and make them go viral, aiming to
increase the visibility of their ideas—a phenomenon known as “attention hacking” [216].
Despite their increasingly relevant role, we have very little measurements and computational
tools to understand the origins and the influence of memes. The online information ecosystem is
very complex; social networks do not operate in a vacuum but rather influence each other as to how
information spreads [331]. However, previous work has mostly focused on social networks in an
isolated manner.
In this work, we aim to bridge these gaps by identifying and addressing a few research ques-
tions, which are oriented towards fringe Web communities: 1) How can we characterize memes, and
how do they evolve and propagate? 2) Can we track meme propagation across multiple commu-
nities and measure their influence? 3) How can we study variants of the same meme? 4) Can we
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characterize Web communities through the lens of memes?
Our work focuses on four Web communities: Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and 4chan’s Politically
Incorrect board (/pol/), because of their impact on the information ecosystem [331] and anecdotal
evidence of them disseminating weaponized memes [269]. We design a processing pipeline and use
it over 160M images posted between July 2016 and July 2017. Our pipeline relies on perceptual
hashing (pHash) and clustering techniques; the former extracts representative feature vectors from
the images encapsulating their visual peculiarities, while the latter allow us to detect groups of im-
ages that are part of the same meme. We design and implement a custom distance metric, based
on both pHash and meme metadata, obtained from Know Your Meme (KYM), and use it to un-
derstand the interplay between the different memes. Finally, using Hawkes processes, we quantify
the reciprocal influence of each Web community with respect to the dissemination of image-based
memes.
Findings. Some of our findings (among others) include:
1. Our influence estimation analysis reveals that /pol/ and The Donald are influential actors in
the meme ecosystem, despite their modest size. We find that /pol/ substantially influences the
meme ecosystem by posting a large number of memes, while The Donald is the most efficient
community in pushing memes to both fringe and mainstream Web communities.
2. Communities within 4chan, Reddit, and Gab use memes to share hateful and racist content.
For instance, among the most popular cluster of memes, we find variants of the anti-semitic
“Happy Merchant” meme [165] and the controversial Pepe the Frog [174].
3. Our custom distance metric effectively reveals the phylogenetic relationships of clusters of
images. This is evident from the graph that shows the clusters obtained from /pol/, Reddit’s
The Donald subreddit, and Gab available for exploration at [2].
Contributions. First, we develop a robust processing pipeline for detecting and tracking memes
across multiple Web communities. Based on pHash and clustering algorithms, it supports large-
scale measurements of meme ecosystems, while minimizing processing power and storage require-
ments. Second, we introduce a custom distance metric, geared to highlight hidden correlations
between memes and better understand the interplay and overlap between them. Third, we provide a
characterization of multiple Web communities (Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and /pol/) with respect to the
memes they share, and an analysis of their reciprocal influence using the Hawkes Processes statisti-
cal model. Finally, we release our processing pipeline and datasets3, in the hope to support further
measurements in this space.
4.2.2 Methodology
In this section, we present our methodology for measuring the propagation of memes across Web
communities.
3https://github.com/memespaper/memes_pipeline
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Figure 4.11: An example of a meme (Smug Frog) that provides an intuition of what an image, a cluster, and a
meme is.
4.2.2.1 Overview
Memes are high-level concepts or ideas that spread within a culture [81]. In Internet vernacular, a
meme usually refers to variants of a particular image, video, cliche´, etc. that share a common theme
and are disseminated by a large number of users. In this thesis, we focus on their most common
incarnation: static images.
To gain an understanding of how memes propagate across the Web, with a particular focus on
discovering the communities that are most influential in spreading them, our intuition is to build
clusters of visually similar images, allowing us to track variants of a meme. We then group clusters
that belong to the same meme to study and track the meme itself. In Figure 4.11, we provide a
visual representation of the Smug Frog meme [181], which includes many variants of the same
image (a “smug” Pepe the Frog) and several clusters of variants. Cluster 1 has variants from a
Jurassic Park scene, where one of the characters is hiding from two velociraptors behind a kitchen
counter: the frogs are stylized to look similar to velociraptors, and the character hiding varies to
express a particular message. For example, in the image in the top right corner, the two frogs are
searching for an anti-semitic caricature of a Jew (itself a meme known as the Happy Merchant [165]).
Cluster N shows variants of the smug frog wearing a Nazi officer military cap with a photograph
of the infamous “Arbeit macht frei” slogan from the distinctive curved gates of Auschwitz in the
background. In particular, the two variants on the right display the death’s head logo of the SS-
Totenkopfverba¨nde organization responsible for running the concentration camps during World War
II. Overall, these clusters represent the branching nature of memes: as a new variant of a meme
becomes prevalent, it often branches into its own sub-meme, potentially incorporating imagery from
other memes.
4.2.2.2 Processing Pipeline
Our processing pipeline is depicted in Figure 4.12. As discussed above, our methodology aims at
identifying clusters of similar images and assign them to higher level groups, which are the actual
4.2. Detecting and Understanding the Spread of Memes Across Multiple Web Communities 87
3. Clustering 
1. pHash Extraction
2. pHash-based Pairwise
Distance Calculation
pHashes of some or all Web  
communities' images
Clusters of images
5. Cluster Annotation 
Pairwise Comparisons  
of pHashes
annotated  
images 
6. Association of
Images to Clusters
Annotated  
Clusters
pHashes of  
annotated images 
pHashes 
(all Web Communities) 
7. Analysis and
Influence Estimation
Occurrences of Memes in  
all Web Communities 
4. Screenshot
Classifier
annotated  
images 
pHashes of non-screenshot  
annotated images 
Know Your  
Meme
Generic
Annotation
Sites
Meme Annotation Sites
Generic  
Web
Communities
4chan Twitter Reddit Gab
Web Communities posting Memes
images
Figure 4.12: High-level overview of our processing pipeline.
memes. Note that the proposed pipeline is not limited to image macros and can be used to identify
any image. We first discuss the types of data sources needed for our approach, i.e., meme annotation
sites and Web communities that post memes (dotted rounded rectangles in the figure). Then, we
describe each of the operations performed by our pipeline (Steps 1-7, see regular rectangles).
Data Sources. Our pipeline uses two types of data sources: 1) sites providing meme annotation
and 2) Web communities that disseminate memes. In this thesis, we use Know Your Meme for the
former, and Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab for the latter. We provide more details about our datasets
in Section 4.2.3. Note that our methodology supports any annotation site and any Web community,
and this is why we add the “Generic” sites/communities notation in Figure 4.12.
pHash Extraction (Step 1). We use the Perceptual Hashing (pHash) algorithm [227] to calculate a
fingerprint of each image in such a way that any two images that look similar to the human eye map
to a “similar” hash value. pHash generates a feature vector of 64 elements that describe an image,
computed from the Discrete Cosine Transform among the different frequency domains of the image.
Thus, visually similar images have minor differences in their vectors, hence allowing to search for
and detect visually similar images. For example, the string representation of the pHashes obtained
from the images in cluster N (see Figure 4.11) are 55352b0b8d8b5b53, 55952b0bb58b5353, and
55952b2b9da58a53, respectively. The algorithm is also robust against changes in the images, e.g.,
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signal processing operations and direct manipulation [335], and effectively reduces the dimension-
ality of the raw images.
Clustering via pairwise distance calculation (Steps 2-3). Next, we cluster images from one or
more Web Communities using the pHash values. We perform a pairwise comparison of all the
pHashes using Hamming distance (Step 2). To support large numbers of images, we implement
a highly parallelizable system on top of TensorFlow [214], which uses multiple GPUs to enhance
performance. Images are clustered using a density-based algorithm (Step 3). Our current implemen-
tation uses DBSCAN [91], mainly because it can discover clusters of arbitrary shape and performs
well over large, noisy datasets. Nonetheless, our architecture can be easily tweaked to support any
clustering algorithm and distance metric.
We also perform an analysis of the clustering performance and the rationale for selecting the
clustering threshold. Our implementation uses the DBSCAN algorithm with a clustering threshold
equal to 8. To select this threshold, we perform the clustering step while varying the distances.
Table 4.12 shows the number of clusters and the percentage of images that are regarded as noise
by the clustering algorithm for varying distances. We observe that, for distances 2-4, we have a
substantially larger percentage of noise, while with distance 10 we have the least percentage of
noise. With distances between 6 and 8 we observe that we get a larger number of clusters than the
other distances, while the noise percentages are 73% and 63%, respectively.
To further evaluate the clustering performance for varying distances, we randomly select 200
clusters and manually calculate the number of images that are false positives within each cluster.
Figure 4.13 shows the CDF of the false positive fraction in the random sample of clusters for dis-
tances 6, 8, and 10 (we disregard distances 2-4 due to the high percentage of noise). Distance 10
yields a high number of false positives, while distances 6-8 the overall false positives are below 3%.
Therefore, we investigate the impact of these false positives in the overall dataset, looking at all
posts that contain false and true positives in the random sample of 200 clusters, using distance 8.
We find that the false positives have little impact as they occur substantially fewer times than true
positives: the percentage of true positives over the set of false positives and true positives is 99.4%.
Thus, due to the larger number of clusters, the acceptable false positive performance, and the smaller
percentage of noise (when compared to distances 2-6), we elect to use as a threshold the perceptual
distance that is equal to 8.
Screenshots Removal (Step 4). Meme annotation sites like KYM often include, in their image
galleries, screenshots of social network posts that are not variants of a meme but just comments
about it. Hence, we discard social-network screenshots from the annotation sites data sources using
a deep learning classifier. Below, we provide more details about our screenshot removal classifier.
Dataset. Table 4.13 summarizes the dataset used for training the classifier. It includes 28.8K images
that depict posts from Twitter, 4chan, Reddit, Facebook, and Instagram, which we collect from
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Distance #Clusters %Noise
2 30,327 82.9%
4 34,146 78.5%
6 37,292 73.0%
8 38,851 62.8%
10 30,737 27.8%
Table 4.12: Number of clusters and percentage of noise for varying clustering distances.
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Figure 4.13: Fraction of false positives in clusters with varying clustering distance.
public sources. First, we download images from specific subreddits that only allow screenshots
from a particular community. For example, the 4chan subreddit require all submissions to be of
a screenshot of a 4chan thread. Next, we use the Pinterest platform to download specific boards
that contain mostly screenshots from the communities we study. Also, we search and obtain image
datasets that are publicly available on Web archiving services like the Wayback Machine. We then
manually filter out images that were misplaced. Finally, we include 10K random images posted on
/pol/ (i.e., a subset of the 4.3M images collected for our measurements).
Classifier. To detect screenshots that contain images from one of the social networks included in our
dataset, we use Convolutional Neural Networks. Figure 4.14 provides an overview of our classifier’s
architecture. It includes two Convolutional Neural Networks, each followed by a max-pooling layer.
The output of these layers is fed to a fully-connected dense layer comprising 512 units. Finally, we
have another fully-connected layer with two units, which outputs the probability that a particular
image is a screenshot from one of the five social networks and the probability that an image is
a random one. To avoid overfitting on the two last fully-connected layers, we apply Dropout with
d = 0.5 [284]. This means that, while training, 50% of the units are randomly omitted from updating
their parameters.
Experimental Evaluation. Our implementation uses Keras [74] with TensorFlow as the back-
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Figure 4.14: Architecture of the deep learning model for detecting screenshots from Twitter, /pol/, Reddit,
Instagram, and Facebook.
Platform Twitter 4chan Reddit Facebook Instagram Other
# images 14,602 10,127 2,181 1,414 497 10,630
Table 4.13: Curated dataset used to train the screenshot classifier.
end [214]. To train our model, we randomly select 80% of the images and evaluate based on the
rest 20% out-of-sample dataset. Figure 4.15 shows the ROC curve of the model. We observe that
the devised classifier exhibits acceptable performance with an Area Under the Curve (AUC) of 0.96.
We also evaluate our model in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score, which amount to
91.3%, 94.3%, 93.5%, and 93.9%, respectively.
Cluster Annotation (Steps 5). Clustering annotation uses the medoid of each cluster, i.e., the
element with the minimum square average distance from all images in the cluster. In other words,
the medoid is the image that best represents the cluster. The clusters’ medoids are compared with
all images from meme annotation sites, by calculating the Hamming distance between each pair of
pHash vectors. We consider that an image matches a cluster if the distance is less than or equal to a
threshold θ , which we set to 8, as it allows us to capture the diversity of images that are part of the
same meme while maintaining a low number of false positives.
As the annotation process considers all the images of a KYM entry’s image gallery, it is likely
we will get multiple annotations for a single cluster. To find the representative KYM entry for each
cluster, we select the one with the largest proportion of matches of KYM images with the cluster
medoid. In case of ties, we select the one with the minimum average Hamming distance.
While KYM might not be a household name, the site is seemingly the largest curated collection
of memes on the Web, i.e., KYM is as close to an “authority” on memes as there is. That said, crowd-
sourcing is an aspect of how KYM works, and thus there might be questions as to how “legitimate”
some of the content is. To this end, we set out to measure the quality of KYM by sampling a number
of pages and manually examining them. This is clearly a subjective task, and a fully specified defi-
nition of what makes a valid meme is approximately as difficult as defining “art.” Nevertheless, the
authors of this work have, for better or worse, collectively spent thousands of hours immersed in the
communities we explore; thus, while we are not confident in providing a strict definition of a meme,
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Figure 4.15: ROC curve of the screenshot classifier.
we are in claiming that we know a meme when we see it.
Using the same randomly selected 200 clusters as mentioned in Steps2-3 above, we visited each
KYM page the cluster was tagged with and noted whether or not it properly documented what we
consider an “actual” meme. The 200 clusters were mapped to 162 unique KYM pages, and of these
162 pages, 3 (1.85%) we decided were “bad.” This is mainly due to the lack of completeness and
relatively high number of random images in the gallery (see [171, 186] for some examples of “bad”
KYM entries).
Next, we set out to determine whether the label (i.e., KYM page) assigned to each of our
randomly sampled clusters was appropriate. Using three annotators, for each cluster we examined
the KYM page, the medoid of the cluster, and the images in the cluster itself and noted whether the
label does in fact apply to the cluster. Here, again, there is a great degree of subjectivity. To reign
some of the subjectivity in, we used the following guidelines:
1. If the exact image(s) in the cluster appear in the KYM gallery, then the label is correct.
2. For images that do not appear in the KYM gallery, if the label is appropriate, then it is a
correct labeling.
There are some important caveats with these guidelines. First, KYM galleries are crowd-
sourced, and while curated to some extent, the possibility for what amounts to random images in
a gallery does exist; however, based on our assessment of KYM page validity, this occurs with low
probability. Second, we considered a label correct if it was appropriate, even if it was not neces-
sarily the best possible label. For example, as our results show, many memes are related, and many
images mix and match pieces of various memes. While it is definitely true that there might be bet-
ter labels that exist for a given cluster, this straightforward and comprehensible labeling process is
sufficient for our purposes. We leave a more in-depth study of the subjective nature of memes for
future work. Finally, it is important to note that memes are a cultural phenomenon, and thus the
potential for cultural bias in our annotation is possible. Note that our annotators were born in three
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different countries (USA, Italy, and Cyprus), only one is a native English speaker, and two have
spent substantial time in the US.
After annotating clusters, we compute the Fleis agreement score (κ). With our cluster samples,
we achieve κ=0.67, which is considered “substantial” agreement. Finally, for each cluster we obtain
the majority agreement of all annotators to assess the accuracy of our annotation process; we find
that 89% of the clusters had a legitimate annotation to a specific KYM entry.
Association of images to memes (Step 6). To associate images posted on Web communities (e.g.,
Twitter, Reddit, etc.) to memes, we compare them with the clusters’ medoids, using the same thresh-
old θ . This is conceptually similar to Step 5, but uses images from Web communities instead of
images from annotation sites. This lets us identify memes posted in generic Web communities and
collect relevant metadata from the posts (e.g., the timestamp of a tweet). Note that we track the
propagation of memes in generic Web communities (e.g., Twitter) using a seed of memes obtained
by clustering images from other (fringe) Web communities. More specifically, our seeds will be
memes generated on three fringe Web communities (/pol/, The Donald subreddit, Gab); nonetheless,
our methodology can be applied to any community.
Analysis and Influence Estimation (Step 7). We analyze all relevant clusters and the occurrences
of memes, aiming to assess: 1) their popularity and diversity in each community; 2) their temporal
evolution; and 3) how communities influence each other with respect to meme dissemination.
4.2.2.3 Distance Metric
To better understand the interplay and connections between the clusters, we introduce a custom
distance metric, which relies on both the visual peculiarities of the images (via pHash) and data
available from annotation sites. The distance metric supports one of two modes: 1) one for when both
clusters are annotated (full-mode), and 2) another for when one or none of the clusters is annotated
(partial-mode).
Definition. Let c be a cluster of images and F a set of features extracted from the clusters. The
custom distance metric between cluster ci and c j is defined as:
distance(ci,c j) = 1−∑
f∈F
wf ×rf(ci,c j) (4.1)
where rf(ci,c j) denotes the similarity between the features of type f ∈ F of cluster ci and c j, and w f
is a weight that represents the relevance of each feature. Note that ∑f wf = 1 and r f (ci,c j) = {x ∈
R | 0≤ x≤ 1}. Thus, distance(ci,c j) is a number between 0 and 1.
Features. We consider four different features for rf∈F, specifically, F= {perceptual,meme, people,culture};
see below.
rperceptual : this feature is the similarity between two clusters from a perceptual viewpoint. Let h
be a pHash vector for an image m in cluster c, where m is the medoid of the cluster, and di j the
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Figure 4.16: Different values of rperceptual (y-axis) for all possible inputs of d (x-axis) with respect to the
smoother τ .
Hamming distance between vectors hi and h j (see Step 5 in Section 4.2.2.2). We compute di j from
ci and c j as follows. First, we obtain obtain the medoid mi from cluster ci. Subsequently, we obtain
hi=pHash(mi). Finally, we compute di j=Hamming(hi,h j). We simplify notation and use d instead
of di j to denote the distance between two medoid images and refer to this distance as the Hamming
score.
We define the perceptual similarity between two clusters as an exponential decay function over
the Hamming score d:
rperceptual(d) = 1− dτ× emax/τ (4.2)
where max represents the maximum pHash distance between two images and τ is a constant param-
eter, or smoother, that controls how fast the exponential function decays for all values of d (recall
that {d ∈ R | 0 ≤ d ≤ max}). Note that max is bound to the precision given by the pHash algo-
rithm. Recall that each pHash has a size of |d|=64, hence max=64. Intuitively, when τ << 64,
rperceptual is a high value only with perceptually indistinguishable images, e.g., for τ=1, two im-
ages with d=0 have a similarity rperceptual=1.0. With the same τ , the similarity drops to 0.4 when
d=1. By contrast, when τ is close to 64, rperceptual decays almost linearly. For example, for τ=64,
rperceptual(d=0)=1.0 and rperceptual(d=1)=0.98. Figure 4.16 shows how rperceptual performs for dif-
ferent values of τ . As mentioned above, we observe that pairs of images with scores between d=0
and d=8 are usually part of the same variant (see Step 5 in Section 4.2.2.2). In our implementation,
we set τ=25 as rperceptual returns high values up to d=8, and rapidly decays thereafter.
rmeme, rculture, and rpeople: the annotation process (Step 5) provides contextualized information about
the cluster medoid, including the name (i.e., the main identifier) given to a meme, the associated
culture (i.e., high-level group of meme), and people that are included in a meme. Note that we use
all the annotations for each category and not only the representative one (see Step 5). Therefore,
we model a different similarity for each of the these categories, by looking at the overlap of all the
annotations among the medoids of both clusters (mi, m j, for ci and c j, respectively). Specifically, for
each category, we calculate the Jaccard index between the annotations of both medoids, for memes,
cultures, and people, thus acquiring rmeme, rculture, rpeople, respectively.
Modes. Our distance metric measures how similar two clusters are. If both clusters are annotated, we
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operate in “full-mode,” and in “partial-mode” otherwise. For each mode, we use different weights
for the features in Eq. 4.1, which we set empirically as we lack the ground-truth data needed to
automate the computation of the optimal set of thresholds.
Full-mode. In full-mode, we set weights as follows. 1) The features from the perceptual and meme
categories should have higher relevance than people and culture, as they are intrinsically related to
the definition of meme (see Section 4.2.2.1). The last two are non-discriminant features, yet are in-
formative and should contribute to the metric. Also, 2) rmeme should not outweigh rperceptual because
of the relevance that visual similarities have on the different variants of a meme. Likewise, rperceptual
should not dominate over rmeme because of the branching nature of the memes. Thus, we want
these two categories to play an equally important weight. Therefore, we choose wperceptual=0.4,
wmeme=0.4, wpeople=0.1, wculture=0.1.
This means that when two clusters belong to the same meme and their medoids are perceptually
similar, the distance between the clusters will be small. In fact, it will be at most 0.2= 1−(0.4+0.4)
if people and culture do not match, and 0.0 if they also match. Note that our metric also assigns small
distance values for the following two cases: 1) when two clusters are part of the same meme variant,
and 2) when two clusters use the same image for different memes.
Partial-mode. In this mode, we associate unannotated images with any of the known clusters. This
is a critical component of our analysis (Step 6), allowing us to study images from generic Web
communities where annotations are unavailable. In this case, we rely entirely on the perceptual
features. We once again use Eq. 4.1, but simply set all weights to 0, except for wperceptual (which is
set to 1). That is, we compare the image we want to test with the medoid of the cluster and we apply
Eq. 4.2 as described above.
4.2.3 Datasets
We now present the datasets used in our measurements.
4.2.3.1 Web Communities
As mentioned earlier, our data sources are Web communities that post memes and meme annotation
sites. For the former, we focus on four communities: Twitter, Reddit, Gab, and 4chan (more pre-
cisely, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board, /pol/). This provides a mix of mainstream social networks
(Twitter and Reddit) as well as fringe communities that are often associated with the alt-right and
have an impact on the information ecosystem (Gab and /pol/) [331].
There are several other platforms playing important roles in spreading memes, however, many
are “closed” (e.g., Facebook) or do not involve memes based on static images (e.g., YouTube, Gi-
phy). In future work, we plan to extend our measurements to communities like Instagram and
Tumblr, as well as to GIF and video memes. Nonetheless, we believe our data sources already allow
us to elicit comprehensive insights into the meme ecosystem.
Table 4.14 reports the number of posts and images processed for each community. Note that the
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Platform #Posts #Posts with #Images #Unique
Images pHashes
Twitter 1,469,582,378 242,723,732 114,459,736 74,234,065
Reddit 1,081,701,536 62,321,628 40,523,275 30,441,325
/pol/ 48,725,043 13,190,390 4,325,648 3,626,184
Gab 12,395,575 955,440 235,222 193,783
KYM 15,584 15,584 706,940 597,060
Table 4.14: Overview of our datasets.
number of images is lower than the number of posts with images because of duplicate image URLs
and because some images get deleted. Next, we discuss each dataset.
Twitter. Our Twitter dataset is based on tweets made available via the 1% Streaming API, between
July 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017. In total, we parse 1.4B tweets: 242M of them have at least one
image. We extract all the images, ultimately collecting 114M images yielding 74M unique pHashes.
Reddit. We gather images from Reddit using publicly available data from Pushshift [250]. We parse
all submissions and comments between July 1, 2016 and July, 31 2017, and extract 62M posts that
contain at least one image. We then download 40M images producing 30M unique pHashes.
4chan. We obtain all threads posted on /pol/, between July 1, 2016 and July 31, 2017, using the same
methodology of [128]. Since all threads (and images) are removed after a week, we use a public
archive service called 4plebs [32] to collect 4.3M images, thus yielding 3.6M unique pHashes.
Gab. We collect 12M posts, posted on Gab between August 10, 2016 and July 31, 2017, and 955K
posts have at least one image, using the same methodology as in [328]. Out of these, 235K images
are unique, producing 193K unique pHashes. Note that our Gab dataset starts one month later than
the other ones, since Gab was launched in August 2016.
4.2.3.2 Meme Annotation Site
Know Your Meme (KYM). We choose KYM as the source for meme annotation as it offers a
comprehensive database of memes. KYM is a sort of encyclopedia of Internet memes: for each
meme, it provides information such as its origin (i.e., the platform on which it was first observed),
the year it started, as well as descriptions and examples. In addition, for each entry, KYM provides
a set of keywords, called tags, that describe the entry. Also, KYM provides a variety of higher-
level categories that group meme entries; namely, cultures, subcultures, people, events, and sites.
“Cultures” and “subcultures” entries refer to a wide variety of topics ranging from video games
to various general categories. For example, the Rage Comics subculture [176] is a higher level
category associated with memes related to comics like Rage Guy [177] or LOL Guy [167], while the
Alt-right culture [153] gathers entries from a loosely defined segment of the right-wing community.
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Figure 4.17: Basic statistics of the KYM dataset.
The rest of the categories refer to specific individuals (e.g., Donald Trump [160]), specific events
(e.g.,#CNNBlackmail [158]), and sites (e.g., /pol/ [175]), respectively. It is also worth noting that
KYM moderates all entries, hence entries that are wrong or incomplete are marked as so by the site.
As of May 2018, the site has 18.3K entries, specifically, 14K memes, 1.3K subcultures, 1.2K
people, 1.3K events, and 427 websites [168]. We crawl KYM between October and December 2017,
acquiring data for 15.6K entries; for each entry, we also download all the images related to it by
crawling all the pages of the image gallery. In total, we collect 707K images corresponding to 597K
unique pHashes. Note that we obtain 15.6K out of 18.3K entries, as we crawled the site several
months before May 2018.
Getting to know KYM. We also perform a general characterization of KYM. First, we look at the
distribution of entries across categories: as shown in Figure 4.17(a), as expected, the majority (57%)
are memes, followed by subcultures (30%), cultures (3%), websites (2%), and people (2%).
Next, we measure the number of images per entry: as shown in Figure 4.17(b), this varies
considerably (note log-scale on x-axis). KYM entries have as few as 1 and as many as 8K images,
with an average of 45 and a median of 9 images. Larger values may be related to the meme’s
popularity, but also to the “diversity” of image variants it generates. Upon manual inspection, we find
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that the presence of a large number of images for the same meme happens either when images are
visually very similar to each other (e.g., Smug Frog images within the two clusters in Figure 4.11),
or if there are actually remarkably different variants of the same meme (e.g., images in ‘cluster 1’
vs. images in ‘cluster N’ in the same figure). We also note that the distribution varies according to
the category: e.g., higher-level concepts like cultures include more images than more specific entries
like memes.
We then analyze the origin of each entry: see Figure 4.17(c). Note that a large portion of the
memes (28%) have an unknown origin, while YouTube, 4chan, and Twitter are the most popular
platforms with, respectively, 21%, 12%, and 11%, followed by Tumblr and Reddit with 8% and 7%.
This confirms our intuition that 4chan, Twitter, and Reddit, which are among our data sources, play
an important role in the generation and dissemination of memes. As mentioned, we do not currently
study video memes originating from YouTube, due to the inherent complexity of video-processing
tasks as well as scalability issues. However, a large portion of YouTube memes actually end up being
morphed into image-based memes (see, e.g., the Overly Attached Girlfriend meme [173]).
4.2.3.3 Running the pipeline on our datasets
For all four Web communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab), we perform Step 1 of the pipeline
(Figure 4.12), using the ImageHash library.4After computing the pHashes, we delete the images (i.e.,
we only keep the associated URL and pHash) due to space limitations of our infrastructure. We then
perform Steps 2-3 (i.e., pairwise comparisons between all images and clustering), for all the images
from /pol/, The Donald subreddit, and Gab, as we treat them as fringe Web communities. Note that,
we exclude mainstream communities like the rest of Reddit and Twitter as our main goal is to obtain
clusters of memes from fringe Web communities and later characterize all communities by means
of the clusters. Next, we go through Steps 4-5 using all the images obtained from meme annotation
websites (specifically, Know Your Meme, see Section 4.2.3.2) and the medoid of each cluster from
/pol/, The Donald, and Gab. Finally, Steps 6-7 use all the pHashes obtained from Twitter, Reddit
(all subreddits), /pol/, and Gab to find posts with images matching the annotated clusters. This is an
integral part of our process as it allows to characterize and study mainstream Web communities not
used for clustering (i.e., Twitter and Reddit).
4.2.4 Analysis
In this section, we present a cluster-based measurement of memes and an analysis of a few Web com-
munities from the “perspective” of memes. We measure the prevalence of memes across the clusters
obtained from fringe communities: /pol/, The Donald subreddit (T D), and Gab. We also use the
distance metric introduced in Eq. 4.1 to perform a cross-community analysis, then, we group clusters
into broad, but related, categories to gain a macro-perspective understanding of larger communities,
including Reddit and Twitter.
4https://github.com/JohannesBuchner/imagehash
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Platform #Images Noise #Clusters #Clusters with
KYM tags (%)
/pol/ 4,325,648 63% 38,851 9,265 (24%)
T D 1,234,940 64% 21,917 2,902 (13%)
Gab 235,222 69% 3,083 447 (15%)
Table 4.15: Statistics obtained from clustering images from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab.
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Figure 4.18: CDF of (a) KYM entries per cluster and (b)clusters per KYM entry.
4.2.4.1 Cluster-based Analysis
We start by analyzing the 12.6K annotated clusters consisting of 268K images from /pol/,
The Donald, and Gab (Step 5 in Figure 4.12). We do so to understand the diversity of memes in
each Web community, as well as the interplay between variants of memes. We then evaluate how
clusters can be grouped into higher structures using hierarchical clustering and graph visualization
techniques.
4.2.4.1.1 Clusters
Statistics. In Table 4.15, we report some basic statistics of the clusters obtained for each Web
community. A relatively high percentage of images (63%–69%) are not clustered, i.e., are labeled as
noise. While in DBSCAN “noise” is just an instance that does not fit in any cluster (more specifically,
there are less than 5 images with perceptual distance ≤ 8 from that particular instance), we note that
this likely happens as these images are not memes, but rather “one-off images.” For example, on
/pol/ there is a large number of pictures of random people taken from various social media platforms.
Overall, we have 2.1M images in 63.9K clusters: 38K clusters for /pol/, 21K for The Donald,
and 3K for Gab. 12.6K of these clusters are successfully annotated using the KYM data: 9.2K from
/pol/ (142K images), 2.9K from The Donald (121K images), and 447 from Gab (4.5K images).
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Figure 4.19: Images that are part of the Dubs Guy/Check Em Meme.
Figure 4.20: Images that are part of the Nut Button Meme.
We also present some examples of clusters showcasing how the proposed pipeline can effec-
tively detect and group images that belong to the same meme.
Specifically, Figure 4.19 shows a subset of the images from the Dubs Guy/Check Em
meme [161], Figure 4.20 a subset of images that belong to the Nut Button meme [172], while Fig-
ure 4.21 – to the Goofy’s Time meme [164]. Note that all these images are obtained from /pol/
clusters.
In all clusters, we observe similar variations, i.e., variations of Donald Trump, Adolf Hitler,
The Happy Merchant, and Pepe the Frog appear in all examples. Once again, this emphasizes the
overlap that exists among memes.
As for the un-annotated clusters, manual inspection confirms that many include miscellaneous
images unrelated to memes, e.g., similar screenshots of social networks posts (recall that we only
filter out screenshots from the KYM image galleries), images captured from video games, etc.
KYM entries per cluster. Each cluster may receive multiple annotations, depending on the KYM
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Figure 4.21: Images that are part of the Goofy’s Time Meme.
entries that have at least one image matching that cluster’s medoid. As shown in Figure 4.18(a), the
majority of the annotated clusters (74% for /pol/, 70% for The Donald, and 58% for Gab) only have
a single matching KYM entry. However, a few clusters have a large number of matching entries, e.g.,
the one matching the Conspiracy Keanu meme [159] is annotated by 126 KYM entries (primarily,
other memes that add text in an image associated with that meme). This highlights that memes do
overlap and that some are highly influenced by other ones.
Clusters per KYM entry. We also look at the number of clusters annotated by the same KYM
entry. Figure 4.18(b) plots the CDF of the number of clusters per entry. About 40% only annotate a
single /pol/ cluster, while 34% and 20% of the entries annotate a single The Donald and a single Gab
cluster, respectively. We also find that a small number of entries are associated to a large number
of clusters: for example, the Happy Merchant meme [165] annotates 124 different clusters on /pol/.
This highlights the diverse nature of memes, i.e., memes are mixed and matched, not unlike the way
that genetic traits are combined in biological reproduction.
Top KYM entries. Because the majority of clusters match only one or two KYM entries (Fig-
ure 4.18(a)), we simplify things by giving all clusters a representative annotation based on the most
prevalent annotation given to the medoid, and, in the case of ties the average distance between all
matches (see Section 4.2.2.2). Thus, in the rest of this thesis, we report our findings based on the
representative annotation for each cluster.
In Table 4.16, we report the top 20 KYM entries with respect to the number of clusters they an-
notate. These cover 17%, 23%, and 27% of the clusters in /pol/, The Donald, and Gab, respectively,
hence covering a relatively good sample of our datasets. Donald Trump [160], Smug Frog [181], and
Pepe the Frog [174] appear in the top 20 for all three communities, while the Happy Merchant [165]
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/pol/ T D Gab
Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%) Entry Category Clusters (%)
Donald Trump People 207 (2.2%) Donald Trump People 177 (6.1%) Donald Trump People 25 (5.6%)
Happy Merchant Memes 124 (1.3%) Smug Frog Memes 78 (2.7%) Happy Merchant Memes 10 (2.2%)
Smug Frog Memes 114 (1.2%) Pepe the Frog Memes 63 (2.1%) Demotivational Posters Memes 7 (1.5%)
Computer Reaction Faces Memes 112 (1.2%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 61 (2.1%) Pepe the Frog Memes 6 (1.3%)
Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog Memes 94 (1.0%) Make America Great Again Memes 50 (1.7%) #Cnnblackmail Events 6 (1.3%)
I Know that Feel Bro Memes 90 (1.0%) Bernie Sanders People 31 (1.0%) 2016 US election Events 6 (1.3%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why Memes 89 (1.0%) 2016 US Election Events 27 (0.9%) Know Your Meme Sites 6 (1.3%)
Bait/This is Bait Memes 84 (0.9%) Counter Signal Memes Memes 24 (0.8%) Tumblr Sites 6 (1.3%)
#TrumpAnime/Rick Wilson Events 76 (0.8%) #Cnnblackmail Events 24 (0.8%) Feminism Cultures 5 (1.1%)
Reaction Images Memes 73 (0.8%) Know Your Meme Sites 20 (0.7%) Barack Obama People 5 (1.1%)
Make America Great Again Memes 72 (0.8%) Angry Pepe Memes 18 (0.6%) Smug Frog Memes 5 (1.1%)
Counter Signal Memes Memes 72 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters Memes 18 (0.6%) rwby Subcultures 5 (1.1%)
Pepe the Frog Memes 65 (0.7%) 4chan Sites 16 (0.5%) Kim Jong Un People 5 (1.1%)
Spongebob Squarepants Subcultures 61 (0.7%) Tumblr Sites 15 (0.5%) Murica Memes 5 (1.1%)
Doom Paul its Happening Memes 57 (0.6%) Gamergate Events 15 (0.5%) UA Passenger Removal Events 5 (1.1%)
Adolf Hitler People 56 (0.6%) Colbertposting Memes 15 (0.5%) Make America Great Again Memes 4 (0.9%)
pol Sites 53 (0.6%) Donald Trump’s Wall Memes 15 (0.5%) Bill Nye People 4 (0.9%)
Dubs Guy/Check’em Memes 53 (0.6%) Vladimir Putin People 15 (0.5%) Trolling Cultures 4 (0.9%)
Smug Anime Face Memes 51 (0.6%) Barack Obama People 15 (0.5%) 4chan Sites 4 (0.9%)
Warhammer 40000 Subcultures 51 (0.6%) Hillary Clinton People 15 (0.5%) Furries Cultures 3 (0.7%)
Total 1,638 (17.7%) 695 (23.9%) 121 (27.1%)
Table 4.16: Top 20 KYM entries appearing in the clusters of /pol/, The Donald, and Gab. We report the
number of clusters and their respective percentage (per community). Each item contains a hyperlink to the
corresponding entry on the KYM website.
only in /pol/ and Gab. In particular, Donald Trump annotates the most clusters (207 in /pol/, 177
in The Donald, and 25 in Gab). In fact, politics-related entries appear several times in the Table,
e.g., Make America Great Again [169] as well as political personalities like Bernie Sanders, Barack
Obama, Vladimir Putin, and Hillary Clinton.
When comparing the different communities, we observe the most prevalent categories are
memes (6 to 14 entries in each community) and people (2-5). Moreover, in /pol/, the 2nd most
popular entry, related to people, is Adolf Hilter, which supports previous reports of the community’s
sympathetic views toward Nazi ideology [128]. Overall, there are several memes with hateful or dis-
turbing content (e.g., holocaust). This happens to a lesser extent in The Donald and Gab: the most
popular people after Donald Trump are contemporary politicians, i.e., Bernie Sanders, Vladimir
Putin, Barack Obama, and Hillary Clinton.
Finally, image posting behavior in fringe Web communities is greatly influenced by real-world
events. For instance, in /pol/, we find the #TrumpAnime controversy event [184], where a political
individual (Rick Wilson) offended the alt-right community, Donald Trump supporters, and anime
fans (an oddly intersecting set of interests of /pol/ users). Similarly, on The Donald and Gab, we find
the #Cnnblackmail [158] event, referring to the (alleged) blackmail of the Reddit user that created
the infamous video of Donald Trump wrestling the CNN.
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Figure 4.22: Inter-cluster distance between all clusters with frog memes. Clusters are labeled with the origin
(4 for 4chan, D for The Donald, and G for Gab) and the meme name. To ease readability, we do not display all
labels, abbreviate meme names, and only show an excerpt of all relationships.
4.2.4.1.2 Memes’ Branching Nature
Next, we study how memes evolve by looking at variants across different clusters. Intuitively, clus-
ters that look alike and/or are part of the same meme are grouped together under the same branch
of an evolutionary tree. We use the custom distance metric introduced in Section 4.2.2.3, aiming
to infer the phylogenetic relationship between variants of memes. Since there are 12.6K annotated
clusters, we only report on a subset of variants. In particular, we focus on “frog” memes (e.g., Pepe
the Frog [174]); as discussed later in Section 4.2.4.3, this is one of the most popular memes in our
datasets.
The dendrogram in Figure 4.22 shows the hierarchical relationship between groups of clusters
of memes related to frogs. Overall, there are 525 clusters of frogs, belonging to 23 different memes.
These clusters can be grouped into four large categories, dominated by Apu Apustaja [155], Feels
Bad Man/Sad Frog [163], Pepe the Frog [174], and Smug Frog [181]. The different memes express
different ideas or messages: e.g., Apu Apustaja depicts a simple-minded non-native speaker using
broken English, while the Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog (ironically) expresses dismay at a given situa-
tion, often accompanied with text like “You will never do/be/have X.” The dendrogram also shows
a variant of Smug Frog (smug-frog-b) related to a variant of the Russian Anti Meme Law [180]
(anti-meme) as well as relationships between clusters from Pepe the Frog and Isis meme [166], and
between Smug Frog and Brexit-related clusters [185], as shown in Section 4.2.5.2.
The distance metric quantifies the similarity of any two variants of different memes; however,
recall that two clusters can be close to each other even when the medoids are perceptually different
(see Section 4.2.2.3), as in the case of Smug Frog variants in the smug-frog-a and smug-frog-b
clusters (top of Figure 4.22). Although this analysis is limited to a single “family” of memes, our
distance metric can actually provide useful insights regarding the phylogenetic relationships of any
clusters. In fact, more extensive analysis of these relationships (through our pipeline) can facilitate
the understanding of the diffusion of ideas and information across the Web, and provide a rigorous
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Figure 4.23: Visualization of the obtained clusters from /pol/, The Donald, and Gab. Note that memes with
red labels are annotated as racist, while memes with green labels are annotated as politics (see Section 4.2.4.3.1
for the selection criteria).
technique for large-scale analysis of Internet culture.
4.2.4.2 Meme Visualization
We also use the custom distance metric (see Eq. 4.1) to visualize the clusters with annotations. We
build a graph G = (V ,E), where V are the medoids of annotated clusters and E the connections
between medoids with distance under a threshold κ . Figure 4.23 shows a snapshot of the graph
for κ = 0.45, chosen based on the frogs analysis above. In particular, we select this threshold as
the majority of the clusters from the same meme (note coloration in Figure 4.22) are hierarchically
connected with a higher-level cluster at a distance close to 0.45. To ease readability, we filter out
nodes and edges that have a sum of in- and out-degree less than 10, which leaves 40% of the nodes
and 92% of the edges. Nodes are colored according to their KYM annotation. NB: the graph is
laid out using the OpenOrd algorithm [215] and the distance between the components in it does not
exactly match the actual distance metric. We observe a large set of disconnected components, with
each component containing nodes of primarily one color. This indicates that our distance metric is
indeed capturing the peculiarities of different memes. Finally, note that an interactive version of the
full graph is publicly available from [2].
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/pol/ Reddit Gab Twitter
Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts(%)
Feels Bad Man/Sad Frog 64,367 (4.9%) Manning Face 12,540 (2.2%) Jesusland (P) 454 (1.6%) Roll Safe 55,010 (5.9%)
Smug Frog 63,290 (4.8%) That’s the Joke 7,626 (1.3%) Demotivational Posters 414 (1.5%) Evil Kermit 50,642 (5.4%)
Happy Merchant (R) 49,608 (3.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 7,240 (1.3%) Smug Frog 392 (1.4%) Arthur’s Fist 37,591 (4.0%)
Apu Apustaja 29,756 (2.2%) Confession Bear 7,147 (1.3%) Based Stickman (P) 391 (1.4%) Nut Button 13,598 (1,5%)
Pepe the Frog 25,197 (1.9%) This is Fine 5,032 (0.9%) Pepe the Frog 378 (1.3%) Spongebob Mock 11,136 (1,2%)
Make America Great Again (P) 21,229 (1.6%) Smug Frog 4,642 (0.8%) Happy Merchant (R) 297 (1.1%) Reaction Images 9,387 (1.0%)
Angry Pepe 20,485 (1.5%) Roll Safe 4,523 (0.8%) Murica 274 (1.0%) Conceited Reaction 9,106 (1.0%)
Bait this is Bait 16,686 (1.2%) Rage Guy 4,491 (0.8%) And Its Gone 235 (0.9%) Expanding Brain 8,701 (0.9%)
I Know that Feel Bro 14,490 (1.1%) Make America Great Again (P) 4,440 (0.8%) Make America Great Again (P) 207 (0.8%) Demotivational Posters 7,781 (0.8%)
Cult of Kek 14,428 (1.1%) Fake CCG Cards 4,438 (0.8%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 206 (0.8%) Cash Me Ousside/Howbow Dah 5,972 (0.6%)
Laughing Tom Cruise 14,312 (1.1%) Confused Nick Young 4,024 (0.7%) Trump’s First Order of Business (P) 192 (0.7%) Salt Bae 5,375 (0.6%)
Awoo 13,767 (1.0%) Daily Struggle 4,015 (0.7%) Kekistan 186 (0.6%) Feels Bad Man/ Sad Frog 4,991 (0.5%)
Tony Kornheiser’s Why 13,577 (1.0%) Expanding Brain 3,757 (0.7%) Picardia (P) 183 (0.6%) Math Lady/Confused Lady 4,722 (0.5%)
Picardia (P) 13,540 (1.0%) Demotivational Posters 3,419 (0.6%) Things with Faces (Pareidolia) 156 (0.5%) Computer Reaction Faces 4,720 (0.5%)
Big Grin / Never Ever 12,893 (1.0%) Actual Advice Mallard 3,293 (0.6%) Serbia Strong/Remove Kebab 149 (0.5%) Clinton Trump Duet (P) 3,901 (0.4%)
Reaction Images 12,608 (0.9%) Reaction Images 2,959 (0.5%) Riot Hipster 148 (0.5%) Kendrick Lamar Damn Album Cover 3,656 (0.4%)
Computer Reaction Faces 12,247 (0.9%) Handsome Face 2,675 (0.5%) Colorized History 144 (0.5%) What in tarnation 3,363 (0.3%)
Wojak / Feels Guy 11,682 (0.9%) Absolutely Disgusting 2,674 (0.5%) Most Interesting Man in World 140 (0.5%) Harambe the Gorilla 3,164 (0.3%)
Absolutely Disgusting 11,436 (0.8%) Pepe the Frog 2,672 (0.5%) Chuck Norris Facts 131 (0.4%) I Know that Feel Bro 3,137 (0.3%)
Spurdo Sparde 9,581 (0.7%) Pretending to be Retarded 2,462 (0.4%) Roll Safe 131 (0.4%) This is Fine 3,094 (0.3%)
Total 445,179 (33.4%) 94,069 (16.7%) 4,808 (17.0%) 249,047 (26.4%)
Table 4.17: Top 20 KYM entries for memes that we find our datasets. We report the number of posts for each
meme as well as the percentage over all the posts (per community) that contain images that match one of the
annotated clusters. The (R) and (P) markers indicate whether a meme is annotated as racist or politics-related,
respectively (see Section 4.2.4.3.1 for the selection criteria).
4.2.4.3 Web Community-based Analysis
We now present a macro-perspective analysis of the Web communities through the lens of memes.
We assess the presence of different memes in each community, how popular they are, and how they
evolve. To this end, we examine the posts from all four communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and Gab)
that contain images matching memes from fringe Web communities (/pol/, The Donald, and Gab).
4.2.4.3.1 Meme Popularity
Memes. We start by analyzing clusters grouped by KYM ‘meme’ entries, looking at the number of
posts for each meme in /pol/, Reddit, Gab, and Twitter.
In Table 4.17, we report the top 20 memes for each Web community sorted by the number of
posts. We observe that Pepe the Frog [174] and its variants are among the most popular memes
for every platform. While this might be an artifact of using fringe communities as a “seed” for
the clustering, recall that the goal of this work is in fact to gain an understanding of how fringe
communities disseminate memes and influence mainstream ones. Thus, we leave to future work a
broader analysis of the wider meme ecosystem.
Sad Frog [163] is the most popular meme on /pol/ (4.9%), the 3rd on Reddit (1.3%), the 10th
on Gab (0.8%), and the 12th on Twitter (0.5%). We also find variations like Smug Frog [181], Apu
Apustaja [155], Pepe the Frog [174], and Angry Pepe [154]. Considering that Pepe is treated as a hate
symbol by the Anti-Defamation League [200] and that is often used in hateful or racist, this likely
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/pol/ Reddit Gab Twitter
Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts (%) Entry Posts(%)
Donald Trump 60,611 (4.6%) Donald Trump 34,533 (6.1%) Donald Trump 1,665 (6.1%) Donald Trump 10,208 (1.3%)
Adolf Hitler 8,759 (0.6%) Steve Bannon 3,733 (0.6%) Mitt Romney 455 (1.7%) Barack Obama 5,187 (0.6%)
Mike Pence 4,738 (0.3%) Stephen Colbert 3,121 (0.6%) Bill Nye 370 (1.3%) Chelsea Manning 4,173 (0.5%)
Jeb Bush 4,217 (0.3%) Chelsea Manning 2,261 (0.4%) Adolf Hitler 106 (0.4%) Kim Jong Un 3,271 (0.4%)
Vladimir Putin 3,218 (0.2%) Ben Carson 2,148 (0.4%) Barack Obama 104 (0.4%) Anita Sarkeesian 2,764 (0.3%)
Alex Jones 3,206 (0.2%) Bernie Sanders 1,757 (0.3%) Isis Daesh 92 (0.3%) Bernie Sanders 2,277 (0.3%)
Ron Paul 3,116 (0.2%) Ajit Pai 1,658 (0.3%) Death Grips 91 (0.3%) Vladimir Putin 1,733 (0.2%)
Bernie Sanders 3,022 (0.2%) Barack Obama 1,628 (0.3%) Eminem 89 (0.3%) Billy Mays 1,454 (0.2%)
Massimo D’alema 2,725 (0.2%) Gabe Newell 1,518 (0.3%) Kim Jong Un 87 (0.3%) Adolf Hitler 1,304 (0.2%)
Mitt Romney 2,468 (0.2%) Bill Nye 1,478 (0.3%) Ajit Pai 76 (0.3%) Kanye West 1,261 (0.2%)
Chelsea Manning 2,403 (0.2%) Hillary Clinton 1,468 (0.3%) Pewdiepie 73 (0.3%) Bill Nye 968 (0.2%)
Hillary Clinton 2,378 (0.2%) Death Grips 1,463 (0.3%) Bernie Sanders 71 (0.3%) Mitt Romney 923 (0.1%)
A. Wyatt Mann 2,110 (0.2%) Adolf Hitler 1,449 (0.3%) Alex Jones 70 (0.3%) Filthy Frank 777 (0.1%)
Ben Carson 1,780 (0.1%) Mitt Romney 1,294 (0.2%) Hillary Clinton 59 (0.2%) Hillary Clinton 758 (0.1%)
Filthy Frank 1,598 (0.1%) Eminem 1,274 (0.2%) Anita Sarkeesian 54 (0.2%) Ajit Pai 715 (0.1%)
Table 4.18: Top 15 KYM entries about people that we find in each of our dataset. We report the number of
posts and the percentage over all the posts (per community) that match a cluster with KYM annotations.
indicates that polarized communities like /pol/ and Gab do use memes to incite hateful conversation.
This is also evident from the popularity of the anti-semitic Happy Merchant meme [165], which
depicts a “greedy” and “manipulative” stereotypical caricature of a Jew (3.8% on /pol/ and 1.1% on
Gab).
By contrast, mainstream communities like Reddit and Twitter primarily share harmless/neutral
memes, which are rarely used in hateful contexts. Specifically, on Reddit the top memes are Manning
Face [170] (2.2%) and That’s the Joke [182] (1.3%), while on Twitter the top ones are Roll Safe [179]
(5.9%) and Evil Kermit [162] (5.4%).
Once again, we find that users (in all communities) post memes to share politics-related infor-
mation, possibly aiming to enhance or penalize the public image of politicians (see Section 4.2.5.2
for an example of such memes). For instance, we find Make America Great Again [169], a meme
dedicated to Donald Trump’s US presidential campaign, among the top memes in /pol/ (1.6%), in
Reddit (0.8%), and Gab (0.8%). Similarly, in Twitter, we find the Clinton Trump Duet meme [157]
(0.4%), a meme inspired by the 2nd US presidential debate.
People. We also analyze memes related to people (i.e., KYM entries with the people category).
Table 4.18 reports the top 15 KYM entries in this category. We observe that, in all Web Communities,
the most popular person portrayed in memes is Donald Trump: he is depicted in 4.6% of /pol/ posts
that contain annotated images, while for Reddit, Gab, and Twitter the percentages are 6.1%, 6.1%,
and 1.3%, respectively. Other popular personalities, in all platforms, include several politicians. For
instance, in /pol/, we find Mike Pence (0.3%), Jeb Bush (0.3%), Vladimir Putin (0.2%), while, in
Reddit, we find Steve Bannon (0.6%), Chelsea Manning (0.6%), and Bernie Sanders (0.3%), in Gab,
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Figure 4.24: Percentage of posts per day in our dataset for all, racist, and politics-related memes.
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Figure 4.25: CDF of scores of posts that contain memes on Reddit and Gab.
Mitt Romney (1.7%) and Barack Obama (0.4%), and, in Twitter, Barack Obama (0.6%), Kim Jong
Un (0.5%), and Chelsea Manning (0.4%). This highlights the fact that users on these communities
utilize memes to share information and opinions about politicians, and possibly try to either enhance
or harm public opinion about them. Finally, we note the presence of Adolf Hitler memes on all Web
Communities, i.e., /pol/ (0.6%), Reddit (0.3%), Gab (0.4%), and Twitter (0.2%).
We further group memes into two high-level groups, racist and politics-related. We use the
tags that are available in our KYM dataset, i.e., we assign a meme to the politics-related group if it
has the “politics,” “2016 us presidential election,” “presidential election,” “trump,” or “clinton” tags,
and to the racism-related one if the tags include “racism,” “racist,” or “antisemitism,” obtaining 117
racist memes (4.4% of all memes that appear in our dataset) and 556 politics-related memes (21.2%
of all memes that appear on our dataset). In the rest of this section, we use these groups to further
study the memes, and later in Section 4.2.5 to estimate influence.
4.2.4.3.2 Temporal Analysis
Next, we study the temporal aspects of posts that contain memes from /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and
Gab. In Figure 4.24, we plot the percentage of posts per day that include memes. For all memes
(Figure 4.24(a)), we observe that /pol/ and Reddit follow a steady posting behavior, with a peak in
activity around the 2016 US elections. We also find that memes are increasingly more used on Gab
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All Memes Racism-Related Memes Politics-Related Memes
Subreddit Posts (%) Subreddit Posts (%) Subreddit Posts (%)
The Donald 82,698 (12.5%) The Donald 359 (9.3%) The Donald 24,343 (26.4%)
AdviceAnimals 35,475 (5.3%) AdviceAnimals 87 (2.2%) politics 2,751 (3.0%)
me irl 15,366 (2.3%) conspiracy 76 (2.0%) EnoughTrumpSpam 2,679 (2.9%)
politics 8,875 (1,3%) me irl 70 (1.8%) TrumpsTweets 2,363 (2.5%)
funny 8,508 (1.3%) funny 56 (1.4%) AdviceAnimals 1,740 (1.9%)
dankmemes 7,744 (1,1%) CringeAnarchy 43 (1.1%) USE2016 1,653 (1.8%)
EnoughTrumpSpam 6,973 (1.1%) EDH 43 (1.1%) PoliticsAll 1,401(1.5%)
pics 5,945 (0.9%) magicTCG 42 (1.1%) dankmemes 881 (0.9%)
AskReddit 5,482 (0.8%) dankmemes 40 (1.0%) pics 877 (0.9%)
HOTandTrending 4,674 (0.7%) ImGoingToHellForThis 39 (1.0%) me irl 873 (0.9%)
Table 4.19: Top ten subreddits for all memes, racism-related memes, and politics-related memes.
(see, e.g., 2016 vs 2017).
As shown in Figure 4.24(b), both /pol/ and Gab include a substantially higher number of posts
with racist memes, used over time with a difference in behavior: while /pol/ users share them in a
very steady and constant way, Gab exhibits a bursty behavior. A possible explanation is that the
former is inherently more racist, with the latter primarily reacting to particular world events. As for
political memes (Figure 4.24(c)), we find a lot of activity overall on Twitter, Reddit, and /pol/, but
with different spikes in time. On Reddit and /pol/, the peaks coincide with the 2016 US elections.
On Twitter, we note a peak that coincides with the 2nd US Presidential Debate on October 2016. For
Gab, there is again an increase in posts with political memes after January 2017.
4.2.4.3.3 Score Analysis
As discussed in Chapter 2, Reddit and Gab incorporate a voting system that determines the popularity
of content within the Web community and essentially captures the appreciation of other users towards
the shared content. To study how users react to racist and politics-related memes, we plot the CDF
of the posts’ scores that contain such memes in Figure 4.25.
For Reddit (Figure 4.25(a)), we find that posts that contain politics-related memes are rated
highly (mean score of 224.7 and a median of 5) than posts that contain non-politics memes (mean
124.9, median 4). On the contrary, posts that contain racist memes are rated lower (average score of
94.8 and a median of 3) than other non-racist memes (average 141.6 and median 4). On Gab (Fig-
ure 4.25(b)), posts that contain politics-related memes have a similar score as non-political memes
(mean 87.3 vs 82.4). However, this does not apply for racist and non-racist memes, as non-racist
memes have over 2 times higher scores than racist memes (means 84.7 vs 35.5).
Overall, this suggests that posts that contain politics-related memes receive high scores by
Reddit and Gab users, while for racist memes this applies only on Reddit.
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4.2.4.3.4 Sub-Communities
Among all the Web communities that we study, only Reddit is divided into multiple sub-
communities. We now study which sub-communities share memes with a focus on racist and
politics-related content. In Table 4.19, we report the top ten subreddits in terms of the percentage
over all posts that contain memes in Reddit for: 1) all memes; 2) racist ones; and 3) politics-related
memes.
For all three groups, the most popular subreddit is The Donald with 12.5%, 9.3%, and 26.4%,
respectively. Interestingly, AdviceAnimals, a general-purpose meme subreddit, is among the top-
ten sub-communities also for racist and political memes, highlighting their infiltration in otherwise
non-hateful communities.
Other popular subreddits for racist memes include conspiracy (2.0%), me irl (1.8%), and funny
(1.4%) subreddits. For politics-related memes, the majority of the subreddits are related to Donald
Trump, while there also are general subreddits that talk about politics, e.g., the politics (3.0%) and
the PoliticsAll subreddit (1.5%).
4.2.4.4 Take-Aways
In summary, the main take-aways of our analysis include:
1. Fringe Web communities use many variants of memes related to politics and world events,
possibly aiming to share weaponized information about them (Section 4.2.5.2 include some
examples of such memes). For instance, Donald Trump is the KYM entry with the largest
number of clusters in /pol/ (2.2%), The Donald (6.1%), and Gab (2.2%).
2. /pol/ and Gab share hateful and racist memes at a higher rate than mainstream communities,
as we find a considerable number of anti-semitic and pro-Nazi clusters (e.g., The Happy Mer-
chant meme [165] appears in 1.3% of all /pol/ annotated clusters and 2.2% of Gab’s, while
Adolf Hitler in 0.6% of /pol/’s). This trend is steady over time for /pol/ but ramping up for
Gab.
3. Seemingly “neutral” memes, like Pepe the Frog (or one of its variants), are used in conjunction
with other memes to incite hate or influence public opinion on world events, e.g., with images
related to terrorist organizations like ISIS or world events such as Brexit.
4. Our custom distance metric successfully allows us to study the interplay and the overlap of
memes, as showcased by the visualizations of the clusters and the dendrogram (see Figs. 4.22
and 4.23).
5. Reddit users are more interested in politics-related memes than other type of memes. That
said, when looking at individual subreddits, we find that The Donald is the most active one
when it comes to posting memes in general. It is also the subreddit where most racism and
politics-related memes are posted.
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/pol/ Twitter Reddit T D Gab
1,574,045 865,885 581,803 81,924 44,918
Table 4.20: Events per community from the 12.6K clusters.
4.2.5 Influence Estimation
So far we have studied the dissemination of memes by looking at Web communities in isolation.
However, in reality, these influence each other: e.g., memes posted on one community are often
re-posted to another. Aiming to capture the relationship between them, we use a statistical model
known as Hawkes Processes [204, 205], which describes how events occur over time on a collection
of processes (for more details regarding Hawkes Processes see Section 2.2).
4.2.5.1 Influence Results
We fit Hawkes models using Gibbs sampling as described in [205] for the 12.6K annotated clusters;
in Table 4.20, we report the total number of meme images posted to each community in these clus-
ters. As seen in Table 4.20, /pol/ has the greatest number of memes posted, followed by Twitter and
then Reddit. In terms of total images collected (see Table 4.14), Twitter and Reddit have many more
than /pol/. However, many of the images on these communities might not be memes; additionally,
because our clusters are created from the memes present on only /pol/, The Donald, and Gab (as
these are the communities primarily of interest in this work), it is possible that there are memes on
Twitter and Reddit that are not included in the clusters. This yields an additional interesting question:
how efficient are different communities at disseminating memes?
First, we report the source of events in terms of the percent of events on the destination com-
munity. This describes the results in terms of the data as we have collected it, e.g., it tells us the
percentage of memes posted on Twitter that were caused by /pol/. The second way we report in-
fluence is by normalizing the values by the total number of events in the source community, which
lets us see how much influence each community has, relative to the number of memes they post—in
other words, their efficiency.
We first look at the influence of all clusters together. Figure 4.26 shows the percent of events on
each destination community caused by each source community. The values from one community to
the same community (for example, from /pol/ to /pol/) include both events caused by the background
rate of that community and events caused by previous events within that community; these values
are the largest influence for each community. After this, /pol/ is the strongest source of influence for
Reddit, The Donald, and Gab, but not for Twitter, which is most influenced by Reddit. Interestingly,
although Twitter has a greater number of memes posted than Reddit, it causes less influence. Perhaps
there is less original content posted directly to Twitter.
Next, we look at the normalized influence of all clusters together. Figure 4.27 shows the influ-
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16.34%13.15%3.13%3.88%97.06%
8.89%8.92%4.78%90.37%1.21%
5.05%9.11%90.75%3.48%0.94%
0.56%59.60%0.16%0.15%0.09%
69.15%9.22%1.18%2.11%0.71%
Figure 4.26: Percent of destination events caused by the source community on the destination community.
Colors indicate the largest-to-smallest influences per destination.
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4.38%101.44%0.85%0.38%1.72%1.43%97.06%
12.34%102.71%1.25%0.69%7.11%90.37%3.28%
4.99%95.74%0.48%0.47%90.75%2.34%1.70%
9.10%68.70%1.02%59.60%3.07%1.98%3.03%
46.07%115.22%69.15%5.05%12.49%14.97%13.55%
Figure 4.27: Influence from source to destination community, normalized by the number of events in the source
community. Columns for total influence and total external influence are shown.
ence that a source community has on a destination community, normalized by the total number of
memes posted on the source community. The values can be understood as an indication of how much
influence a community has, relative to the frequency of memes posted. For example, the influence
Reddit has on Twitter is equal to 5.71% of the total events on Reddit. If the sum of values for a source
is less than 100%, it implies that many of the posts on the source community were caused by other
communities, or that posts on the source community do not cause many posts on other communities.
There are several interesting things to note in Figure 4.27. First, The Donald has by far the
greatest influence for the number of memes posted on it. This is particularly apparent when looking
at just external influence, where The Donald has more than 4 times as much influence than the rest
of Reddit, the closest other community. Memes from this community spread very well to all of
the other communities. While /pol/ has a large total influence on the other communities (as seen in
Figure 4.26), when normalized by its size, it has the smallest external influence: just 4.03%. Most
of the memes posted on /pol/ do not spread to other communities. Both Gab and Twitter have a total
normalized influence of less than 100%; much less in Gab’s case, although it has higher external
influence.
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Figure 4.28: Percent of the destination community’s racist (R) and non-racist (NR) meme postings caused by
the source community. Colors indicate the percent difference between racist and non-racist.
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Figure 4.29: Percent of the destination community’s political (P) and non-political (NP) meme postings caused
by the source community. Colors indicate the percent difference between political and non-political.
Using the clusters identified as either racist or non-racist (see the end of Section 4.2.4.3.1), we
compare how the communities influence the spread of these two types of content. Figure 4.28 shows
the percentage of both the destination community’s racist and non-racist meme posts caused by the
source community. We perform two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests to compare the distributions
of influence from the racist and non-racist clusters; cells with statistically significant differences
between influence of racist/non-racist memes (with p<0.01) are reported with a * in the figure.
/pol/ has the most total influence for both racist and non-racist memes, with the notable exception
of Twitter, where Reddit has the most the influence. Interestingly, while the percentage of racist
meme posts caused by /pol/ is greater than non-racist for Reddit, Twitter, and Gab, this is not the
case for The Donald. The only other cases where influence is greater for racist memes are Reddit to
The Donald and Gab to Reddit.
When looking at political vs non political memes (Figure 4.29), we see a somewhat different
story. Here, /pol/ influences The Donald more in terms of political memes. Further, we see dif-
ferences in the percent increase and decrease of influence between the two figures (as indicated by
the cell colors). For example, Twitter has a relatively larger difference in its influence on /pol/ and
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Figure 4.30: Influence from source to destination community of racist and non-racist meme postings, normal-
ized by the number of events in the source community.
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Figure 4.31: Influence from source to destination community of political and non-political meme postings,
normalized by the number of events in the source community.
Reddit for political and non-political memes than for racist and non-racist memes, but a smaller
difference in its influence on Gab and The Donald. This exposes how different communities have
varying levels of influence depending on the type of memes they post.
While examining the raw influence provides insights into the meme ecosystem, it obscures no-
table differences in the meme posting behavior of the different communities. To explore this, we look
at the normalized influence in Figure 4.30 (racist/non-racist memes) and Figure 4.31 (political/non-
political memes). As mentioned previously, normalization reveals how efficient the communities are
in disseminating memes to other communities by revealing the per meme influence of meme posts.
First, we note that the percent change in influence for the dissemination of racist/non-racist memes
is quite a bit larger than that for political/non-political memes (again, indicated by the coloring of
the cells). More interestingly, both figures show that, contrary to the total influence, /pol/ is the least
influential when taking into account the number of memes posted. While this might seem surpris-
ing, it actually yields a subtle, yet crucial aspect of /pol/’s role in the meme ecosystem: /pol/ (and
4chan in general) acts as an evolutionary microcosm for memes. The constant production of new
content [128] results in a “survival of the fittest” [93] scenario. A staggering number of memes
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Figure 4.32: Image that exists in the clusters that are connected with frogs and Isis Daesh.
are posted on /pol/, but only the best actually make it out to other communities. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first result quantifying this analogy to evolutionary pressure.
Take-Aways. There are several take-aways from our measurement of influence. We show that /pol/
is, generally speaking, the most influential disseminator of memes in terms of raw influence. In
particular, it is more influential in spreading racist memes than non-racist one, and this difference
is deeper than in any other community. There is one notable exception: /pol/ is more influential in
terms of non-racist memes on The Donald. Relatedly, /pol/ has generally more influence in terms
of spreading political memes than other communities. When looking at the normalized influence,
however, we surface a more interesting result: /pol/ is the least efficient in terms of influence while
The Donald is the most efficient. This provides new insight into the meme ecosystem: there are
clearly evolutionary effects. Many meme postings do not result in further dissemination, and one
of the key components to ensuring they are disseminated is ensuring that new “offspring” are con-
tinuously produced. /pol/’s “famed” meme magic, i.e., the propensity to produce and heavily push
memes, is thus the most likely explanation for /pol/’s influence on the Web in general.
4.2.5.2 Interesting Images
Finally, we report some “interesting” examples of images from our frogs case study (see Sec-
tion 4.2.4.1.2), as well as an example of an image for enhancing/penalizing the public image of
specific politicians (as discussed in Section 4.2.4.3.1).
Specifically, Figure 4.32 shows an image connecting the Smug Frog [181] and the ISIS
memes [166]. Also, Figure 4.33 shows an image connecting the Smug Frog and the Brexit
meme [185]. Finally, Figure 4.34 shows a graphic image found in /pol/ that aims to attack the image
of Hillary Clinton, while boosting that of Donald Trump. (The image depicts Hillary Clinton as a
monster, Medusa, while Donald Trump is presented as Perseus, the hero who beheaded Medusa.)
4.2.6 Remarks
In this work, we presented a large-scale measurement study of the meme ecosystem. We introduced a
novel image processing pipeline and ran it over 160M images collected from four Web communities
(4chan’s /pol/, Reddit, Twitter, and Gab). We clustered images from fringe communities (/pol/, Gab,
and Reddit’s The Donald) based on perceptual hashing and a custom distance metric, annotated the
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Figure 4.33: Image that exists in the clusters that are connected with frogs and Brexit.
Figure 4.34: Meme that is used for enhancing/penalizing the public image of specific politicians. Hillary Clin-
ton is represented as Medusa, a monster, while Donald Trump is presented as Perseus (the hero who beheaded
Medusa).
clusters using data gathered from Know Your Meme, and analyzed them along a variety of axes. We
then associated images from all the communities to the clusters to characterize them through the lens
of memes and the influence they have on each other.
Our analysis highlights that the meme ecosystem is quite complex, with intricate relationships
between different memes and their variants. We found important differences between the memes
posted on different communities (e.g., Reddit and Twitter tend to post “fun” memes, while Gab and
/pol/ racist or political ones). When measuring the influence of each community toward disseminat-
ing memes to other Web communities, we found that /pol/ has the largest overall influence for racist
and political memes, however, /pol/ was the least efficient, i.e., in terms of influence w.r.t. the total
4.2. Detecting and Understanding the Spread of Memes Across Multiple Web Communities 115
number of memes posted, while The Donald is very successful in pushing memes to both fringe and
mainstream Web communities.
Our work constitutes the first attempt to provide a multi-platform measurement of the meme
ecosystem, with a focus on fringe and potentially dangerous communities. Considering the increas-
ing relevance of digital information on world events, our study provides a building block for future
cultural anthropology work, as well as for building systems to protect against the dissemination of
harmful ideologies. Moreover, our pipeline can already be used by social network providers to as-
sist the identification of hateful content; for instance, Facebook is taking steps to ban Pepe the Frog
used in the context of hate [202], and our methodology can help them automatically identify hateful
variants. Finally, our pipeline can be used for tracking the propagation of images from any context
or other language spheres, provided an appropriate annotation dataset.
Performance. We also measured the time that it takes to associate images posted on Web com-
munities to memes. All other steps in our system are one-time batch tasks, only executed if the
annotations dataset is updated. To ease presentation, we only report the time to compare all the 74M
images from Twitter (the largest dataset) against the medoids of all 12K annotated clusters: it took
about 12 days on our infrastructure, equipped with two NVIDIA Titan Xp GPUs. This corresponds
to 14ms per image, or 73 images per second. Note that, if new GPUs are added to our infrastructure,
the workload would be divided equally across all GPUs.
Chapter 5
Characterizing the Role of Emerging Web
Communities and Services on the
Information Ecosystem
In this chapter, we study various Web communities and services, with a particular focus on under-
standing their role in the spread of information on the Web. Specifically, we study Gab with the goal
to understand and characterize the platform with respect to the content and users it attracts. Also, we
study Web archiving services (services that archive Web content) and how they are used by users on
Twitter, Reddit, 4chan, and Gab.
5.1 What is Gab?
5.1.1 Motivation
The Web’s information ecosystem is composed of multiple communities with varying influ-
ence [331]. As mainstream online social networks become less novel, users have begun to join
smaller, more focused platforms. In particular, as the former have begun to reject fringe communi-
ties identified with racist and aggressive behavior, a number of alt-right focused services have been
created. Among these emerging communities, the Gab social network has attracted the interest of
a large number of users since its creation in 2016 [104], a few months before the US Presidential
Election. Gab was created, ostensibly as a censorship-free platform, aiming to protect free speech
above anything else. From the very beginning, site operators have welcomed users banned or sus-
pended from platforms like Twitter for violating terms of service, often for abusive and/or hateful
behavior. In fact, there is extensive anecdotal evidence that the platform has become the alt-right’s
new hub [317] and that it exhibits a high volume of hate speech [249] and racism [46]. As a re-
sult, in 2017, both Google and Apple rejected Gab’s mobile apps from their stores because of hate
speech [249] and non-compliance to pornographic content guidelines [27].
In this work, we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first characterization of the Gab
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social network. We crawl the Gab platform and acquire 22M posts by 336K users over a 1.5 year
period (August 2016 to January 2018). Overall, the main findings of our analysis include:
1. Gab attracts a wide variety of users, ranging from well-known alt-right personalities like Milo
Yiannopoulos to conspiracy theorists like Alex Jones. We also find a number of “troll” ac-
counts that have migrated over from other platforms like 4chan, or that have been heavily
inspired by them.
2. Gab is predominantly used for the dissemination and discussion of world events, news, as
well as conspiracy theories. Interestingly, we note that Gab reacts strongly to events related to
white nationalism and Donald Trump.
3. Hate speech is extensively present on the platform, as we find that 5.4% of the posts include
hate words. This is 2.4 times higher than on Twitter, but 2.2 times lower than on 4chan’s
Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) [128].
4. There are several accounts making coordinated efforts towards recruiting millennials to the
alt-right.
In summary, our analysis highlights that Gab appears to be positioned at the border of main-
stream social networks like Twitter and “fringe” Web communities like 4chan’s /pol/. We find that,
while Gab claims to be all about free speech, this seems to be merely a shield behind which its
alt-right users hide.
5.1.2 Dataset
Using Gab’s API, we crawl the social network using a snowball methodology. Specifically, we
obtain data for the most popular users as returned by Gab’s API and iteratively collect data from all
their followers as well as their followings. We collect three types of information: 1) basic details
about Gab accounts, including username, score, date of account creation; 2) all the posts for each
Gab user in our dataset; and 3) all the followers and followings of each user that allow us to build
the following/followers network. Overall, we collect 22,112,812 posts from 336,752 users, between
August 2016 and January 2018.
5.1.3 Analysis
In this section, we provide our analysis on the Gab platform. Specifically, we analyze Gab’s user
base and posts that get shared across several axes.
5.1.3.1 Ranking of users
To get a better handle on the interests of Gab users, we first examine the most popular users using
three metrics: 1) the number of followers; 2) user account score; and 3) user PageRank. These three
metrics provide us a good overview of things in terms of “reach,” appreciation of content production,
and importance in terms of position within the social network. We report the top 20 users for each
5.1. What is Gab? 118
Followers Scores PageRank
Name Username # Name Username # Name Username PR score
Milo Yiannopoulos m 45,060 Andrew Torba a 819,363 Milo Yiannopoulos m 0.013655
PrisonPlanet PrisonPlanet 45,059 John Rivers JohnRivers 606,623 Andrew Torba a 0.012818
Andrew Torba a 38,101 Ricky Vaughn Ricky Vaughn99 496,962 PrisonPlanet PrisonPlanet 0.011762
Ricky Vaughn Ricky Vaughn99 30,870 Don Don 368,698 Mike Cernovich Cernovich 0.006549
Mike Cernovich Cernovich 29,081 Jared Wyand JaredWyand 281,798 Ricky Vaughn Ricky Vaughn99 0.006143
Stefan Molyneux stefanmolyneux 26,337 [omitted] TukkRivers 253,781 Sargon of Akkad Sargonofakkad100 0.005823
Brittany Pettibone BrittPettibone 24,799 Brittany Pettibone BrittPettibone 244,025 [omitted] d seaman 0.005104
Jebs DeadNotSleeping 22,659 Tony Jackson USMC-Devildog 228,370 Stefan Molyneux stefanmolyneux 0.004830
[omitted] TexasYankee4 20,079 [omitted] causticbob 228,316 Brittany Pettibone BrittPettibone 0.004218
[omitted] RightSmarts 20,042 Constitutional Drunk USSANews 224,261 Vox Day voxday 0.003972
Vox Day voxday 19,454 Truth Whisper truthwhisper 206,516 Alex Jones RealAlexJones 0.003345
[omitted] d seaman 18,080 Andrew Anglin AndrewAnglin 203,437 Lauren Southern LaurenSouthern 0.002984
Alex Jones RealAlexJones 17,613 Kek Magician Kek Magician 193,819 Donald J Trump realdonaldtrump 0.002895
Jared Wyand JaredWyand 16,975 [omitted] shorty 169,167 Dave Cullen DaveCullen 0.002824
Ann Coulter AnnCoulter 16,605 [omitted] SergeiDimitrovicIvanov 169,091 [omitted] e 0.002648
Lift lift 16,544 Kolja Bonke KoljaBonke 160,246 Chuck C Johnson Chuckcjohnson 0.002599
Survivor Medic SurvivorMed 16,382 Party On Weimerica CuckShamer 155,021 Andrew Anglin AndrewAnglin 0.002599
[omitted] SalguodNos 16,124 PrisonPlanet PrisonPlanet 154,829 Jared Wyand JaredWyand 0.002504
Proud Deplorable luther 15,036 Vox Day voxday 150,930 Pax Dickinson pax 0.002400
Lauren Southern LaurenSouthern 14,827 W.O. Cassity wocassity 144,875 Baked Alaska apple 0.002292
Table 5.1: Top 20 popular users on Gab according to the number of followers, their score, and their ranking
based on PageRank in the followers/followings network. We omit the “screen names” of certain accounts for
ethical reasons.
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Figure 5.1: Correlation of the rankings for each pair of rankings: (a) Followers - Score; (b) PageRank - Score;
and (c) PageRank - Followers.
metric in Table 5.1. Although we believe that their existence in Table 5.1 is arguably indicative
of their public figure status, for ethical reasons, we omit the “screen names” for accounts in cases
where a potential link between the screen name and the user’s real life names existed and it was
unclear to us whether or not the user is a public figure. While Twitter has many celebrities in the
most popular users [195], Gab seems to have what can at best be described as alt-right celebrities
like Milo Yiannopoulos and Mike Cernovich.
Number of followers. The number of followers that each account has can be regarded as a metric of
impact on the platform, as a user with many followers can share its posts to a large number of other
users. We observe a wide variety of different users; 1) popular alt-right users like Milo Yiannopoulos,
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Mike Cernovich, Stefan Molyneux, and Brittany Pettibone; 2) Gab’s founder Andrew Torba; and
3) popular conspiracy theorists like Alex Jones. Notably lacking are users we might consider as
counter-points to the alt-right right, an indication of Gab’s heavily right-skewed user-base.
Score. The score of each account is a metric of content popularity, as it determines the number of
up-votes and down-votes that they receive from other users. In other words, is the degree of appre-
ciation from other users. By looking at the ranking using the score, we observe two new additional
categories of users: 1) users purporting to be news outlets, likely pushing false or controversial
information on the network like PrisonPlanet and USSANews; and 2) troll users that seem to have
migrated from or been inspired by other platforms (e.g., 4chan) like Kek Magician and CuckShamer.
PageRank. We also compute PageRank on the followers/followings network and we rank the users
according to the obtained score. We use this metric as it quantifies the structural importance of nodes
within a network according to its connections. Here, we observe some interesting differences from
the other two rankings. For example, the account with username “realdonaldtrump,” an account
reserved for Donald Trump, appears in the top users mainly because of the extremely high number
of users that follow this account, despite the fact that it has no posts or score.
Comparison of rankings. To compare the three aforementioned rankings, we plot the ranking of
all the users for each pair of rankings in Fig. 5.1. We observe that the pair with the most agreement
is PageRank-Followers (Fig. 5.1(c)), followed by the pair Followers-Score (Fig, 5.1(a)), while the
pair with the least agreement is PageRank - Score (Fig 5.1(b). Overall, for all pairs we find a varying
degree of rank correlation. Specifically, we calculate the Spearman’s correlation coefficient for each
pair of rankings; finding 0.53, 0.42, 0.26 for PageRank-Followers, Followers-Score, and PageRank-
Score, respectively. While these correlations are not terribly strong, they are significant (p < 0.01)
for the two general classes of users: those that play an important structural role in the network,
perhaps encouraging the diffusion of information, and those that produce content the community
finds valuable.
5.1.3.2 User account analysis
User descriptions. To further assess the type of users that the platform attracts we analyze the de-
scription of each created account in our dataset. Note that by default Gab adds a quote from a famous
person as the description of each account and a user can later change it. Although not perfect, we
look for any user description enclosed in quotes with a “–” followed by a name, and assume it is a de-
fault quote. Using this heuristic, we find that only 20% of the users actively change their description
from the default. Table 5.2 reports the top words and bigrams found in customized descriptions (we
remove stop words for more meaningful results). Examining the list, it is apparent that Gab users
are conservative Americans, religious, and supporters of Donald Trump and “free speech.” We also
find some accounts that are likely bots and trying to deceive users with their descriptions; among the
top bigrams there some that nudge users to click on URLs, possibly malicious, with the promise that
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Word (%) Bigram (%)
maga 4.35% free speech 1.24%
twitter 3.62% trump supporter 0.74%
trump 3.53% night area 0.49%
conservative 3.47% area wanna 0.48%
free 3.08% husband father 0.45%
love 3.03% check link 0.42%
people 2.76% freedom speech 0.41%
life 2.70% hey guys 0.40%
like 2.67% donald trump 0.40%
man 2.49% man right 0.39%
truth 2.46% america great 0.39%
god 2.45% link contracts 0.35%
world 2.44% wanna check 0.34%
freedom 2.29% make america 0.34%
right 2.27% need man 0.34%
american 2.25% guys need 0.33%
want 2.23% president trump 0.32%
one 2.20% guy sex 0.31%
christian 2.17% click link 0.30%
time 2.14% link login 0.30%
Table 5.2: Top 20 words and bigrams found in the descriptions of Gab users.
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Figure 5.2: Percentage of accounts created per month.
they will get sex. For example, we find many descriptions similar to the following: “Do you wanna
get sex tonight? One step is left ! Click the link - < url >.” It is also worth noting that our account
(created for crawling the platform) was followed by 12 suspected bot accounts between December
2017 and January 2018 without making any interactions with the platform (i.e., our account has
never made a post or followed any user).
User account creation. We also look when users joined the Gab platform. Fig. 5.2 reports the
percentage of accounts created for each month of our dataset. Interestingly, we observe that we have
peaks for account creation on November 2016 and August 2017. These findings highlight the fact
that Gab became popular during notable world and politics events like the 2016 US elections as well
as the Charlottesville Unite the Right rally [315]. Finally, only a small percentage of Gab’s users are
either pro or verified, 0.75% and 0.5%, respectively, while 1.7% of the users have a private account
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Figure 5.3: Followers and Following analysis (a) CDF of number of followers and following (b) number of
followers and number of posts and (c) number of following and number of posts.
(i.e., only their followers can see their gabs).
Followers/Followings. Fig. 5.3 reports our analysis based on the number of followers and followings
for each user. From Fig. 5.3(a) we observe that in general Gab users have a larger number of
followers when compared with following users. Interestingly, 43% of users are following zero other
users, while only 4% of users have zero followers. I.e., although counter-intuitive, most users have
more followers than users they follow. Figs. 5.3(b) and 5.3(c) show the number of followers and
following in conjunction with the number of posts for each Gab user. We bin the data in log-scale
bins and we report the mean and median value for each bin. We observe that in both cases, that there
is a near linear relationship with the number of posts and followers/followings up until around 10
followers/followings. After this point, we see this relationship diverge, with a substantial number
of users with huge numbers of posts, some over 77K. This demonstrates the extremely heavy tail in
terms of content production on Gab, as is typical of most social medial platforms.
Reciprocity. From the followers/followings network we find a low level of reciprocity: specifically,
only 29.5% of the node pairs in the network are connected both ways, while the remaining 71.5%
are connected one way. When compared with the corresponding metric on Twitter [195], these
results highlight that Gab has a larger degree of network reciprocity indicating that the community is
more tightly-knit, which is expected when considering that Gab mostly attracts users from the same
ideology (i.e., alt-right community).
5.1.3.3 Posts Analysis
Basic Statistics. First, we note that 63% of the posts in our dataset are original posts while 37%
are reposts. Interestingly, only 0.14% of the posts are marked as NSFW. This is surprising given
the fact that one of the reasons that Apple rejected Gab’s mobile app is due to the share of NSFW
content [27]. From browsing the Gab platform, we also can anecdotally confirm the existence of
NSFW posts that are not marked as such, raising questions about how Gab moderates and enforces
the use of NSFW tags by users. When looking a bit closer at their policies, Gab notes that they use
a 1964 United States Supreme Court Ruling [310] on pornography that provides the famous “I’ll
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Domain (%) Domain (%)
youtube.com 4.22% zerohedge.com 0.53%
youtu.be 2.67% twimg.com 0.53%
twitter.com 1.96% dailycaller.com 0.49%
breitbart.com 1.44% t.co 0.47%
bit.ly 0.82% ussanews.com 0.46%
thegatewaypundit.com 0.74% dailymail.co.uk 0.46%
kek.gg 0.69% tinyurl.com 0.44%
imgur.com 0.68% wordpress.com 0.43%
sli.mg 0.61% foxnews.com 0.41%
infowars.com 0.56% blogspot.com 0.32%
Table 5.3: Top 20 domains in posts and their respective percentage over all posts.
known it when I see it” test. In any case, it would seem that Gab’s social norms are relatively lenient
with respect to what is considered NSFW.
We also look into the languages of the posts, as returned by Gab’s API. We find that Gab’s
API does not return a language code for 56% of posts. By looking at the dataset, we find that all
posts before June 2016 do not have an associated language; possibly indicating that Gab added the
language field afterwards. Nevertheless, we find that the most popular languages are English (40%),
Deutsch (3.3%), and French (0.14%); possibly shedding light to Gab’s users locations which are
mainly the US, the UK, and Germany.
URLs. Next, we assess the use of URLs in Gab; overall we find 3.5M unique URLs from 81K
domains. Table 6.14 reports the top 20 domains according to their percentage of inclusion in all
posts. We observe that the most popular domain is YouTube with almost 7% of all posts, followed
by Twitter with 2%. Interestingly, we note the extensive use of alternative news sources like Breitbart
(1.4%), The Gateway Pundit (0.7%), and Infowars (0.5%), while mainstream news outlets like Fox
News (0.4%) and Daily Mail (0.4%) are further below. Also, we note the use of image hosting
services like Imgur (0.6%), sli.mg (0.6%), and kek.gg (0.7%) and URL shorteners like bit.ly
(0.8%) and tinyurl.com (0.4%). Finally, it is worth mentioning that The Daily Stormer, a well
known neo-Nazi web community is five ranks ahead of the most popular mainstream news source,
The Hill.
Hashtags & Mentions As discussed in Chapter 2, Gab supports the use of hashtags and mentions
similar to Twitter. Table 5.4 reports the top 20 hashtags/mentions that we find in our dataset. We
observe that the majority of the hashtags are used in posts about Trump, news, and politics. We note
that among the top hashtags are “AltRight”, indicating that Gab users are followers of the alt-right
movement or they discuss topics related to the alt-right; “Pizzagate”, which denotes discussions
around the notorious conspiracy theory [309]; and “BanIslam”, which indicate that Gab users are
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Hashtag (%) Mention (%)
MAGA 6.06% a 0.69%
GabFam 4.22% TexasYankee4 0.31%
Trump 3.01% Stargirlx 0.26%
SpeakFreely 2.28% YouTube 0.24%
News 2.00% support 0.23%
Gab 0.88% Amy 0.22%
DrainTheSwamp 0.71% RaviCrux 0.20%
AltRight 0.61% u 0.19%
Pizzagate 0.57% BlueGood 0.18%
Politics 0.53% HorrorQueen 0.17%
PresidentTrump 0.47% Sockalexis 0.17%
FakeNews 0.41% Don 0.17%
BritFam 0.37% BrittPettibone 0.16%
2A 0.35% TukkRivers 0.15%
maga 0.32% CurryPanda 0.15%
NewGabber 0.28% Gee 0.15%
CanFam 0.27% e 0.14%
BanIslam 0.25% careyetta 0.14%
MSM 0.22% PrisonPlanet 0.14%
1A 0.21% JoshC 0.12%
Table 5.4: Top 20 hashtags and mentions found in Gab. We report their percentage over all posts.
sharing their islamophobic views. It is also worth noting the use of hashtags for the dissemination of
popular memes, like the Drain the Swamp meme that is popular among Trump’s supporters [261].
When looking at the most popular users that get mentioned, we find popular users related to the Gab
platform like Andrew Torba (Gab’s CEO with username @a).
We also note users that are popular with respect to mentions, but do not appear in Table 5.1’s
lists of popular users. For example, Amy is an account purporting to be Andrew Torba’s mother. The
user Stargirlx, who we note changed usernames three times during our collection period, appears to
be an account presenting itself as a millennial “GenZ” young woman. Interestingly, it seems that
Amy and Stargirlx have been organizing Gab “chats,” which are private groups of users, for 18
to 29 year olds to discuss politics; possibly indicating efforts to recruit millennials to the alt-right
community.
Categories & Topics. As discussed in Chapter 2, gabs may be part of a topic or category. By
analyzing the data, we find that this happens for 12% and 42% of the posts for topics and cate-
gories, respectively. Table 5.5 reports the percentage of posts for each category as well as for the
top 15 topics. For topics, we observe that the most popular are general “Ask Me Anything” (AMA)
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Topic (%) Category (%)
Deutsch 2.29% News 15.91%
BritFam 0.73% Politics 10.30%
Introduce Yourself 0.59% AMA 4.46%
International News 0.19% Humor 3.50%
DACA 0.17% Technology 1.44%
Las Vegas Terror Attack 0.16% Philosophy 1.06%
Hurricane Harvey 0.16% Entertainment 1.01%
Gab Polls 0.13% Art 0.72%
London 0.12% Faith 0.69%
2017 Meme Year in Review 0.12% Science 0.56%
Twitter Purge 0.12% Music 0.52%
Seth Rich 0.11% Sports 0.39%
Memes 0.11% Photography 0.37%
Vegas Shooting 0.11% Finance 0.31%
Judge Roy Moore 0.09% Cuisine 0.16%
Table 5.5: Top 15 categories and topics found in the Gab dataset
topics like Deutsch (2.29%, for German users), BritFam (0.73%, for British users), and Introduce
Yourself (0.59%). Furthermore, other popular topics include world events and news like Interna-
tional News (0.59%), Las Vegas shooting (0.27%), and conspiracy theories like Seth Rich’s Murder
(0.11%). When looking at the top categories we find that by far the most popular categories are News
(15.91%) and Politics (10.30%). Other popular categories include AMA 4.46%), Humor (3.50%),
and Technology (1.44%).
These findings highlight that Gab is heavily used for the dissemination and discussion of world
events and news. Therefore, its role and influence on the Web’s information ecosystem should be
assessed in the near future. Also, this categorization of posts can be of great importance for the
research community as it provides labeled ground truth about discussions around a particular topic
and category.
Hate speech assessment. As previously discussed, Gab was openly accused of allowing the dis-
semination of hate speech. In fact, Google removed Gab’s mobile app from its Play Store because
it violates their hate speech policy [249]. Due to this, we aim to assess the extent of hate speech in
our dataset. Using the modified Hatebase [31] dictionary used by the authors of [128], we find that
5.4% of all Gab posts include a hate word. In comparison, Gab has 2.4 times the rate of hate words
when compared to Twitter, but less than halve the rate of hate words compared to 4chan’s Politically
Incorrect board (/pol/) [128]. These findings indicate that Gab resides on the border of mainstream
social networks like Twitter and fringe Web communities like 4chan’s Politically Incorrect (/pol/)
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Figure 5.4: Temporal analysis of the Gab posts (a) each day; (b) based on hour of day and (c) based on hour of
week.
board.
Temporal Analysis. Finally, we study the posting behavior of Gab users from a temporal point
of view. Fig. 6.13 shows the distribution of the Gab posts in our dataset according to each day of
our dataset, as well as per hour of day and week (in UTC). We observe that the general trend is
that the number of Gab’s posts increase over time (Fig. 5.8(a)); this indicates an increase in Gab’s
popularity. Furthermore, we note that Gab users posts most of their gabs during the afternoon and
late night (after 3 PM UTC) while they rarely post during the morning hours (Fig. 5.8(b)). Also, the
aforementioned posting behavior follow a diurnal weekly pattern as we show in Fig. 5.4(c).
To isolate significant days in the time series in Fig. 5.8(a), we perform a changepoint analy-
sis using the Pruned Exact Linear Time (PELT) method [150]. First, we use our knowledge of the
weekly variation in average post numbers from Fig. 5.4(c) to subtract from our timeseries the mean
number of posts for each day. This leaves us with a mean-zero timeseries of the deviation of the
number of posts per day from the daily average. We assume that this timeseries is drawn from a
normal distribution, with mean and variance that can change at a discrete number of changepoints.
We then use the PELT algorithm to maximize the log-likelihood function for the mean(s) and vari-
ance(s) of this distribution, with a penalty for the number of changepoints. By ramping down the
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penalty function, we produce a ranking of the changepoints.
Examining current events around these changepoints provides insight into they dynamics that
drive Gab behavior. First, we note that there is a general increase in activity up to the Trump inau-
guration, at which point activity begins to decline. When looking later down the timeline, we see
an increase in activity after the changepoint marked 1 in Fig. 5.8(a). Changepoint 1 coincides with
James Comey’s firing from the FBI, and the relative acceleration of the Trump-Russian collusion
probe [278].
The next changepoint (2) coincides with the so-called “March Against Sharia” [217] organized
by the alt-right, with the event marked 4 corresponding to Trump’s “blame on both sides” response
to violence at the Unite the Right Rally in Charlottesville [274]. Similarly, we see a meaningful
response to Twitter’s banning of abusive users [87] marked as changepoint 5.
Changepoint 3, occurring on July 12, 2017 is of particular interest, since it is the most extreme
reduction in activity recognized as a changepoint. From what we can tell, this is a reaction to Donald
Trump Jr. releasing emails that seemingly evidenced his meeting with a Russian lawyer to receive
compromising intelligence on Hillary Clinton’s campaign [279]. I.e., the disclosure of evidence of
collusion with Russia corresponded to the single largest drop in posting activity on Gab.
5.1.4 Remarks
In this work, we have provided the first characterization of a new social network called Gab. We
analyzed 22M posts from 336K users, finding that Gab attracts the interest of users ranging from
alt-right supporters and conspiracy theorists to trolls. We showed that Gab is extensively used for
the discussion of news, world events, and politics-related topics, further motivating the need take
it into account when studying information cascades on the Web. By looking at the posts for hate
words, we also found that 5.4% of the posts include hate words. Finally, using changepoint analysis,
we highlighted how Gab reacts very strongly to real-world events focused around white nationalism
and support of Donald Trump.
5.2 Understanding Web Archiving Services and their Use on
Multiple Web Communities
5.2.1 Motivation
In today’s digital society, the availability and persistence of Web resources are very relevant issues.
A substantial number of URLs shared on the Web becomes unavailable after some time as websites
are shutdown or redesigned in a way that does not preserve old URLs – a phenomenon known as
“link rot” [188]. Moreover, content might be taken down by authorities on a legal basis, deleted
by users who have shared it on social media, removed as per the “right to be forgotten” [92], etc.
Overall, the ephemerality of Web content often prompts debate with respect to its impact on the
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availability of information, accountability, or even censorship.
In this context, an important role is played by services like the Wayback Machine (archive.
org), which proactively archives large portions of the Web, allowing users to search and retrieve
the history of more than 300 billion pages. At the same time, on-demand archiving services like
archive.is have also become popular: users can take a snapshot of a Web page by entering its
URL, which the system crawls and archives, returning a permanent short URL serving as a time
capsule that can be shared across the Web.
Archiving services serve a variety of purposes beyond addressing link rot. Platforms like
archive.is are reportedly used to preserve controversial blogs and tweets that the author may
later opt to delete [226]. Moreover, they also reduce Web traffic toward “source URLs” when the
original content is still accessible, thus depriving them of potential ad revenue streams (users do
not visit the original site, but just the archived copy). In fact, anecdotal evidence has emerged that
alt-right communities target outlets they disagree with by nudging their users to share archive URLs
instead [187], or discrediting them by pointing at earlier versions of articles [254].
Given the role in helping content persist, their use on social networks, as well as anecdotal
evidence of their misuse in contexts where information could be weaponized [231], archiving ser-
vices are arguably impactful actors that should be thoroughly analyzed. To this end, we aim to shed
light on the Web archiving ecosystem, aiming to answer the following research questions: How are
archive URLs disseminated across popular social networks? What kind of content gets archived, by
whom and why? Are archiving services misused in any way?
To answer these questions, we perform a large-scale quantitative analysis of Web archives,
based on two data sources: 1) 21M URLs collected from the archive.is live feed, and 2) 356K
archive.is plus 391K Wayback Machine URLs that were shared on four social networks: Red-
dit, Twitter, Gab, and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/).
Our main findings include:
1. News and social media posts are the most common types of content archived, likely due to
their (perceived) ephemeral and/or controversial nature.
2. URLs of archiving services are extensively shared on “fringe” communities within Reddit and
4chan to preserve possibly contentious content, or to refer to it without increasing the Web
traffic to the source. We also find that /pol/ and Gab users favor archive.is over Wayback
Machine (respectively, 15x and 16x), highlighting a particular use case in “controversial”
online communities.
3. Web archives are exploited by users to bypass censorship policies in some communities: for
instance, /pol/ users post archive.is URLs to share content from 8chan and Facebook,
which are banned on the platform, or to circumvent accidental censorship of some news
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sources because of substitution filters (e.g., ‘smh’ becomes ‘baka’, so links to smh.com.au
are unusable).
4. Reddit bots are responsible for posting a very large portion of archive URLs in Reddit (re-
spectively, 44% and 85% of archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs). This is due to
moderators aiming to alleviate the effects of link rot on the platform; however, this pro-active
archival of content also impact traffic to archived sites originating from Reddit.
5. The Donald subreddit systematically targets ad revenue of news sources with conflicting ide-
ologies: moderation bots block URLs from those sites and prompt users to post archive URLs
instead (some domains, e.g. nydailynews.com, have up to 46% of their content censored).
According to our conservative estimates, popular news sources like the Washinghton Post lose
yearly approximately $70K from their ad revenue because of the use of archiving services on
Reddit.
5.2.2 Background
Our analysis focuses on two popular archiving services: archive.is and the Wayback Machine
(archive.org). The former stores snapshots of Web pages upon request, while the latter is run by
a non-profit organization (the Internet Archive) aiming to archive pages mainly through a constant
crawling process.
Archive.is offers a free, on-demand archival service of Web pages: a user visits the service and
enters a URL to be archived. It also acts as a link shortener which obfuscates the source URL, by
generating a 5-character URL. For instance, http://archive.is/HVbU shows the snapshot of
Google’s homepage, archived on July, 03, 2012 at 07:03:24.
Wayback Machine. Launched in 2001, the Wayback Machine archives a large portion of Web
content, storing periodic snapshots of various pages. It mainly works through a proactive crawler1,
which visits various sites and captures a snapshot of the content. However, users can also trig-
ger information archival on demand. When a page is archived, an archive URL is created in
the following format: https://web.archive.org/web/[time of archival]/[source URL]. For example,
the archive URL https://web.archive.org/web/20100205062719/http://www.
google.com/ returns the version of Google’s home page on February 5, 2010, at 06:27:19 (UTC).
In the rest of the thesis, we refer to the URLs generated by archiving services as archive URLs, and
to the archived URL as source URLs.
We opt to study the Wayback Machine and archive.is for a few reasons. First of all, they
are popular services: as of Jan 2018, their Alexa Global Rank is, resp., 300 and 2,920. The Way-
back Machine is actually one of the oldest initiatives, with about 300 billion pages archived as of
2017. We also choose these two because of some important differences between them. The Wayback
1http://crawler.archive.org/index.html
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Machine is run by a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization, while archive.is is hosted by Russian
provider Hostkey (interestingly, it is only accessible via HTTP in Russia). Moreover, the former
respects robots exclusion standards (even retroactively) and generally gives website owners the right
to request removal of pages from the archive, while the latter only complies (albeit inconsistently)
with DMCA take-down requests. Finally, archive.is is reportedly used in “fringe” Web com-
munities within 4chan and Reddit, which are known for generating [309] and incubating [136] fake
news stories, and for their influence on the information ecosystem [331].
5.2.3 Datasets
We now present the datasets studied in our work as well as our data collection methodology. We
perform two crawls: 1) archive.is URLs obtained from the live feed page and 2) Wayback
Machine and archive.is URLs posted on four social networks, namely, Twitter, Reddit, Gab,
and 4chan’s /pol/. The resulting datasets are summarized in Table 5.6.
Archive.is live feed. To gather a large dataset of archive.is generated URLs, we use the live
feed page (http://archive.is/livefeed/), which provides a view of the archive based on
archival time (e.g., the first page lists URLs archived in the previous 10 minutes). In August 2017,
we crawl the first 100K pages of the live feed, acquiring 45.2M URLs, archived between October 7,
2015 and August 26, 2017.
Next, we visit the archive.is URLs, and scrape the content to get the archival time and the
source URL. To avoid issues for the site operators, we throttle our crawler and do not visit all 45.2M
URLs. Instead, we randomly sample them while ensuring temporal coverage, visiting 21.5M (48%)
archive URLs, corresponding to 20.6M unique source URLs from 5.3M unique domains. Note that
given the substantial size of our sample, which guarantees temporal coverage over almost two years,
the resulting dataset is representative of the archive. In other words, our sampling strategy does not
likely introduce substantial biases affecting our results.
Archive URLs posted on social networks. We search for archive.is and Wayback Machine
URLs on Twitter, Reddit, and /pol/, between Jul 1, 2016 and Aug 31, 2017, and on Gab between
Aug 1, 2016–Aug 31, 2017. We obtain the 4chan dataset from the authors of [128], the Reddit one
from pushshift.io, while, for Twitter, we rely on the 1% Streaming API.2 For Gab, we use
a snowball sampling by collecting popular users returned by Gab’s API, and iteratively collecting
posts for all their followers and users they follow.
Overall, the resulting dataset includes 50K posts from /pol/, 528K posts from Reddit, 7K posts
from Gab, and about 9K tweets. Note that we have some gaps due to failure of our data collection
infrastructure, specifically, there are 70 and 13 days missing for Twitter and /pol/, respectively.
Basic Statistics. In Table 5.6, we report statistics from our archive.is live-feed crawl as well
as the crawl of archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs shared on Twitter, Reddit, /pol/, and
2https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
5.2. Understanding Web Archiving Services and their Use on Multiple Web Communities 130
Platform Archive #Posts with Archive Archive Source Source Filtered
URLs (%all posts) URLs URLs Domains
Live Feed archive.is 21,537,554 20,608,834 5,388,112 -
Reddit archive.is 327,050 (2.9·10−4%) 310,392 291,382 15,994 35.70%
Wayback 320,379 (2.8·10−4%) 387,081 343,851 21,124 17.20%
/pol/ archive.is 46,912 (1.1·10−3%) 36,277 33,824 3,970 4.67%
Wayback 3,848 (9.7·10−5%) 2,325 2,207 976 83.12%
Gab archive.is 6,602 (3.4·10−4%) 5,943 5,773 1,300 5.54%
Wayback 478 (5.1·10−5%) 361 349 240 61.18%
Twitter archive.is 6,750 (3.1·10−6%) 3,772 3,669 845 8.23%
Wayback 1,905 (9.0·10−7%) 1,290 1,257 846 7.49%
Table 5.6: Overview of our datasets: number and percentage of posts that include archive URLs, unique number
of archive URLs, source URLs, and source domains. We also filter URLs that are malformed, unreachable, or
point to resources other than Web pages.
Gab. We report the number of posts with archive URLs, along with the percentage over the total
number of posts, as well as the number of unique archive URLs, unique source URLs, unique source
domains, and the percentage of URLs that are filtered out. Specifically, besides malformed URLs, we
exclude, for archive.is, URLs unreachable between Aug 29 and Oct 7, 2017, while for Wayback
Machine those pointing to types of information other than Web pages (e.g., images, videos, software,
etc.).
Overall, /pol/ and Gab users often share Wayback Machine URLs that point to non-Web pages:
around 83% and 61% of the total, respectively, suggesting that archive.is is used mostly for the
dissemination of Web pages, while Wayback Machine is preferred for other content. Also, a high
percentage of malformed archive.is URLs are shared on Reddit (35%), due to bots trying to
pro-actively archive resources but failing. From the normalized percentages, we observe that Twitter
users rarely share URLs from archiving services, while Reddit users do so from both archiving
services. On /pol/ and Gab, we find 15 and 16 times, respectively, more archive.is URLs than
Wayback Machine ones.
5.2.4 Cross-Platform Analysis
In this section, we present a cross-platform analysis of archive URLs collected from the archive.
is live feed, as well as Wayback Machine and archive.is URLs shared on Twitter, Reddit,
Gab, and /pol/. We focus on understanding what kind of content gets archived, as well as the related
temporal characteristics, and on assessing whether archived content is still available from the source.
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Figure 5.5: CDF of the number of distinct URLs per source domain.
5.2.4.1 Source Domains
Live Feed. In Fig. 5.5(a), we plot the CDF of the number of distinct URLs per domain in our
archive.is live feed dataset. The vast majority (90%) of domains only appear once, while a
few domains yield a large numbers of archive URLs – e.g., there are 1.2M distinct archive.is
URLs for which twitter.com is the source domain. In Table 5.7, we report the top 20 source
domains as well as the top 20 domain suffixes (Sx). Surprisingly, the top domain (11.8%) is actually
the Wayback Machine’s archive.org. Mainstream social networks like Twitter and Facebook are
also included, likely due to their (perceived) ephemerality, i.e., users want to preserve social network
posts before they are removed or deleted. As for the suffixes, we observe that common ones, such
as .com and .org, are the majority, followed by domains from Germany (.de) and Japan (.jp) with
7% and 5.6% of the URLs, respectively. This suggests that a substantial portion of archive.is’s
user base might be in Germany and Japan.
Social Networks. In Figs 5.5(b)–5.5(e), we plot the CDF of the number of URLs for each source
domain in each dataset, finding that over 40% of the source domains only appear once. Wayback
Machine generally archives more URLs per source domain than archive.is, although for Reddit
the distributions are quite similar. Then, in Tables 5.8–5.11, we report the top 20 source domains
observed on each platform, along with their archival fraction (AF), i.e., the number of times a source
domain appears in an archive over the total number of times it appears in the dataset (either archived
or not).
On all platforms except for Gab, the most popular domain archived through archive.is is
the platform itself; e.g., archives of tweets are the most shared ones on Twitter. This also happens for
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Domain (%) Sx (%) Domain (%) Sx (%)
archive.org 11.82% .com 38.29% ru-board.com 0.50% .pl 1.24%
twitter.com 5.73% .org 17.64% asstr.org 0.49% .ch 1.23%
quora.com 3.18% .de 7.02% ruliweb.com 0.43% .eu 1.01%
livejournal.com 2.17% .jp 5.61% 4chan.org 0.40% .se 0.80%
reddit.com 1.81% .net 3.19% googleusercontent.com 0.40% .cz 0.69%
facebook.com 1.31% .ru 3.10% ameblo.jp 0.39% .br 0.66%
nhk.or.jp 0.78% .nl 2.56% wordpress.com 0.38% .at 0.63%
youtube.com 0.65% .uk 1.51% yahoo.co.jp 0.38% .es 0.57%
wikipedia.org 0.52% .it 1.39% aaaaarg.fail 0.37% .be 0.55%
tumblr.com 0.51% .fr 1.39% blogspot.nl 0.36% .ca 0.51%
Table 5.7: Top 20 domains and suffixes of the source URLs in the archive.is live feed dataset.
Domain (archive.is) (%) AF Domain (Wayback) (%) AF
reddit.com 31.21% <0.01 reddit.com 36.88% <0.01
pastebin.com 6.80% 0.08 imgur.com 7.05% <0.01
twitter.com 5.89% <0.01 twitter.com 5.19% <0.01
imgur.com 3.02% <0.01 redd.it 4.79% <0.01
washingtonpost.com 2.46% 0.02 youtube.com 3.90% <0.01
youtube.com 2.33% <0.01 washingtonpost.com 1.54% 0.01
redd.it 2.14% <0.01 youtu.be 1.19% <0.01
nytimes.com 1.76% 0.01 nytimes.com 0.98% <0.01
cnn.com 1.64% 0.02 cnn.com 0.90% <0.01
wikipedia.org 1.37% <0.01 reddituploads.com 0.89% 0.06
huffingtonpost.com 0.93% 0.02 archive.is 0.61% <0.01
theguardian.com 0.78% <0.01 streamable.com 0.61% <0.01
googleusercontent.com 0.65% 0.08 thehill.com 0.54% 0.01
politico.com 0.64% 0.02 wikipedia.org 0.52% <0.01
wsj.com 0.61% 0.03 politico.com 0.49% 0.02
dailymail.co.uk 0.54% 0.01 theguardian.com 0.46% <0.01
4chan.org 0.53% 0.16 rawstory.com 0.45% 0.06
facebook.com 0.52% <0.01 huffingtonpost.com 0.44% <0.01
thehill.com 0.43% 0.01 bbc.com 0.44% 0.01
breitbart.com 0.40% 0.01 kickstarter.com 0.37% 0.02
Table 5.8: Top 20 source domains of archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs, and archival fraction (AF),
in the Reddit dataset.
Wayback Machine URLs, but only on Reddit. On Reddit, this may be due to meta-subreddits focused
on the preservation and discussion of dramatic happenings, e.g., flame wars and intra-Reddit conflict,
that would otherwise be lost when deleted by moderators after some time. These meta-subreddits
tend to make use of bots that automatically archive drama submitted by their members.
Overall, we notice a strong presence of both mainstream (e.g., Washington Post) and alternative
(e.g., Breitbart) news sources archived and shared on Reddit, /pol/, and Gab. Moreover, on /pol/,
archive.is is often used for links to hypothes.is, a service that lets users annotate news
articles, possibly due to the fact that /pol/ users often “unravel” conspiracy theories by researching
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Domain (archive.is) (%) AF Domain (Wayback) (%) AF
4chan.org 9.35% 0.54 justice4germans.com 7.50% 0.94
theguardian.com 3.78% 0.13 chetlyzarko.com 3.90% 1.00
washingtonpost.com 3.70% 0.20 twitter.com 2.82% <0.01
nytimes.com 3.46% 0.16 dailymail.co.uk 2.47% <0.01
cnn.com 2.78% 0.14 revcom.us 2.16% 0.66
twitter.com 2.75% 0.01 reddit.com 1.98% <0.01
independent.co.uk 2.37% 0.13 tumblr.com 1.85% 0.02
breitbart.com 1.96% 0.08 thebilzerianreport.com 1.57% 0.72
reddit.com 1.85% 0.09 jeffreyepsteinscience.com 1.55% 1.00
dailymail.co.uk 1.72% 0.05 cnn.com 1.51% <0.01
facebook.com 1.69% 0.96 tdbimg.com 1.43% 1.00
huffingtonpost.com 1.37% 0.20 huffingtonpost.com 1.43% 0.01
thehill.com 1.21% 0.16 metapedia.org 1.22% 0.04
politico.com 1.04% 0.13 nytimes.com 1.15% <0.01
bbc.com 1.01% 0.08 washingtonpost.com 1.11% <0.01
8ch.net 0.98% 1.00 theguardian.com 1.08% <0.01
googleusercontent.com 0.91% 0.59 independent.co.uk 1.08% <0.01
hypothes.is 0.87% 0.98 wordpress.com 1.06% <0.01
telegraph.co.uk 0.85% 0.03 idrsolutions.com 1.01% 0.86
theatlantic.com 0.81% 0.24 wikileaks.com 1.01% <0.01
Table 5.9: Top 20 source domains of archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs, and archival fraction (AF),
in the /pol/ dataset.
and commenting on news articles. On Twitter, where the footprint of archive URLs is relatively low,
we find a relatively large number of Japanese domains, which might possibly indicate a stronger
presence of Japanese Twitter users relying on archives.
The AFs are quite low overall, implying that archiving services disseminate a small frac-
tion of most domains. However, on /pol/, specific domains have extremely high AFs. For in-
stance, we find that facebook.com (AF = 0.96) and 8ch.net (AF = 1.0) are marked as
spam from /pol/, and posts including links to them are rejected, a phenomenon we refer to as
platform-specific censorship. We manually analyze other domains with high AF values, specifi-
cally, hypothes.is, chetlyzarko.com, tdbming.com, justice4germans.com, and
jeffreyepsteinscience.com, without finding evidence of censorship on /pol/. There is also
“accidental” censorship on /pol/: for instance, the Australian newspaper smh.com.au, is affected
because of a substitution filter (used for fun), which replace one word with another, as the word
“smh” is automatically replaced on /pol/ with “baka.”
5.2.4.2 URL Characterization
We now proceed to characterize the type of content archived. To this end, we extract the domain
categories of source URLs using the free Virus Total API (virustotal.com), which we choose
since it consolidates categories from multiple services including Bit Defender, TrendMicro, Alexa,
etc. Although categorization is done at domain-level, results are presented at a per-URL level (a
URL is assigned the same category as its domain) in order to capture the popularity of each domain
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Domain (archive.is) (%) AF Domain (Wayback) (%) AF
twitter.com 25.02 % <0.01 justpaste.it 11.90 % 0.02
facebook.com 3.65 % <0.01 twitter.com 6.90 % 0.01
togetter.com 3.58 % <0.01 dailymail.co.uk 1.95 % 0.13
seesaa.net 2.97 % 0.91 nikkansports.com 1.50 % 0.18
justpaste.it 2.19 % 0.01 mikelofgren.net 1.20% 1.00
yahoo.co.jp 2.03 % 0.21 blogspot.com 1.10% 0.09
googleusercontent.com 1.77 % 0.98 whitehouse.gov 1.05% 0.02
time.com 1.75 % 0.01 journalists-in-russia.org 1.00% 1.00
monjiro.net 1.66 % 0.51 pcdepot.co.jp 0.90% 0.90
pastebin.com 1.45 % 0.04 rydon.co.uk 0.85% 1.00
google.com 1.39 % 0.01 yeniakit.com.tr 0.85% 0.16
jimin.jp 1.35 % 0.95 cdse.edu 0.75% 0.93
notepad.cc 1.33 % 0.47 tetsureki.com 0.75% 1.00
ameblo.jp 1.16 % <0.01 donaldjtrump.com 0.75% 0.04
nhk.or.jp 1.16 % 0.33 reidreport.com 0.75% 1.00
magi.md 1.16 % 0.49 ameblo.cjp 0.70% <0.01
opensecrets.org 1.05 % 0.67 jreast.co.jp 0.70% 0.93
fc2.com 0.99 % 0.27 eastandard.net 0.65% 1.00
dailyshincho.jp 0.93 % 0.94 yahoo.co.jp 0.60% 0.01
reddit.com 0.89 % 0.03 livedoor.jp 0.60% 0.07
Table 5.10: Top 20 source domains of archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs, and archival fraction (AF),
in the Twitter dataset.
Domain (archive.is) (%) AF Domain (Wayback) (%) AF
twitter.com 12.28% <0.01 dailymail.co.uk 20.98% < 0.01
nytimes.com 4.71% 0.03 washingtonpost.com 7.08% 0.01
washingtonpost.com 4.17% 0.03 infowars.com 5.54% <0.01
reddit.com 3.10% 0.03 brandenburg.de 4.35% 0.10
googleusercontent.com 2.43% 0.18 twitter.com 3.63% < 0.01
breitbart.com 1.82% < 0.01 huffingtonpost.com 3.08% <0.01
cnn.com 1.63% 0.01 abcnews.go.com 2.54% < 0.01
4chan.org 1.59% 0.07 salon.com 1.72% 0.01
dailymail.co.uk 1.44% <0.01 alexa.com 1.63% 0.03
theguardian.com 1.29% < 0.01 news.com.au 1.54% <0.01
wsj.com 1.22% 0.01 tu-dortmunt.de 1.45% 0.80
bbc.com 1.15% 0.01 causes.com 1.27% 0.50
huffingtonpost.com 1.14% 0.03 vigilantcitizen.com 1.18% 0.02
google.com 1.01% < 0.01 reddit.com 1.08% <0.01
facebook.com 0.92% < 0.01 sahra-wagenknecht.de 0.99% 0.78
latimes.com 0.85% 0.01 quillette.com 0.99% 0.02
yahoo.com 0.81% < 0.01 derwesten.de 0.99% <0.01
dailycaller.com 0.77% < 0.01 politico.com 0.91% <0.01
thehill.com 0.74% < 0.01 mikelofgren.net 0.81% 0.90
wikileaks.org 0.73% 0.01 alexanderhiggins.com 0.81% 0.02
Table 5.11: Top 20 source domains of archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs, and archival fraction (AF),
in the Gab dataset.
in our datasets.
Live Feed. Due to throttling enforced by the API, we are not able to categorize all the 20.6M source
URLs in our archive.is live feed dataset. Therefore, we first aggregate URLs into their domain,
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(b) Sample of 121K Domains
Figure 5.6: Top 15 domain categories for the archive.is live feed.
then, we follow a sampling approach using: 1) the top 100K most popular domains in our dataset,
which correspond to 15M (73%) source URLs, and 2) a sample of 121K domains drawn according
to their empirical distribution in our archive datasets, resulting in 1.4M (7%) source URLs.
In Fig. 5.6, we report the top 15 categories obtained from Virus Total for both samples. Note
that Virus Total is unable to provide a category for 1% and 7% of the URLs for the two sets of
domains that we checked, respectively. From Fig. 5.6(a), we observe that the most popular category
is Reference Materials (23%), which is due to the fact that, as discussed earlier, many archive.is
URLs archive Wayback Machine URLs. Other popular categories include Social Networks (15%),
News Sources (14%), Education (13%), and Business (12%). Adult Content accounts for 4% of
source URLs. Fig. 5.6(b) shows that, for the empirically distributed sample, the top 15 categories
are slightly different, including Business (21%), News (13%), and Adult Content (12%).
Social Networks. Unlike the live feed dataset, we perform URL characterization for all source URLs
(aggregated by domain) found on Reddit, /pol/, Gab, and Twitter, again using the Virus Total API.
In Fig. 5.7, we report the top categories and their corresponding percentages for both archiving ser-
vices (specifically, the union of categories that appear in the top 10 categories for each service). The
Virus Total API is unable to provide a category for, on average, 1.5% and 9% of the archive.is
and Wayback Machine URLs found on Reddit, /pol/, Gab, and Twitter, respectively. Overall, both
archiving services are often used to disseminate URLs from news sources, social networks, and mar-
keting sites on all social networks. However, there are interesting differences for the two archiving
services: Education and Government URLs appear as top categories for the Wayback Machine (see
Fig. 5.7(b), 5.7(c), and 5.7(d)), while sites that contain obscene language only for archive.is
(see Fig. 5.7(c)). This suggests that the latter is used more extensively for “questionable” content.
Moreover, we observe that Adult Content is among the top categories for all social networks
except Twitter, while Gab and Reddit users often share archive URLs for domains related to Boards
and Forums. Also, on /pol/, archive.is is used to archive and disseminate pages with obscene
language, which is somewhat in line with previous observations [128] showing that /pol/ conversa-
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Figure 5.7: Top domain categories for archive URLs appearing on the four social networks.
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Figure 5.8: Temporal analysis of the archive.is live feed dataset, reporting the number of URLs that are
archived (a) each day and (b) based on hour of day.
tions often include hate speech and aggressive behavior, and so archive.is URLs likely point to
similar content.
5.2.4.3 Temporal Dynamics
Next, we study, from a temporal point of view, how archive URLs are created and shared on social
networks.
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Figure 5.9: CDF of the time difference between the archival time and the time appeared on each of the four
platforms. (Note log scale on x-axis).
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Figure 5.10: CDF of the time difference between archival time on archive.is and appearance on social
networks for the top four source domains.
Live Feed. In Fig. 5.8, we plot the day and hour of day of the creation of the archive.is URLs.
Each day, between 1K and 10K URLs are archived (Fig. 5.8(a)), mostly between 11AM and 4PM
UTC time, with a peak at 2PM (Fig. 5.8(b)), which seems to suggest that a great number of users
may be located in Europe and the US. According to Alexa, the top country for archive.is is the
US, with 37% of the visitors.
Social Networks. Next, we measure the time interval between the archiving of a URL and its
appearance on one of the four social networks. In Fig. 5.9, we plot the CDF of these time intervals,
finding that the interval between archiving and sharing times of a URL ranges from a few seconds
(in which case, Reddit/4chan/Twitter/Gab users themselves might be creating the archive) to years.
Reddit is the “fastest” platform for Wayback Machine URLs, mainly because of bots that actively
archive URLs (as we show later in this work), while for archive.is it is Gab.
We also focus on the top source domains shared via archive URLs: Figs 5.10–5.11 plot the CDF
of the slack time of the top four domains for archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs, respec-
tively. On Reddit, the top domains archived via Wayback Machine follow very similar distributions,
likely due to bots, while for archive.is URLs, distributions vary, with the fastest domain being
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Figure 5.11: CDF of the time difference between archival time on Wayback Machine and appearance on social
networks for top four source domains.
reddit.com itself. On Twitter, slack times vary for URLs archived via archive.is, with the
fastest domain being Twitter and the slowest nhk.org.jp. The same applies for the Wayback
Machine, with the fastest domain being Twitter and the slowest ameblo.jp. We also find that,
on /pol/, archive.is URLs pointing to 4chan are considerably slower, suggesting that users are
more interested in archiving the URL for persistence rather than sharing the content within /pol/.
Based on anecdotal observations, we believe users might be archiving threads with “evidence” for
conspiracy theories/false narratives, and using them in the future to perpetuate mis/disinformation.
This is not the case for news sources like the Washington Post or Guardian, as /pol/ users might be
more focused on reducing Web traffic to the source domain instead (indeed we find users explicitly
mentioning this when manually examining posts). Finally, on Gab, the faster domain is Twitter, and
Reddit the slowest.
5.2.4.4 Original Content Availability
We then assess the availability of the original content that gets archived; this allow us to determine
whether users are archiving URLs that are subsequently deleted. To this end, we make an HTTP
request for each source URL in our datasets, on October 14–21, 2017 for the live feed dataset, on
October 4–5, 2017 for Reddit, Twitter, /pol/ datasets and on January 3, 2018 for Gab dataset. We
treat each URL as unavailable if we receive HTTP codes 404/410/451/5xx, or if the request times
out.
Live Feed. We find that 12% of the source URLs corresponding to archive URLs on archive.is live
feed are no longer available. Domains with most unavailable content include twitter.com (6%),
nhk.or.jp (6%), googleusercontent.com (3%), aaaaarg.fail (3%), 4chan.org (3%), and 8ch.net
(2%).
Social Networks. In Reddit, source URLs corresponding to both archive.is and Wayback
Machine are still available to a large degree (93% and 89% of them, respectively). This can be
explained by the fact that Reddit bots archive URLs without considering the content. In /pol/, the
original content is available 82% and 66% of the times, while on Gab 87% and 48% for archive.
is and Wayback Machine URLs, respectively. Percentages decrease further for Twitter; 76% and
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49% for archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs, respectively.
We also find that the top domains for which content is no longer available differ across plat-
forms. Except for Gab, the top unavailable domain are the social networks themselves: 10%,
54%, and 28%, for Reddit, /pol/, and Twitter, respectively. URLs from cache servers (i.e.,
googleusercontent.com) and Twitter are also frequently unavailable; 9% and 10% in Reddit,
5% and 4% in /pol/, 8% and 28% in Twitter, and 12% and 19% in Gab, for googleusercontent.
com and Twitter, respectively. We also note the presence of unavailable 8ch.net URLs (another
ephemeral imageboard) with 5% and 4% on /pol/ and Gab, respectively.
5.2.4.5 Take-Aways
Overall, we find that archiving services play an important role in the information ecosystem, as they
are used to preserve news sources as well as ephemeral or controversial content. Also, users on fringe
communities such as /pol/ and Gab favor less popular Web archiving services like archive.is to
archive and disseminate Web pages. This prompts questions as to why less popular, and seemingly
less durable, archiving services are favored by more controversial communities like /pol/ and Gab.
Although this would be out of the scope of this work, we do find one potential answer in that these
communities also use archiving services to bypass platform-specific censorship policies.
We also observe that temporal dynamics of how archive URLs are shared on social networks
differ according to their content: for instance, on /pol/, content from news sources has a consider-
ably larger time lag between first appearing on the platform and archival compared to 4chan threads.
Lastly, a non-negligible percentage of archived content is no longer available at the source; in partic-
ular, a substantial percentage of posts from social networks like Twitter are eventually deleted from
the platform, yet remain stored in the archives.
5.2.5 Social-Network-based Analysis
In this section, we present a social-network-specific analysis by taking into account the fundamental
differences of each platform. We analyze the users involved in the dissemination of archive URLs
as well as the content that is shared along with those URLs. Lastly, we discuss a case study of ad
revenue deprivation on Reddit.
5.2.5.1 User Base
Reddit. Our analysis shows that archiving services are extensively used by Reddit bots. In fact,
31% of all archive.is URLs and 82% of Wayback Machine URLs in our Reddit dataset are
posted by a specific bot, namely, SnapshillBot (which is used by subreddit moderators to preserve
“drama-related” happenings discussed earlier or just as a subreddit specific policy to preserve every
submission). Other bots include AutoModerator, 2016VoteBot, yankbot, and autotldr. We also at-
tempt to quantify the percentage of archive URLs posted from bots, assuming that, if a username
includes “bot” or “auto”, it is likely a bot. This is a reasonable strategy since Reddit bots are exten-
5.2. Understanding Web Archiving Services and their Use on Multiple Web Communities 140
10 1 100 101 102 103 104 105
Score
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Archive.is (bots)
Archive.is (non-bots)
Wayback Machine (bots)
Wayback Machine (non-bots)
Baseline
(a) Reddit
10 1 100 101 102 103 104 105
Score
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Archive.is
Wayback Machine
Baseline
(b) Gab
Figure 5.12: CDF of the scores of posts that include archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs.
sively used for moderation purposes, and do not usually try to obfuscate the fact that they are bots.3
Using this heuristic, we find that bots are responsible for disseminating 44% of all the archive.is
and 85% of all the Wayback Machine URLs that appear on Reddit between July 1, 2016 and August
31, 2017.
We also use the score of each Reddit post to get an intuition of users’ appreciation for posts that
include archive URLs. In Fig. 5.12(a), we plot the CDF of the scores of posts with archive.is
and Wayback Machine URLs, as well as all posts that contain URLs as a baseline, differentiating
between bots and non-bots. For both archiving services, posts by bots have a substantially smaller
score: 80% of them have score of at most one, as opposed to 37% for non-bots and 59% of the
baseline.
Reddit Sub-Communities. We then study how specific subreddits share URLs from archiving
services. In Table 5.12, we report the top subreddits that share the most archive URLs from
archive.is and the Wayback Machine. Among these, we find a variety of subreddits ranging
from politics (e.g., EnoughTrumpSpam, The Donald, politics) to gaming (e.g., Gamingcirclejerk)
and “drama-related” communities (e.g., SubredditDrama and Drama). Several subreddits prefer to
use archive.is rather than the Wayback Machine, e.g., KotakuInAction, which historically cov-
ers the GamerGate controversy [69], The Donald, which discusses politics with a focus on Donald
Trump, and Conspiracy, which focuses on various conspiracy theories.
Gab. On Gab, each post has a score that determines the popularity of the content. In Fig. 5.12(b),
we report the CDF of the scores in posts that contain archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs,
between August 2016 and August 2017. Once again, we also include a baseline, which is the scores
for all the posts with URLs. We find that posts with Wayback Machine URLs have higher scores
than those with archive.is URLs, and the baseline. Specifically, the mean score for Wayback
3This is somewhat evident from the list of Reddit bots available at https://www.reddit.com/r/autowikibot/
wiki/redditbots
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Subreddit (archive.is) (%) Subreddit (Wayback) (%)
The Donald 24.48% EnoughTrumpSpam 31.82%
KotakuInAction 15.83% MGTOW 7.38%
EnoughTrumpSpam 12.06% SnapshillBotEx 7.19%
MGTOW 3.48% undelete 5.90%
undelete 2.74% SubredditDrama 5.50%
SubredditDrama 2.61% Drama 5.03%
Drama 2.33% Gamingcirclejerk 3.47%
Gamingcirclejerk 1.57% ShitAmericansSay 1.63%
conspiracy 1.44% TopMindsOfReddit 1.51%
MensRights 1.12% TheBluePill 1.25%
savedyouaclick 1.00% Buttcoin 1000 1.15%
politics 0.98% AgainstHateSubreddits 1.06%
DerekSmart 0.76% subredditcancer 0.99%
ShitAmericansSay 0.75% The Donald 0.95%
PoliticsAll 0.72% badeconomics 0.75%
TopMindsOfReddit 0.71% ShitWehraboosSay 0.74%
4chan4trump 0.62% shittykickstarters 0.71%
SnapshillBotEx 0.59% jesuschristreddit 0.68%
Buttcoin 0.56% badhistory 0.66%
AgainstHateSubreddits 0.55% politics 0.59%
Table 5.12: Top 20 subreddits sharing archive.is and Wayback Machine URLs.
Machine is 90, while for archive.is and the baseline the mean score is 35 and 30, respectively.
This trend mirrors the one observed on Reddit for posts not authored by bots.
/pol/. As mentioned earlier, 4chan is an anonymous imageboard, which prevents us from performing
user-level analysis. However, we can use the flag attribute to provide a country-level estimation. The
top country sharing archive URLs is the USA, which is in line with previous characterizations of the
board [128]. We also find a substantial percentage of “troll” flags: 9% and 5% for archive.is and
Wayback Machine, respectively. This is somewhat surprising, since troll flags were re-introduced to
/pol/ on June 13, 2017, thus they were only available for about 3 months of our 14-month dataset.
5.2.5.2 Content Analysis
Next, we focus on the content that gets shared along with archive URLs on social platforms. We
aim to evaluate if users share the same information for a given archive URL on multiple platforms.
We do so using Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [51]. Before running LDA, we exclude /pol/ and
Reddit threads that contain less than 100 posts, so that the LDA can extract topics from a reasonable
amount of documents. We then select only threads that have archive URLs appearing in both Reddit
and /pol/ datasets; there are 425 such threads on /pol/ and 299 on Reddit. Next, we run LDA on all
the posts within these threads and extract terms for 10 topics per thread.
In Fig. 5.13, we plot the CDF of the cosine similarities on the terms extracted from LDA topics
on the two platforms when sharing the same archive URLs. We observe that 80% of the terms have
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Figure 5.13: CDF of cosine similarity of words obtained from LDA topics on Reddit and dspol threads.
News Source Count (%) News Source Count (%)
washingtonpost.com 3,814 44.13% change.org 96 7.52%
cnn.com 3,354 39.39% huffpost.com 62 13.39%
nydailynews.com 1,070 46.32% fusion.net 60 44.77%
huffingtonpost.com 978 43.77% cnn.it 58 44.61%
nationalreview.com 774 45.58% alternet.org 26 20.01%
theblaze.com 704 46.74% infostormer.com 16 27.11%
buzzfeed.com 588 45.97% dailynewsbin.com 4 26.67%
salon.com 373 44.88% todayvibes.com 4 7.27%
vice.com 372 45.14% usanewsbets.ga 4 10.52%
vox.com 323 45.23% fullycucked.com 1 1.78%
weeklystandard.com 253 46.25% northcrane.com 1 0.13%
politifact.com 185 33.09%
Table 5.13: Number and percentage of submissions deleted from The Donald with links to different news
sources.
similarity under 0.3, which is expected given the fact that the two communities discuss topics in a
different way. By manually observing terms with high similarity scores, we find that a number of
them relate to well-known conspiracy theories, like the Seth Rich murder [313] or Pizzagate [314], as
well as general discussions around politics (e.g., tensions between North Korea and the USA). Once
again, this highlights that archiving services are used to preserve content related to controversial
stories and conspiracy theories.
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5.2.5.3 Ad Revenue Deprivation
During our experiments, we find evidence that at least one Reddit bot, AutoModerator4, is used to
remove links to unwanted domains and nudge users to share archive.is instead. In particular, it
posts:
Your submission was removed because it is from cnn.com, which has been identified
as a severely anti-Trump domain. Please submit a cached link or screenshot when
submitting content from this domain. We recommend using www.archive.is for
this purpose.
This kind of notification appears in five different subreddits that discuss mainly politics and
news, specifically, The Donald, Mr Trump, TheNewRight, Vote Trump, and Republicans. In par-
ticular, in The Donald, there are 13K such comments. AutoModerator blocks URLs from 23 news
sources likely to be considered as anti-Trump by that community. In Table 5.13 we report the number
of submissions deleted for each of the sources, along with the percentage over all submissions that
include that source. Mainstream news outlets like Washington Post and CNN are the top domains
that get removed from The Donald (3.8K and 3.3K submissions, respectively), and this happens
slightly less than half the times (44% and 39% of the submissions, respectively). Interestingly, only
URLs posted via the URL submission field are censored by AutoModerator, but not URLs that are
inserted as part of the title field.
We attempt to estimate possible ad revenue deprivation due to the practice of nudging users
to share archive URLs instead of source URLs on Reddit. We do so by providing a conservative
approximation of the ad revenue loss. Since we do not have knowledge of how many times a par-
ticular URL is clicked, we use the up- and down-votes of a post. That is, we assume that when a
user up-votes or down-votes a post, he also clicks on the URL included on the post. This consti-
tutes a best-effort technique as prior work shows that a substantial portion of users on Reddit do
not vote [107], while, at the same time, users that do vote do not necessarily read or click on the
articles [108]. That said, this approach is reasonably conservative considering the complex influence
that Reddit has with respect to news dissemination [331].
We then calculate the potential revenue loss using only ad impressions, i.e., we conservatively
estimate the revenue generated when a user visits the website without taking into account any po-
tential further action (e.g., clicking on the actual ad). To this end, we use an average Cost per 1,000
impressions (CPM) of $24.74, as reported by Statista5, while we assume an average of 3 ads per
page [43]. In other words, we calculate the monthly revenue loss, for each domain, based on the
average CPM value as well as the conservative estimate of the visits using the up- and down-votes.
Overall, replacing URLs with archive URLs, as done, e.g., by the AutoModerator bot, yields an esti-
4https://www.reddit.com/r/AutoModerator/
5https://www.statista.com/statistics/308015/online-display-cpm-usa/
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Domain Visits Loss ($) Domain Visits Loss ($)
washingtonpost.com 79,880 5,928 wsj.com 11,389 845
cnn.com 70,483 5,231 breitbart.com 11,357 842
nytimes.com 46,442 3,446 bbc.com 10,708 794
huffingtonpost.com 27,125 2,013 salon.com 10,364 769
thehill.com 18,643 1,383 buzzfeed.com 10,359 768
theguardian.com 16,376 1,215 foxnews.com 9,638 715
politico.com 15,774 1,170 yahoo.com 9,497 704
dailymail.co.uk 14,442 1,071 latimes.com 9,277 688
dailycaller.com 12,735 945 vox.com 8,976 667
google.com 11,576 859 washingtontimes.com 8,862 657
Table 5.14: Top 20 domains with the largest ad revenue losses because of the use of archiving services on
Reddit. We report an estimate of the average monthly visits from Reddit as well as the average monthly ad
revenue loss.
mate of $30K per month in revenue loss (for the top 20 domains in terms of views). This is detailed
in Table 5.14, where we break down the estimate for each of the top 20 revenue-deprived domains.
On a purely pragmatic level, consider that our estimate of ad revenue deprivation is around
$70K per year for the Washington Post alone. Although a more detailed impact analysis is out of
the scope of this work, we suspect that even $70K could have a real world effect, e.g., on intern bud-
gets or even early career hires. In light of recent criticism of their credibility by President Donald
Trump [149], Trump-supporting communities’ deliberate use of archive.is, and the conserva-
tive nature of our revenue loss estimate, we believe this attack on the Fourth Estate is particularly
worrying and in need of future exploration.
5.2.5.4 Take-Aways
In summary, our social-network-specific analysis shows, among other things, that moderation bots
on Reddit proactively leverage Web archiving services to ensure that content shared on their com-
munity persists. In particular, we find that 44% and 85% of archive.is and Wayback Machine
URLs are shared by Reddit moderation bots.
Also, Web archiving services are extensively used for the archival and dissemination of content
related to conspiracy theories (e.g., Pizzagate) as well as other world events related to politics (e.g.,
tensions between North Korea and the USA), thus suggesting that these services play an important
role in the (false) information ecosystem and need to be taken into account when designing systems
to detect and contain the cascade of mis/disinformation on the Web.
Finally, we find evidence that moderators from specific Reddit sub-communities force users to
misuse Web archiving services so as to ideologically target certain news sources by depriving them
of traffic and potential ad revenue. We also provide a best-effort conservative estimate of ad revenue
loss of popular news sources showing that they can lose up to $70K per year.
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5.2.6 Remarks
This work presented a large-scale analysis of how popular Web archiving services such as
archive.is and the Wayback Machine are used on social media. Our study is based two data
crawls: 1) 21M URLs, spanning almost two years, obtained from the archive.is live feed; and
2) 356K archive.is plus 391K Wayback Machine URLs that were shared on four social net-
works: Reddit, Twitter, Gab, and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) over 14 months. Among
other things, we showed that these services are extensively used to archive and disseminate news,
social network posts, and controversial content—in particular by users of fringe Web communities
within Reddit and 4chan. We also found that users not only use them to ensure persistence of Web
content, but also to bypass censorship policies enforced on some social networks.
We uncovered evidence that certain subreddits, as well as 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board
(/pol/), actually nudge users to share archive URLs instead of links to news sources they perceive
as having contrasting ideologies, taking away potentially hundreds of thousands of dollars in ad
revenue. Overall, our measurements illustrate the importance of archiving services in the Web’s
information and ad ecosystems, and the need to carefully consider them when studying such ecosys-
tems.
Chapter 6
Towards Understanding State-Sponsored
Actors
In this chapter, we study the behavior of state-sponsored actors on the Web. To do this, we leverage
ground truth datasets released by Twitter and Reddit pertaining to Russian and Iranian trolls. By
analyzing the dataset across several axes we provide a comprehensive analysis on these actors.
Note that the methodology for detecting state-sponsored trolls employed by Twitter and Reddit
is not publicly available, therefore, it is unclear on whether there are false positive or how compre-
hensive these datasets are (i.e., if there are still a lot of unidentified troll accounts). Despite this
fact, in this Chapter, we assume that the released datasets are high-quality ground truth datasets with
negligible percentage of false positives and adequate coverage of state-sponsored trolls accounts.
Therefore, the reader should take into account that all claims and analysis made throughout this
Chapter are based on these datasets and it is not clear how these claims and results will change with
larger datasets or with datasets from other state-sponsored accounts (e.g., originating from other
countries other than Russia and Iran).
6.1 How State-Sponsored Trolls Compare to Random Users and
How do Their Accounts Evolve?
6.1.1 Motivation
Recent political events and elections have been increasingly accompanied by reports of disinfor-
mation campaigns attributed to state-sponsored actors [98]. In particular, “troll farms,” allegedly
employed by Russian state agencies, have been actively commenting and posting content on social
media to further the Kremlin’s political agenda [291]. In late 2017, the US Congress started an in-
vestigation on Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential Election, releasing the IDs of 2.7K
Twitter accounts identified as Russian trolls.
Despite the growing relevance of state-sponsored disinformation, the activity of accounts linked
to such efforts has not been thoroughly studied. Previous work has mostly looked at campaigns run
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by bots [98, 124, 256]; however, automated content diffusion is only a part of the issue, and in
fact recent research has shown that human actors are actually key in spreading false information on
Twitter [285]. Overall, many aspects of state-sponsored disinformation remain unclear, e.g., how
do state-sponsored trolls operate? What kind of content do they disseminate? And, perhaps more
importantly, how do they compare to a set of random users?
In this work, we aim to address these questions, by relying on the set of 2.7K accounts released
by the US Congress as ground truth for Russian state-sponsored trolls. From a dataset containing
all tweets released by the 1% Twitter Streaming API, we search and retrieve 27K tweets posted by
1K Russian trolls between January 2016 and September 2017. We characterize their activity by
comparing to a random sample of Twitter users.
Main findings. Our study leads to several key observations:
1. The main topics discussed by Russian trolls target very specific world events (e.g., Char-
lottesville protests) and organizations (such as ISIS), and political threads related to Donald
Trump and Hillary Clinton.
2. Trolls adopt different identities over time, i.e., they “reset” their profile by deleting their pre-
vious tweets and changing their screen name/information.
3. Trolls exhibit significantly different behaviors compared to other (random) Twitter accounts.
For instance, the locations they report concentrate in a few countries like the USA, Germany,
and Russia, perhaps in an attempt to appear “local” and more effectively manipulate opinions
of users from those countries. Also, while random Twitter users mainly tweet from mobile
versions of the platform, the majority of the Russian trolls do so via the Web Client.
6.1.2 Datasets
Russian trolls. We start from the 2.7K Twitter accounts suspended by Twitter because of con-
nections to Russia’s Internet Research Agency. The list of these accounts was released by the US
Congress as part of their investigation of the alleged Russian interference in the 2016 US presiden-
tial election, and includes both Twitter’s user ID (which is a numeric unique identifier associated
to the account) and the screen name.1 From a dataset storing all tweets released by the 1% Twitter
Streaming API, we search for tweets posted between January 2016 and September 2017 by the user
IDs of the trolls. Overall, we obtain 27K tweets from 1K out of the 2.7K Russian trolls.
Baseline dataset. We also compile a list of random Twitter users, while ensuring that the distribution
of the average number of tweets per day posted by the random users is similar to the one by trolls.
To calculate the average number of tweets posted by an account, we find the first tweet posted after
January 1, 2016 and retrieve the overall tweet count. This number is then divided by the number
1See https://democrats-intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/exhibit_b.pdf
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Figure 6.1: Temporal characteristics of tweets from Russian trolls and random Twitter users.
of days since account creation. Having selected a set of 1K random users, we then collect all their
tweets between January 2016 and September 2017, obtaining a total of 96K tweets. We follow this
approach as it gives a good approximation of posting behavior, even though it might not be perfect,
since (1) Twitter accounts can become more or less active over time, and (2) our datasets are based
on the 1% Streaming API, thus, we are unable to control the number of tweets we obtain for each
account.
6.1.3 Analysis
In this section, we present an in-depth analysis of the activities and the behavior of Russian trolls.
First, we provide a general characterization of the accounts and a geographical analysis of the loca-
tions they report. Then, we analyze the content they share and how they evolved until their suspen-
sion by Twitter. Finally, we present a case study of one specific account.
6.1.3.1 General Characterization
Temporal analysis. We observe that Russian trolls are continuously active on Twitter between
January, 2016 and September, 2017, with a peak of activity just before the second US presidential
debate (October 9, 2016). Fig. 6.1(a) shows that most tweets from the trolls are posted between
14:00 and 15:00 UTC. In Fig. 6.1(b), we also report temporal characteristics based on hour of the
week, finding that both datasets follow a diurnal pattern, while trolls’ activity peaks around 14:00
and 15:00 UTC on Mondays and Wednesdays. Considering that Moscow is three hours ahead UTC,
this distribution does not rule out that tweets might actually be posted from Russia.
Account creation. Next, we examine the dates when the trolls infiltrated Twitter, by looking at the
account creation dates. From Fig. 6.2, we observe that 71% of them are actually created before 2016.
There are some interesting peaks, during 2016 and 2017: for instance, 24 accounts are created on
July 12, 2016, approx. a week before the Republican National Convention (when Donald Trump
received the nomination), while 28 appear on August 8, 2017, a few days before the infamous Unite
the Right rally in Charlottesville. Taken together, this might be evidence of coordinated activities
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Figure 6.2: Number of Russian troll accounts created per day.
Screen Name Description
Word (%) 4-gram (%) Word (%) Word bigram (%)
news 1.3% news 1.5% news 10.7% follow me 7.8%
bote 1.2% line 1.5% follow 10.7% breaking news 2.6%
online 1.1% blac 1.3% conservative 8.1% news aus 2.1%
daily 0.8% bote 1.3% trump 7.8% uns in 2.1%
today 0.6% rist 1.1% und 6.2% deiner stdt 2.1%
ezekiel2517 0.6% nlin 1.1% maga 5.9% die news 2.1%
maria 0.5% onli 1.0% love 5.8% wichtige und 2.1%
black 0.5% lack 1.0% us 5.3% nachrichten aus 2.1%
voice 0.4% bert 1.0% die 5.0% aus deiner 2.1%
martin 0.4% poli 1.0% nachrichten 4.3% die dn 2.1%
Table 6.1: Top 10 words found in Russian troll screen names and account descriptions. We also report character
4-grams for the screen names and word bigrams for the description.
aimed at manipulating users’ opinions with respect to specific events.
Account characteristics. We also shed light on the troll account profile information. In Table 6.1,
we report the top ten words appearing in the screen names and the descriptions of Russian trolls, as
well as character 4-grams for screen names and word bigrams for profile descriptions. Interestingly,
a substantial number of Russian trolls pose as news outlets, evident from the use of the term “news”
in both the screen name (1.3%) and the description (10.7%). Also, it seems they attempt to increase
the number of their followers, thus their reach of Twitter users, by nudging users to follow them
(see, e.g., “follow me” appearing in almost 8% of the accounts). Finally, 10.3% of the Russian trolls
describe themselves as Trump supporters: “trump” and “maga” (Make America Great Again, one of
Trump campaign’s main slogans).
Language. Looking at the language (as provided via the Twitter API) of the tweets posted by
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Figure 6.3: CDF of number of (a) languages used (b) clients used per user.
Client (Trolls) (%) Client (Baseline) (%)
Twitter Web Client 50.1% TweetDeck 32.6%
twitterfeed 13.4% Twitter for iPhone 26.2%
Twibble.io 9.0% Twitter for Android 22.6%
IFTTT 8.6% Twitter Web Client 6.1%
TweetDeck 8.3% GrabInbox 2.0%
NovaPress 4.6% Twitter for iPad 1.4%
dlvr.it 2.3% IFTTT 1.0%
Twitter for iPhone 0.8% twittbot.net 0.9%
Zapier.com 0.6% Twitter for BlackBerry 0.6%
Twitter for Android 0.6% Mobile Web (M2) 0.4%
Table 6.2: Top 10 Twitter clients (as % of tweets).
Russian trolls, we find that most of them (61%) are in English, although a substantial portion are
in Russian (27%), and to a lesser extent in German (3.5%). In Fig. 6.3(a), we plot the cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of the number of different languages for each user: 64% of the Russian
trolls post all their tweets in only one language, compared to only 54% for random users. Overall, by
comparing the two distributions, we observe that random Twitter users tend to use more languages
in their tweets compared to the trolls.
Client. Finally, we analyze the clients used to post tweets. We do so since previous work [89]
shows that the client used by official or professional accounts are quite different that the ones used
by regular users. Table 6.2 reports the top 10 clients for both Russian trolls and baseline users. We
find the latter prefer to use Twitter clients for mobile devices (48%) and the TweetDeck dashboard
(32%), whereas, the former mainly use the Web client (50%). We also assess how many different
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Figure 6.4: Distribution of reported locations for tweets by Russian trolls (red circles) and baseline (green
triangles).
clients Russian trolls use throughout our dataset: in Fig. 6.3(b), we plot the CDF of the number of
clients used per user. We find that 65% of the Russian trolls use only one client, 28% of them two
different clients, and the rest more than three, which is overall less than the random baseline users.
6.1.3.2 Geographical Analysis
Location. We then study users’ location, relying on the self-reported location field in their profiles.
Note that users not only may leave it empty, but also change it any time they like, so we look at
locations for each tweet. We retrieve it for 75% of the tweets by Russian trolls, gathering 261
different entries, which we convert to a physical location using the Google Maps Geocoding API. In
the end, we obtain 178 unique locations for the trolls, as depicted in Fig. 6.4 (red circles). The size
of the circles on the map indicates the number of tweets that appear at each location. We do the same
for the baseline, getting 2,037 different entries, converted by the API to 894 unique locations. We
observe that most of the tweets from Russian trolls come from locations within the USA and Russia,
and some from European countries, like Germany, Belgium, and Italy. On the other hand, tweets
in our baseline are more uniformly distributed across the globe, with many tweets from North and
South America, Europe, and Asia. This suggests that Russian trolls may be pretending to be from
certain countries, e.g., USA or Germany, aiming to pose as locals and better manipulate opinions.
This explanation becomes more plausible when we consider that a plurality of trolls’ tweets have
their location set as a generic form of “US,” as opposed to a specific city, state, or even region.
Interestingly, the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th most popular location for trolls to tweet from are Moscow, St.
Petersburg, and a generic form of “Russia.” We also assess whether users change their country of
origin based on the self-reported location: only a negligible percentage (1%) of trolls change their
country, while for the baseline the percentage is 16%.
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Timezone (Trolls) (%) Timezone (Baseline) (%)
Eastern Time 38.87% Athens 24.41%
Pacific Time 18.37% Pacific Time 21.41%
Volgograd 10.03% London 21.27%
Central Time 9.43% Tokyo 3.83%
Moscow 8.18% Central Time 3.75%
Bern 2.56% Eastern Time 2.10%
Minsk 2.06% Seoul 1.97%
Yerevan 1.96% Brasilia 1.97%
Nairobi 1.52% Buenos Aires 1.92%
Baku 1.29% Urumqi 1.50%
Table 6.3: Top 10 timezones (as % of tweets).
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Figure 6.5: CDF of the number of (a) characters and (b) words in each tweet.
Timezone. We then study the timezone chosen by the users in their account setting. In Table 6.3,
we report the top 10 timezones for each dataset, in terms of the corresponding tweet volumes. Two
thirds of the tweets by trolls appear to be from US timezones, while a substantial percentage (18%)
from Russian ones. Whereas, the baseline has a more diverse set of timezones, which seems to
mirror findings from our location analysis.
We also check whether users change their timezone settings, finding that 7% of the Russian
trolls do so two to three times. The most popular changes are Berlin to Bern (18 times), Nairobi
to Moscow (10), and Nairobi to Volgograd (10).By contrast, this almost never happens for baseline
accounts.
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Trolls Baseline
Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%)
news 7.2% US 0.7% iHeartAwards 1.8% UrbanAttires 0.6%
politics 2.6% tcot 0.6% BestFanArmy 1.6% Vacature 0.6%
sports 2.1% PJNET 0.6% Harmonizers 1.0% mPlusPlaces 0.6%
business 1.4% entertainment 0.5% iOSApp 0.9% job 0.5%
money 1.3% top 0.5% JouwBaan 0.9% Directioners 0.5%
world 1.2% topNews 0.5% vacature 0.9% JIMIN 0.5%
MAGA 0.8% ISIS 0.4% KCA 0.9% PRODUCE101 0.5%
health 0.8% Merkelmussbleiben 0.4% Psychic 0.8% VoteMainFPP 0.5%
local 0.7% IslamKills 0.4% RT 0.8% Werk 0.4%
BlackLivesMatter 0.7% breaking 0.4% Libertad2016 0.6% dts 0.4%
Table 6.4: Top 20 hashtags in tweets from Russian trolls and baseline users.
6.1.3.3 Content Analysis
Text. Next, we quantify the number of characters and words contained in each tweet, and plot the
corresponding CDF in Fig. 6.5, finding that Russian trolls tend to post longer tweets.
Media. We then assess whether Russian trolls use images and videos in a different way than random
baseline users. For Russian trolls (resp., baseline accounts), 66% (resp., 73%) of the tweets include
no images, 32% (resp., 18%) exactly one image, and 2% (resp., 9%) more than one. This suggests
that Russian trolls disseminate a considerable amount of information via single-image tweets. As
for videos, only 1.5% of the tweets from Russian trolls includes a video, as opposed to 6.4% for
baseline accounts.
Hashtags. Our next step is to study the use of hashtags in tweets. Russian trolls use at least one hash-
tag in 32% of their tweets, compared to 10% for the baseline. Overall, we find 4.3K and 7.1K unique
hashtags for trolls and random users, respectively, with 74% and 78% of them only appearing once.
In Table 6.4, we report the top 20 hashtags for both datasets. Trolls appear to use hashtags to dissem-
inate news (7.2%) and politics (2.6%) related content, but also use several that might be indicators
of propaganda and/or controversial topics, e.g., #ISIS, #IslamKills, and #BlackLivesMatter. For in-
stance, we find some notable examples including: “We just have to close the borders, ‘refugees’
are simple terrorists #IslamKills” on March 22, 2016, “#SyrianRefugees ARE TERRORISTS from
#ISIS #IslamKills” on March 22, 2016, and “WATCH: Here is a typical #BlackLivesMatter protester:
‘I hope I kill all white babes!’ #BatonRouge <url>” on July 17, 2016.
We also study when these hashtags are used by the trolls, finding that most of them are well dis-
tributed over time. However, there are some interesting exceptions, e.g., with #Merkelmussbleiben
(a hashtag seemingly supporting Angela Merkel) and #IslamKills. Specifically, tweets with the for-
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Trolls Baseline
Mention (%) Mention (%) Mention (%) Mention (%)
leprasorium 2.1% postsovet 0.4% TasbihIstighfar 0.3% RasSpotlights 0.1%
zubovnik 0.8% DLGreez 0.4% raspotlights 0.2% GenderReveals 0.1%
realDonaldTrump 0.6% DanaGeezus 0.4% FunnyBrawls 0.2% TattedChanel 0.1%
midnight 0.6% ruopentwit 0.3% YouTube 0.2% gemvius 0.1%
blicqer 0.6% Spoontamer 0.3% Harry Styles 0.2% DrizzyNYC 0.1%
gloed up 0.6% YouTube 0.3% shortdancevids 0.2% August Alsina 0.1%
wylsacom 0.5% ChrixMorgan 0.3% UrbanAttires 0.2% RihannaBITCH 0.1%
TalibKweli 0.4% sergeylazarev 0.3% BTS twt 0.2% sexualfeed 0.1%
zvezdanews 0.4% RT com 0.3% KylieJenner NYC 0.2% PetsEvery30 0.1%
GiselleEvns 0.4% kozheed 0.3% BaddiessNation 0.2% IGGYAZALEAoO 0.1%
Table 6.5: Top 20 mentions in tweets from trolls and baseline.
mer appear exclusively on July 21, 2016, while the latter on March 22, 2016, when a terrorist attack
took place at Brussels airport. These two examples illustrate how the trolls may be coordinating to
push specific narratives on Twitter.
Mentions. We find that 46% of trolls’ tweets include mentions to 8.5K unique Twitter users. This
percentage is much higher for the random baseline users (80%, to 41K users). Table 6.5 reports
the 20 top mentions we find in tweets from Russian trolls and baseline users. We find several Rus-
sian accounts, like ‘leprasorium’ (a popular Russian account that mainly posts memes) in 2% of the
mentions, as well as popular politicians like ‘realDonaldTrump’ (0.6%). The practice of mention-
ing politicians on Twitter may reflect an underlying strategy to mutate users’ opinions regarding a
particular political topic, which has been also studied in previous work [75].
URLs. We then analyze the URLs included in the tweets. First of all, we note that 53% of the
trolls’ tweets include at least a URL, compared to only 27% for the random baseline. There is an
extensive presence of URL shorteners for both datasets, e.g., bit.ly (12% for trolls and 26% for
the baseline) and ift.tt (10% for trolls and 2% for the baseline), therefore, in November 2017,
we visit each URL to obtain the final URL after all redirections. In Fig. 6.6, we plot the CDF of
the number of URLs per unique domain. We observe that Russian trolls disseminate more URLs
in their tweets compared to the baseline. This might indicate that Russian trolls include URLs to
increase their credibility and positive user perception; indeed, [112] show that adding a URL in a
tweet correlates with higher credibility scores. Also, in Table 6.6, we report the top 20 domains for
both Russian trolls and the baseline. Most URLs point to content within Twitter itself; 13% and
35%, respectively. Links to a number of popular social networks like YouTube (1.8% and 4.2%,
respectively) and Instagram (1.5% and 1.9%) appear in both datasets. We also note that among the
top 20 domains, there are also a number of news outlets linked from trolls’ tweets, e.g., Washington
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Domain (Trolls) (%) Domain (Baseline) (%)
twitter.com 12.81% twitter.com 35.51%
reportsecret.com 7.02% youtube.com 4.21%
riafan.ru 3.42% vine.co 3.94%
politexpert.net 2.10% factissues.com 3.24%
youtube.com 1.88% blogspot.com.cy 1.92%
vk.com 1.58% instagram.com 1.90%
instagram.com 1.53% facebook.com 1.68%
yandex.ru 1.50% worldstarr.info 1.47%
infreactor.org 1.36% trendytopic.info 1.39%
cbslocal.com 1.35% minibird.jp 1.25%
livejournal 1.35% yaadlinksradio.com 1.24%
nevnov.ru 1.07% soundcloud.com 1.24%
ksnt.com 1.01% linklist.me 1.15%
kron4.com 0.93% twimg.com 1.09%
viid.me 0.93% appparse.com 1.08%
newinform.com 0.89% cargobayy.net 0.88%
inforeactor.ru 0.84% virralclub.com 0.84%
rt.com 0.81% tistory.com 0.50%
washigntonpost.com 0.75% twitcasting.tv 0.49%
seattletimes.com 0.73% nytimes.com 0.48%
Table 6.6: Top 20 domains included in tweets from Russian trolls and baselines users.
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Figure 6.6: CDF of number of URLs per domain.
Post (0.7%), Seattle Times (0.7%), and state-sponsored news outlets like RT (0.8%) in trolls’ tweets,
but much less so from the baseline.
Sentiment analysis. Next, we assess the sentiment and subjectivity of each tweet for both datasets
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Figure 6.7: CDF of sentiment and subjectivity scores for tweets of Russian trolls and random users.
Topic Terms (Trolls) Topic Terms (Baseline)
1 trump, black, people, really, one, enlist, truth, work, can, get 1 want, can, just, follow, now, get, see, don, love, will
2 trump, year, old, just, run, obama, breaking, will, news, police 2 2016, july, come, https, trump, social, just, media, jabberduck, get
3 new, trump, just, breaking, obamacare, one, sessions, senate, politics, york 3 happy, best, make, birthday, video, days, come, back, still, little
4 man, police, news, killed, shot, shooting, woman, dead, breaking, death 4 know, never, get, love, just, night, one, give, time, can
5 trump, media, tcot, just, pjnet, war, like, video, post, hillary 5 just, can, everyone, think, get, white, fifth, veranomtv2016, harmony, friends
6 sports, video, game, music, isis, charlottesville, will, new, health, amb 6 good, like, people, lol, don, just, look, today, said, keep
7 can, don, people, want, know, see, black, get, just, like 7 summer, seconds, team, people, miss, don, will, photo, veranomtv2016, new
8 trump, clinton, politics, hillary, video, white, donald, president, house, calls 8 like, twitter, https, first, can, get, music, better, wait, really
9 news, world, money, business, new, one, says, state, 2016, peace 9 dallas, right, fuck, vote, police, via, just, killed, teenchoice, aldubmainecelebration
10 now, trump, north, korea, people, right, will, check, just, playing 10 day, black, love, thank, great, new, now, matter, can, much
Table 6.7: Terms extracted from LDA topics of tweets from Russian trolls and baseline users.
using the Pattern library [277]. Fig. 6.7(a) plots the CDF of the sentiment scores of tweets posted by
Russian trolls and our baseline users. We observe that 30% of the tweets from Russian trolls have a
positive sentiment, and 18% negative. These scores are not too distant from those of random users
where 36% are positive and 16% negative, however, Russian trolls exhibit a unique behavior in terms
of sentiment, as a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test unveils significant differences between the
distributions (p < 0.01). Overall, we observe that Russian trolls tend to be more negative/neutral,
while our baseline is more positive. We also compare subjectivity scores (Fig. 6.7(b)), finding that
tweets from trolls tend to be more subjective; again, we perform significance tests revealing differ-
ences between the two distributions (p < 0.01).
LDA analysis. We also use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model to analyze tweets’ seman-
tics. We train an LDA model for each of the datasets and extract 10 distinct topics with 10 words,
as reported in Table 6.7. Overall, topics from Russian trolls refer to specific world events (e.g.,
Charlottesville) as well as specific news related to politics (e.g., North Korea and Donald Trump).
By contrast, topics extracted from the random sample are more general (e.g., tweets regarding birth-
days).
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Figure 6.8: CDF of the number of (a) followers/friends for each tweet and (b) increase in followers/friends for
each user from the first to the last tweet.
6.1.3.4 Account Evolution
Screen name changes. Previous work [213] has shown that malicious accounts often change their
screen name in order to assume different identifies. Therefore, we investigate whether trolls show
a similar behavior, as they might change the narrative with which they are attempting to influence
public opinion. Indeed, we find that 9% of the accounts operated by trolls change their screen name,
up to 4 times during the course of our dataset. Some examples include changing screen names
from “OnlineHouston” to “HoustonTopNews,” or “Jesus Quintin Perez” to “WorldNewsPolitics,” in
a clear attempt to pose as news-related accounts. In our baseline, we find that 19% of the accounts
changed their Twitter screen names, up to 11 times during our dataset; highlighting that changing
screen names is a common behavior of Twitter users in general.
Followers/Friends. Next, we look at the number of followers and friends (i.e., the accounts one
follows) of the Russian trolls, as this is an indication of the overall impact of a tweet. In Fig. 6.8(a),
we plot the CDF of the number of followers per tweet measured at the time of that tweet. On
average, Russian trolls have 7K followers and 3K friends, while our baseline has 25K followers
and 6K friends. We also note that in both samples, tweets reached a large number of Twitter users;
at least 1K followers, with peaks up to 145K followers. These results highlight that Russian trolls
have a non-negligible number of followers, which can assist in pushing specific narratives to a much
greater number of Twitter users. We also assess the evolution of the Russian trolls in terms of
the number of their followers and friends. To this end, we get the follower and friend count for
each user on their first and last tweet and calculate the difference. Fig. 6.8(b) plots the CDF of the
increase/decrease of the followers and friends for each troll as well as random user in our baseline.
We observe that, on average, Russian trolls increase their number of followers and friends by 2,065
and 1,225, respectively, whereas for the baseline we observe an increase of 425 and 133 for followers
and friends, respectively. This suggests that Russian trolls work hard to increase their reachability
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Figure 6.9: CDF of the number of deleted tweets per observe deletion.
within Twitter.
Tweet Deletion. Arguably, a reasonable strategy to avoid detection after posting tweets that aim
to manipulate other users might be to delete them. This is particularly useful when troll accounts
change their identity and need to modify the narrative that they use to influence public opinion. With
each tweet, the Streaming API returns the total number of available tweets a user has up to that time.
Retrieving this count allows us to observe if a user has deleted a tweet, and around what period; we
call this an “observed deletion.” Recall that our dataset is based on the 1% sample of Twitter, thus,
we can only estimate, in a conservative way, how many tweets are deleted; specifically, in between
subsequent tweets, a user may have deleted and posted tweets that we do not observe. In Fig. 6.9,
we plot the CDF of the number of deleted tweets per observed deletion. We observe that 13% of
the Russian trolls delete some of their tweets, with a median percentage of tweet deletion equal to
9.7%. Whereas, for the baseline set, 27% of the accounts delete at least one tweet, but the median
percentage is 0.1%. This means that the trolls delete their tweets in batches, possibly trying to cover
their tracks or get a clean slate, while random users make a larger number of deletions but only a
small percentage of their overall tweets, possibly because of typos. We also report the distribution,
over each month, of tweet deletions in Fig. 6.10. Specifically, we report the mean of the percentages
for all observed deletions in our datasets. Most of the tweets from Russian trolls are deleted in
October 2016, suggesting that these accounts attempted to get a clean slate a few months before the
2016 US elections.
6.1.3.5 Case Study
While the previous results provide a quantitative characterization of Russian trolls behavior, we
believe there is value showing a concrete example of the behavior exhibited and how techniques
played out. We start on May 15, 2016, where the troll with screen name ‘Pen Air’, was posing as
a news account via its profile description: “National American news.” On September 8, 2016 as
the US presidential elections approached, ‘Pen Air’ became a Trump supporter, changing its screen
name to ‘Blacks4DTrump’ with a profile description of “African-Americans stand with Trump to
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Figure 6.10: Average percentage of observed deletions per month.
make America Great Again!” Over the next 11 months, the account’s tweet count grew from 49 to
642 while its follower count rose from 1.2K to nearly 9K. Then, around August 18, 2017, the account
was seemingly repurposed. Almost all of its previous tweets were deleted (the account’s tweet count
dropped to 35), it gained a new screen name (‘southlonestar2’), and was now posing as a “Proud
American and TEXAN patriot! Stop ISLAM and PC. Don’t mess with Texas” according to its profile
description. When examining the accounts tweets, we see that most are clearly related to politics,
featuring blunt right-wing attacks and “talking points.” For example, “Mr. Obama! Maybe you bring
your girls and leave them in the bathroom with a grown man! #bathroombill #NObama <url>” on
May 15, 2016, “#HiLIARy has only two faces! And I hate both! #NeverHillary #Hillaryliesmatter
<url>” on May 19, 2016, and “RT @TEN GOP: WikiLeaks #DNCLeaks confirms something we
all know: system is totally rigged! #NeverHillary <url>.” on July 22, 2016.
6.1.3.6 Take-aways
In summary, our analysis leads to the following observations. First, we find evidence that trolls
were actively involved in the dissemination of content related to world news and politics, as well
as propaganda content regarding various topics such as ISIS and Islam. Moreover, several Russian
trolls were created or repurposed a few weeks before notable world events, including the Republican
National Convention meeting or the Charlottesville rally. We also find that the trolls deleted a sub-
stantial amount of tweets in batches and overall made substantial changes to their accounts during
the course of their lifespan. Specifically, they changed their screen names aiming to pose as news
outlets, experienced significant rises in the numbers of followers and friends, etc. Furthermore, our
location analysis shows that Russian trolls might have tried to manipulate users located in the USA,
Germany, and possibly in their own country (i.e., Russia), by appearing to be located in those coun-
tries. Finally, the fact that these accounts were active up until their recent suspension also highlights
the need to develop more effective tools to detect such actors.
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6.1.4 Remarks
In this work, we analyzed the behavior and use of the Twitter platform by Russian trolls during the
course of 21 months. We showed that Russian trolls exhibited interesting differences when compared
with a set of random users, actively disseminated politics-related content, adopted multiple identities
during their account’s lifespan, and that they aimed to increase their impact on Twitter by increasing
their followers.
6.2 A comprehensive analysis of Russian and Iranian trolls on
Twitter and Reddit and their influence on the Web
6.2.1 Motivation
In this work, we are motivated by the fact that many aspects of state-sponsored disinformation remain
unclear, e.g., how do state-sponsored trolls operate? What kind of content do they disseminate? How
does their behavior change over time? And, more importantly, is it possible to quantify the influence
they have on the overall information ecosystem on the Web?
Here, we aim to address these questions, by relying on two different sources of ground truth data
about state-sponsored actors. First, we use 10M tweets posted by Russian and Iranian trolls between
2012 and 2018 [105]. Second, we use a list of 944 Russian trolls, identified by Reddit, and find all
their posts between 2015 and 2018 [257]. We analyze the two datasets across several axes in order
to understand their behavior and how it changes over time, their targets, and the content they shared.
For the latter, we leverage word embeddings to understand in what context specific words/hashtags
are used and shed light to the ideology of the trolls. Also, we use Hawkes Processes [204] to model
the influence that the Russian and Iranian trolls had over multiple Web communities; namely, Twitter,
Reddit, 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) [128], and Gab [328].
Main findings. Our study leads to several key observations:
1. Our influence estimation results reveal that Russian trolls were extremely influential and effi-
cient in spreading URLs on Twitter. Also, by comparing Russian to Iranian trolls, we find that
Russian trolls were more efficient and influential in spreading URLs on Twitter, Reddit, Gab,
but not on /pol/.
2. By leveraging word embeddings, we find ideological differences between Russian and Iranian
trolls. For instance, we find that Russian trolls were pro-Trump, while Iranian trolls were
anti-Trump.
3. We find evidence that the Iranian campaigns were motivated by real-world events. Specifically,
campaigns against France and Saudi Arabia coincided with real-world events that affect the
relations between these countries and Iran.
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Platform Origin of trolls # trolls
# trolls
with tweets/posts
# of tweets/posts
Twitter Russia 3,836 3,667 9,041,308
Iran 770 660 1,122,936
Reddit Russia 944 335 21,321
Table 6.8: Overview of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit. We report the overall number of
identified trolls, the trolls that had at least one tweet/post, and the overall number of tweets/posts.
4. We observe that the behavior of trolls varies over time. We find substantial changes in the use
of language and Twitter clients over time for both Russian and Iranian trolls. These insights
allow us to understand the targets of the orchestrated campaigns for each type of trolls over
time.
5. We find that the topics of discussion vary across Web communities. For example, we find that
Russian trolls on Reddit were extensively discussing about cryptocurrencies, while this does
not apply in great extent for the Russian trolls on Twitter.
Finally, we make our source code publicly available [267] for reproducibility purposes and
to encourage researchers to further work on understanding other types of state-sponsored trolls on
Twitter (i.e., on January 31, 2019, Twitter released data related to trolls originating from Venezuela
and Bangladesh [262]).
6.2.2 Troll Datasets
In this section, we describe our dataset of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit.
Twitter. On October 17, 2018, Twitter released a large dataset of Russian and Iranian troll ac-
counts [105]. Although the exact methodology used to determine that these accounts were state-
sponsored trolls is unknown, based on the most recent Department of Justice indictment [84], the
dataset appears to have been constructed in a manner that we can assume essentially no false pos-
itives, while we cannot make any postulation about false negatives. Table 6.8 summarizes the troll
dataset.
Reddit. On April 10, 2018, Reddit released a list of 944 accounts which they determined were
Russian state-sponsored trolls [257]. We recover the submissions, comments, and account details for
these accounts using two mechanisms: 1) Reddit dumps provided by Pushshift [16]; and 2) crawling
the user pages of those accounts. Although omitted for lack of space, we note that the union of
these two datasets reveals some gaps in both, likely due to a combination of subreddit moderators
removing posts or the troll users themselves deleting them, which would affect the two datasets in
different ways. In any case, we merge the two datasets, with Table 6.8 describing the final dataset.
Note that only about one third (335) of the accounts released by Reddit had at least one submission
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Figure 6.11: Number of Russian and Iranian troll accounts created per week.
Russian troll on Twitter Iranian trolls on Twitter
Word (%) Bigrams (%) Word (%) Bigrams (%)
follow 7.7% follow me 6.4% journalist 3.6% human rights 1.6%
love 4.8% breaking news 0.8% news 3.2% independent news 1.4%
life 4.5% donald trump 0.7% independent 2.8% news media 1.4%
trump 4.4% lokale nachrichten 0.6% lover (in Farsi) 2.6% media organization 1.4%
conservative 4.3% nachrichten aus 0.6% social 2.6% organization aim 1.4%
news 3.4% hier kannst 0.6% politics 2.6% aim inspire 1.4%
maga 3.4% kannst du 0.6% media 2.4% inspire action 1.4%
lbl 2.4% du wichtige 0.6% love 2.2% action likes 1.4%
will 2.4% wichtige und 0.6% justice 2.0% likes social 1.4%
proud 2.2% und aktuelle 0.6% low (in Farsi) 2.0% social justice 1.4%
Table 6.9: Top 10 words and bigrams found in the descriptions of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
or comment in our dataset. We suspect the rest were either completely missed by our data sources,
or, more likely, were used as dedicated voting accounts used in an effort to push (or bury) specific
content.
6.2.3 Analysis
In this section, we present an in-depth analysis of the activities and the behavior of Russian and
Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit.
6.2.3.1 Accounts Characteristics
First we explore when the accounts appeared, what they posed as, and how many followers/friends
they had on Twitter.
Account Creation. Fig. 6.11 plots the Russian and Iranian troll accounts creation dates on Twitter
and Reddit. We observe that the majority of Russian troll accounts were created around the time
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of the Ukrainian conflict: 80% of have an account creation date earlier than 2016. That said, there
are some meaningful peaks in account creation during 2016 and 2017. 57 accounts were created
between July 3-17, 2016, which was right before the start of the Republican National Convention
(July 18-21) where Donald Trump was named the Republican nominee for President [311] . Later,
190 accounts were created between July, 2017 and August, 2017, during the run up to the infamous
Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville [315]. Taken together, this might be evidence of coordinated
activities aimed at manipulating users’ opinions on Twitter with respect to specific events. This is
further evidenced when examining the Russian trolls on Reddit: 75% of Russian troll accounts on
Reddit were created in a single massive burst in the first half of 2015. Also, there are a few smaller
spikes occurring just prior to the 2016 US Presidential election. For the Iranian trolls on Twitter we
observe that they are much “younger,” with the larger bursts of account creation after the 2016 US
Presidential election.
Account Information. To avoid being obvious, state sponsored trolls might attempt to present a
persona that masks their true nature or otherwise ingratiates themselves to their target audience. By
examining the profile description of trolls we can get a feeling for how they might have cultivated
this persona. In Table 6.9, we report the top ten words and bigrams that appear in profile descriptions
of trolls on Twitter. Note that we do this only for Twitter trolls as we do not have descriptions for
Reddit accounts. From the table we see that a relatively large number of Russian trolls pose as news
outlets, with “news” (1.3%) and “breaking news” (0.8%) appearing in their description. Further, they
seem to use their profile description to more explicitly increase their reach on Twitter, by nudging
users to follow them (e.g., “follow me” appearing in almost 6.4% of profile descriptions). Finally,
3.4% of the Russian trolls describe themselves as Trump supporters: see “trump” (4.4%) and “maga”
(3.4%) terms. Iranian trolls are even more likely to pose as news outlets or journalists: 3.6% have
“journalist” and 3.2% have “news” in their profile descriptions. This highlights that accounts that
pose as news outlets may in fact be accounts controlled by state-sponsored actors, hence regular
users should critically think in order to assess whether the account is credible or not.
Followers/Friends. Fig. 6.12 plots the CDF of the number of followers and friends for both Russian
and Iranian trolls. 25% of Iranian trolls had more than 1k followers, while the same applies for only
15% of the Russian trolls. In general, Iranian trolls tend to have more followers than Russian trolls
(median of 392 and 132, respectively). Both Russian and Iranian trolls tend to follow a large number
of users, probably in an attempt to increase their follower count via reciprocal follows. Iranian trolls
have a median followers to friends ratio of 0.51, while Russian trolls have a ratio of 0.74. This might
indicate that Iranian trolls were more effective in acquiring followers without resorting in massive
followings of other users, or perhaps that they took advantages of services that offer followers for
sale [288].
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Figure 6.12: CDF of the number of a) followers and b) friends for the Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
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Figure 6.13: Temporal characteristics of tweets from Russian and Iranian trolls.
6.2.3.2 Temporal Analysis
We next explore aggregate troll activity over time, looking for behavioral patterns. Fig. 6.13(a)
plots the (normalized) volume of tweets/posts shared per week in our dataset. We observe that both
Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter became active during the Ukrainian conflict. Although lower in
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Figure 6.14: Percentage of unique trolls that were active per week.
overall volume, there an increasing trend starts around August 2016 and continues through summer
of 2017.
We also see three major spikes in activity by Russian trolls on Reddit. The first is during the
latter half of 2015, approximately around the time that Donald Trump announced his candidacy for
President. Next, we see solid activity through the middle of 2016, trailing off shortly before the
election. Finally, we see another burst of activity in late 2017 through early 2018, at which point the
trolls were detected and had their accounts locked by Reddit.
Next, we examine the hour of day and week that the trolls post. Fig. 6.13(b) shows that Russian
trolls on Twitter are active throughout the day, while on Reddit they are particularly active during the
first hours of the day. Similarly, Iranian trolls on Twitter tend to be active from early morning until
13:00 UTC. In Fig. 6.13(c), we report temporal characteristics based on hour of the week, finding
that Russian trolls on Twitter follow a diurnal pattern with slightly less activity during Sunday. In
contrast, Russian trolls on Reddit and Iranian trolls on Twitter are particularly active during the first
days of the week, while their activity decreases during the weekend. For Iranians this is likely due
to the Iranian work week being from Sunday to Wednesday with a half day on Thursday.
But are all trolls in our dataset active throughout the span of our datasets? To answer this
question, we plot the percentage of unique troll accounts that are active per week in Fig. 6.14 from
which we draw the following observations. First, the Russian troll campaign on Twitter targeting
Ukraine was much more diverse in terms of accounts when compared to later campaigns. There
are several possible explanations for this. One explanation is that trolls learned from their Ukrainian
campaign and became more efficient in later campaigns, perhaps relying on large networks of bots in
their earlier campaigns which were later abandoned in favor of more focused campaigns like project
Lakhta [85]. Another explanation could be that attacks on the US election might have required
“better trained” trolls, perhaps those that could speak English more convincingly. The Iranians, on
the other hand, seem to be slowly building their troll army over time. There is a steadily increasing
number of active trolls posting per week over time. We speculate that this is due to their troll
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Figure 6.15: Number of trolls that posted their first/last tweet/post for each week in our dataset.
program coming online in a slow-but-steady manner, perhaps due to more effective training. Finally,
on Reddit we see most Russian trolls posted irregularly, possibly performing other operations on the
platform like manipulating votes on other posts.
Next, we investigate the point in time when each troll in our dataset made his first and last
tweet. Fig. 6.15 shows the number of users that made their first/last post for each week in our
dataset, which highlights when trolls became active as well as when they “retired.” We see that
Russian trolls on Twitter made their first posts during early 2014, almost certainly in response to
the Ukrainian conflict. When looking at the last tweets of Russian trolls on Twitter we see that
a substantial portion of the trolls “retired” by the end of 2015. In all likelihood this is because the
Ukrainian conflict was over and Russia turned their information warfare arsenal to other targets (e.g.,
the USA, this is also aligned with the increase in the use of English language, see Section 6.2.3.3).
When looking at Russian trolls on Reddit, we do not see a substantial spike in first posts close to
the time that the majority of the accounts were created (see Fig. 6.11). This indicates that the newly
created Russian trolls on Reddit became active gradually (in terms of posting behavior).
Finally, we assess whether Russian and Iranian trolls mention or retweet each other, and
how this behavior occurs over time. Fig. 6.16 shows the number of tweets that were mention-
ing/retweeting other trolls’ tweets over the course of our datasets. Russian trolls were particularly
fond of this strategy during 2014 and 2015, while Iranian trolls started using this strategy after Au-
gust, 2017. This again highlights how the strategies employed by trolls adapts and evolves to new
campaigns.
6.2.3.3 Languages and Clients
In this section, we study the languages that Russian and Iranian Twitter trolls posted in, as well as
their Twitter clients they used to make tweets (this information is not available for Reddit).
Languages. First we study the languages used by trolls as it provides an indication of their targets.
The language information is included in the datasets released by Twitter. Fig. 6.17(a) plots the CDF
of the number of languages used by troll accounts. We find that 80% and 75% of the Russian and
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Figure 6.16: Number of tweets that contain mentions among Russian trolls and among Iranian trolls on Twitter.
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Figure 6.17: CDF of number of (a) languages used (b) clients used for Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
Iranian trolls, respectively, use more than 2 languages. Next, we note that in general, Iranian trolls
tend to use fewer languages than Russian trolls. The most popular language for Russian trolls is
Russian (53% of all tweets), followed by English (36%), Deutsch (1%), and Ukrainian (0.9%). For
Iranian trolls we find that French is the most popular language (28% of tweets), followed by English
(24%), Arabic (13%), and Turkish (8%).
Fig. 6.18 plots the use of different languages over time. Fig. 6.18(a) and Fig. 6.18(b) plot the
percentage of tweets that were in a given language on a given week for Russian and Iranian trolls,
respectively, in a stacked fashion, which lets us see how the usage of different languages changed
over time relative to each other. Fig. 6.18(c) and Fig. 6.18(d) plot the language use from a different
perspective: normalized to the overall number of tweets in a given language. This view gives us a
better idea of how the use of each particular language changed over time. From the plots we make
the following observations. First, there is a clear shift in targets based on the campaign. For example,
Fig. 6.18(a) shows that the overwhelming majority of early tweets by Russian trolls were in Russian,
with English only reaching the volume of Russian language tweets in 2016. This coincides with
the “retirement” of several Russian trolls on Twitter (see Fig 6.15). Next, we see evidence of other
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Figure 6.18: Use of the four most popular languages by Russian and Iranian trolls over time on Twitter. (a) and
(b) show the percentage of weekly tweets in each language. (c) and (d) show the percentage of total tweets per
language that occurred in a given week.
campaigns, for example German language tweets begin showing up in early to mid 2016, and reach
their highest volume in the latter half of 2017, in close proximity with the 2017 German Federal
elections. Additionally, we note that Russian language tweets have a huge drop off in activity the
last two months of 2017.
For the Iranians, we see more obvious evidence of multiple campaigns. For example, although
Turkish and English are present for most of the timeline, French quickly becomes a commonly
used language in the latter half of 2013, becoming the dominant language used from around May
2014 until the end of 2015. This is likely due to political events that happened during this time
period. E.g., in November, 2013 France blocked a stopgap deal related to Iran’s uranium enrichment
program [148], leading to some fiery rhetoric from Iran’s government (and apparently the launch of
a troll campaign targeting French speakers). As tweets in French fall off, we also observe a dramatic
increase in the use of Arabic in early 2016. This coincides with an attack on the Saudi embassy in
Tehran [134], the primary reason the two countries ended diplomatic relations.
When looking at the language usage normalized by the total number of tweets in that language,
we can get a more focused perspective. In particular, from Fig. 6.18(c) it becomes strikingly clear
that the initial burst of Russian troll activity was targeted at Ukraine, with the majority of Ukrainian
language tweets coinciding directly with the Crimean conflict [44]. From Fig. 6.18(d) we observe
that English language tweets from Iranian trolls, while consistently present over time, have a relative
peak corresponding with French language tweets, likely indicating an attempt to influence non-
French speakers with respect to the campaign against French speakers.
Client usage. Finally, we analyze the clients used to post tweets. When looking at the most popular
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Figure 6.19: Use of the eight most popular clients by Russian and Iranian trolls over time on Twitter.
clients, we find that Russian and Iranian trolls use the main Twitter Web Client (28.5% for Russian
trolls, and 62.2% for Iranian trolls). This is in contrast with what normal users use: using a random
set of Twitter users, we find that mobile clients make up a large chunk of tweets (48%), followed by
the TweetDeck dashboard (32%). We next look at how many different clients trolls use throughout
our dataset: in Fig. 6.17(b), we plot the CDF of the number of clients used per user. 25% and 21%
of the Russian and Iranian trolls, respectively, use only one client, while in general Russian trolls
tend to use more clients than Iranians.
Fig. 6.19 plots the usage of clients over time in terms of weekly tweets by Russian and Ira-
nian trolls. We observe that the Russians (Fig. 6.19(a)) started off with almost exclusive use of the
“twitterfeed” client. Usage of this client drops off when it was shutdown in October, 2016. During
the Ukrainian crisis, however, we see several new clients come into the mix. Iranians (Fig. 6.19(b))
started off almost exclusively using the “facebook” Twitter client. To the best of our knowledge,
this is a client that automatically Tweets any posts you make on Facebook, indicating that Iranians
likely started with a campaign on Facebook. At the beginning of 2014, we see a shift to using the
Twitter Web Client, which only begins to decrease towards the end of 2015. Of particular note in
Fig. 6.19(b) is the appearance of “dlvr.it,” an automated social media manager, in the beginning of
2015. This corresponds with the creation of IUVM [135], which is a fabricated ecosystem of (fake)
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Figure 6.20: Distribution of reported locations for tweets by Russian trolls (100%) (red circles) and Iranian
trolls (green triangles).
news outlets and social media accounts created by the Iranians, and might indicate that Iranian trolls
stepped up their game around that time, starting using services that allowed them for better account
orchestration to run their campaigns more effectively.
6.2.3.4 Geographical Analysis
We then study users’ location, relying on the self-reported location field in their profiles. Note
that this field is not required, and users are also able to change it whenever they like, so we look
at locations for each tweet. Note that 16.8% and 20.9% of the tweets from Russian and Iranians
trolls, respectively, do not include a self-reported location. To infer the geographical location from
the self-reported text, we use pigeo [253], which provides geographical information (e.g., latitude,
longitude, country, etc.) given the text that corresponds to a location. Specifically, we extract 626
self-reported locations for the Russian trolls and 201 locations for the Iranian trolls. Then, we use
pigeo to systematically obtain a geographical location (and its associated coordinates) for each text
that corresponds to a location. Fig. 6.20 shows the locations inferred for Russian trolls (red circles)
and Iranian trolls (green triangles). The size of the shapes on the map indicates the number of tweets
that appear on each location. We observe that most of the tweets from Russian trolls come from
locations within Russia (34%), the USA (29%), and some from European countries, like United
Kingdom (16%), Germany (0.8%), and Ukraine (0.6%). This suggests that Russian trolls may be
pretending to be from certain countries, e.g., USA or United Kingdom, aiming to pose as locals and
effectively manipulate opinions. A similar pattern exists with Iranian trolls, which were particularly
active in France (26%), Brazil (9%), the USA (8%), Turkey (7%), and Saudi Arabia (7%). It is also
worth noting that Iranians trolls, unlike Russian trolls, did not report locations from their country,
indicating that these trolls were primarily used for campaigns targeting foreign countries. Finally,
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Russian trolls on Twitter Iranian trolls on Twitter
Word
Cosine
Similarity
Word
Cosine
Similarity
trumparmi 0.68 impeachtrump 0.81
trumptrain 0.67 stoptrump 0.80
votetrump 0.65 fucktrump 0.79
makeamericagreatagain 0.65 trumpisamoron 0.79
draintheswamp 0.62 dumptrump 0.79
trumppenc 0.61 ivankatrump 0.77
@realdonaldtrump 0.59 theresist 0.76
wakeupamerica 0.58 trumpresign 0.76
thursdaythought 0.57 notmypresid 0.76
realdonaldtrump 0.57 worstpresidentev 0.75
presidenttrump 0.57 antitrump 0.74
Table 6.10: Top 10 similar words to “maga” and their respective cosine similarities (obtained from the
word2vec models).
we note that the location-based findings are in-line with the findings on the languages analysis (see
Section 6.2.3.3), further evidencing that both Russian and Iranian trolls were specifically targeting
different countries over time.
6.2.3.5 Content Analysis
Word Embeddings Recent indictments by the US Department of Justice have indicated that troll
messaging was crafted, with certain phrases and terminology designated for use in certain contexts.
To get a better handle on how this was expressed, we build two word2vec models on the corpus of
tweets: one for the Russian trolls and one for the Iranian trolls. To train the models, we first extract
the tweets posted in English, according to the data provided by Twitter. Then, we remove stop words,
perform stemming, tokenize the tweets, and keep only words that appear at least 500 and 100 times
for the Russian and Iranian trolls, respectively.
Table 6.10 shows the top 10 most similar terms to “maga” for each model. We see a marked
difference between its usage by Russian and Iranian trolls. Russian trolls are clearly pushing heavily
in favor of Donald Trump, while it is the exact opposite with Iranians.
Hashtags. Next, we aim to understand the use of hashtags with a focus on the ones written in
English. In Table 6.11, we report the top 20 English hashtags for both Russian and Iranian trolls.
State-sponsored trolls appear to use hashtags to disseminate news (9.5%) and politics (3.0%) related
content, but also use several that might be indicators of propaganda and/or controversial topics, e.g.,
#BlackLivesMatter. For instance, one notable example is: “WATCH: Here is a typical #BlackLives-
Matter protester: ‘I hope I kill all white babes!’ #BatonRouge <url>” on July 17, 2016. Note that
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Russian trolls on Twitter Iranian trolls on Twitter
Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%) Hashtag (%)
news 9.5% USA 0.7% Iran 1.8% Palestine 0.6%
sports 3.8% breaking 0.7% Trump 1.4% Syria 0.5%
politics 3.0% TopNews 0.6% Israel 1.1% Saudi 0.5%
local 2.1% BlackLivesMatter 0.6% Yemen 0.9% EEUU 0.5%
world 1.1% true 0.5% FreePalestine 0.8% Gaza 0.5%
MAGA 1.1% Texas 0.5% QudsDay4Return 0.8% SaudiArabia 0.4%
business 1.0% NewYork 0.4% US 0.7% Iuvm 0.4%
Chicago 0.9% Fukushima2015 0.4% realiran 0.6% InternationalQudsDay2018 0.4%
health 0.8% quote 0.4% ISIS 0.6% Realiran 0.4%
love 0.7% Foke 0.4% DeleteIsrael 0.6% News 0.4%
Table 6.11: Top 20 (English) hashtags in tweets from Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
<url> denotes a link.
Fig. 6.21 shows a visualization of hashtag usage built from the two word2vec models. Here,
we show hashgtags used in a similar context, by constructing a graph where nodes are words that
correspond to hashtags from the word2vec models, and edges are weighted by the cosine distances
(as produced by the word2vec models) between the hashtags. After trimming out all edges between
nodes with weight less than a threshold, based on methodology from [100], we run the community
detection heuristic presented in [52], and mark each community with a different color. Finally, the
graph is layed out with the ForceAtlas2 algorithm [138], which takes into account the weight of
the edges when laying out the nodes in 2-dimensional space. Note that the size of the nodes is
proportional to the number of times the hashtag appeared in each dataset.
We first observe that, in Fig. 6.21(a) there is a central mass of what we consider “general audi-
ence” hashtags (see green community on the center of the graph): hashtags related to a holiday or a
specific trending topic (but non-political) hashtag. In the bottom right portion of the plot we observe
“general news” related categories; in particular American sports related hashtags (e.g., “baseball”).
Next, we see a community of hashtags (light blue, towards the bottom left of the graph) clearly
related to Trump’s attacks on Hillary Clinton.
The Iranian trolls again show different behavior. There is a community of hashtags related to
nuclear talks (orange), a community related to Palestine (light blue), and a community that is clearly
anti-Trump (pink). The central green community exposes some of the ways they pushed the IUVM
fake news network by using innocuous hashtags like “#MyDatingProfileSays” as well as politically
motivated ones like “#JerusalemIsTheEternalCapitalOfPalestine.”
We also study when these hashtags are used by the trolls, finding that most of them are well
distributed over time. However we find some interesting exceptions. We highlight a few of these in
Fig. 6.22, which plots the top ten hashtags that Russian and Iranian trolls posted with substantially
different rates before and after the 2016 US Presidential election. The set of hashtags was determined
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Figure 6.21: Visualization of the top hashtags used by a) Russian trolls on Twitter (see [266] for interactive
version) and b) Iranian trolls on Twitter (see [265] for an interactive version).
by examining the relative change in posting volume before and after the election. From the plots we
make several observations. First, we note that more general audience hashtags remain a staple of
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Figure 6.22: Top ten hashtags that appear a) c) substantially more times before the US elections rather than
after the elections; and b) d) substantially more times after the elections rather than before.
Russian trolls before the election (the relative decrease corresponds to the overall relative decrease in
troll activity following the Crimea conflict). They also use relatively innocuous/ephemeral hashtags
like #IHatePokemonGoBeacause, likely in an attempt to hide the true nature of their accounts. That
said, we also see them attaching to politically divisive hashtags like #BlackLivesMatters around the
time that Donald Trump won the Republican Presidential primaries in June 2016. In the ramp up to
the 2016 election, we see a variety of clearly political related hashtags, with #MAGA seeing substan-
tial peaks starting in early 2017 (higher than any peak during the 2016 Presidential campaigns). We
also see a large number of politically ephemeral hashtags attacking Obama and a campaign to push
the border wall between Mexico. In addition to these politically oriented hashtags, we again see the
usage of ephemeral hashtags related to holidays. #SurvivalGuideToThanksgiving in late November
2016 is particularly interesting as it was heavily used for discussing how to deal with interacting
with family members with wildly different view points on the recent election results. This hashtag
was exclusively used to give trolls a vector to sow discord. When it comes to Iranian trolls, we
note that, prior to the 2016 election, they share many posts with hashtags related to Hillary Clin-
ton (see Fig. 6.22(c)). After the election they shift to posting negatively about Donald Trump (see
Fig. 6.22(d)).
LDA analysis. We also use the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model [51] to analyze tweets’
semantics. We train an LDA model for each of the datasets and extract ten distinct topics with ten
words, as reported in Table 6.12. While both Russian and Iranian trolls tweet about politics related
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Topic Terms (Russian trolls on Twitter) Topic Terms (Iranian trolls on Twitter)
1 new, now, music, get, got, thanks, orleans, entertainment, follow, show 1 iran, will, deal, irantalks, iranian, nucleartalks, nuclear, irandeal, zarif, congress
2 sports, year, news, old, game, workout, win, nfl, chicago, morning 2 isis, new, state, fire, blackhouse, open, inferno, nation, will, turkish
3 day, love, one, foke, today, happy, first, away, last, time, will, best 3 yemen, press, front, liberty, children, saudi, isis, rohingya, school, king
4 can, don, like, people, just, know, get, want, will, never, good, make 4 isis, american, trump, sex, war, young, fbi, putin, terrorists, world
5 black, women, great, america, people, tcot, blacklivesmatter, read, american, isis 5 president, former, syria, obama, turkish, iraqi, russian, foreign, palestine, stop
6 news, police, man, local, woman, texas, killed, shooting, chicago, death 6 trump, donald, can, toonsonline, see, don, know, like, will, just
7 can, forget, change, wait, book, far, illegal, worst, words, save, united, done 7 saudi, israeli, attack, israel, days, terrorist, usa, palestinian, cia, third
8 exercise, wanna, fight, still, control, nice, gun, hold, perfect, enlist 8 isis, iran, first, realiran, siege, success, sydney, shame, tehran, photos
9 trump, obama, politics, president, hillary, clinton, breaking, just, house, video 9 saudi, united, states, isis, arabia, racist, society, structurally, oil, israel
10 news, world, business, health, new, says, money, tech, water, syria 10 israel, syria, police, syrian, muslim, video, people, death, trump, rights
Table 6.12: Terms extracted from LDA topics of tweets from Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter.
Topic Terms (Russian trolls on Reddit)
1 police, black, man, year, cop, video, woman, shot, white, arrested
2 love, one, absolutely, life, good, time, ever, wow, man, sure
3 man, dog, thank, back, thing, poor, now, happy, feeling, day
4 can, even, damn, cia, right, ledger, government, god, future, cap
5 just, will, one, really, can, people, think, time, like, need
6 like, people, just, don, looks, great, want, tie, also, tokens
7 police, cop, officer, state, man, rights, obama, shooting, death, omg
8 hillary, clinton, trump, new, lives, black, cute, matter, donald, recommend
9 will, don, can, people, get, just, understand, buy, nothing, btc
10 bitcoin, can, crypto, nice, people, try, just, tie, like, blockchain
Table 6.13: Terms extracted from LDA topics of posts from Russian trolls on Reddit.
topics, for Iranian trolls, this seems to be focused more on regional, and possibly even internal issues.
For example, “iran” itself is a common term in several of the topics, as is “israel,” “saudi,” “yemen,”
and “isis.” While both sets of trolls discuss the proxy war in Syria (in which both states are involved),
while the Iranian trolls have topics pertaining to Russia and Putin, the Russian trolls do not make
any mention of Iran, instead focusing on more vague political topics like gun control and racism.
For Russian trolls on Reddit (see Table 6.13) we again find topics related to politics as well some
topics related to discussions about cryptocurrencies (see topics 9 and 10).
Subreddits. Fig. 6.23 shows the top 20 subreddits that Russian trolls on Reddit exploited and their
respective percentage of posts over the whole dataset. The most popular subreddit is /r/uncen (11%
of posts), which is a subreddit created by a specific Russian troll and, via manual examination, ap-
pears to be primarily used to disseminate news articles of questionable credibility. Other popular
subreddits include general audience subreddits like /r/funny (6%) and /r/AskReddit (4%), likely in
an attempt to obfuscate the fact that they are state-sponsored trolls in the same way that innocuous
hashtags were used on Twitter. Finally, it is worth noting that the Russian trolls were particularly
active on communities related to cryptocurrencies like /r/CryptoCurrency (3.6%) and /r/Bitcoin (1%)
possibly attempting to influence the prices of specific cryptocurrencies. This is particularly notewor-
thy considering cryptocurrencies have been reportedly used to launder money, evade capital controls,
and perhaps used to evade sanctions [234, 53].
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Figure 6.23: Top 20 subreddits that Russian trolls were active and their respective percentage of posts.
URLs. We next analyze the URLs included in the tweets/posts. In Table 6.14, we report the top
20 domains for both Russian and Iranian trolls. Livejournal (5.4%) is the most popular domain
in the Russian trolls dataset on Twitter, likely due the Ukrainian campaign. Overall, we can ob-
serve the impact of the Crimean conflict, with essentially all domains posted by the Russian trolls
being Russian language or Russian oriented. One exception to Russian language sites is RT, the
Russian-controlled propaganda outlet. The Iranian trolls similarly post more “localized” domains,
for example, jordan-times, but we also see them heavily pushing the IUVM fake news network.
When it comes to Russian trolls on Reddit, we find that they were mostly posting random images
through Imgur (image-hosting site, 16% of the posts), likely in an attempt to accumulate karma
score. We also note that a substantial portion of posts contained URLs to (fake) news sites linked
with the Internet Research Agency like blackmattersus.com(5.7%) and donotshootus.us (2.5%).
6.2.4 Influence Estimation
Thus far, we have analyzed the behavior of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit, with a
special focus on how they evolved over time. Allegedly, one of their main goals is to manipulate the
opinion of other users and extend the cascade of information that they share (e.g., lure other users
into posting similar content) [88]. Therefore, we now set out to determine their impact in terms of
the dissemination of information on Twitter, and on the greater Web.
To assess their influence, we look at three different groups of URLs: 1) URLs shared by Russian
trolls on Twitter, 2) URLs shared by Iranian trolls on Twitter, and 3) URLs shared by both Russian
and Iranian trolls on Twitter. We then find all posts that include any of these URLs in the following
Web communities: Reddit, Twitter (from the 1% Streaming API, with posts from confirmed Russian
and Iranian trolls removed), Gab, and 4chan’s Politically Incorrect board (/pol/). For Reddit and
Twitter our dataset spans January 2016 to October 2018, for /pol/ it spans July 2016 to October
2018, and for Gab it spans August 2016 to October 2018.2 We select these communities as previous
2NB: the 4chan dataset made available by the authors of [331, 330] starts in late June 2016 and Gab was first launched in
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Domain (Russian
trolls on Twitter
(%)
Domain(Iranian
trolls on Twitter)
(%)
Domain (Russian
trolls on Reddit)
(%)
livejournal.com 5.4% awdnews.com 29.3% i.imgur 10.8%
riafan.ru 5.0% dlvr.it 7.1% blackmattersus.com 5.7%
twitter.com 2.5% fb.me 4.8% imgur.com 5.3%
ift.tt 1.8% whatsupic.com 4.2% donotshoot.us 2.5%
ria.ru 1.8% googl.gl 3.9% theguardian.com 1.0%
googl.gl 1.7% realnienovosti.com 2.1% nytimes.com 1.0%
dlvr.it 1.5% twitter.com 1.7% washingtonpost.com 0.8%
gazeta.ru 1.4% libertyfrontpress.com 1.6% huffingtonpost.com 0.8%
yandex.ru 1.2% iuvmpress.com 1.5% foxnews.com 0.8%
j.mp 1.1% buff.ly 1.4% youtube.com 0.8%
rt.com 0.8% 7sabah.com 1.3% photographyisnotacrime.com 0.7%
nevnov.ru 0.7% bit.ly 1.2% thefreethoughtproject.com 0.6%
youtu.be 0.6% documentinterdit.com 1.0% butthis.com 0.5%
vesti.ru 0.5% facebook.com 0.8% cnn.com 0.5%
kievsmi.net 0.5% al-hadath24.com 0.7% dailymail.co 0.5%
youtube.com 0.5% jordan-times.com 0.7% rt.com 0.5%
kiev-news.com 0.5% iuvmonline.com 0.6% politico.com 0.4%
inforeactor.ru 0.4% youtu.be 0.6% truthdig.com 0.4%
lenta.ru 0.4% alwaght.com 0.5% nbcnews.com 0.4%
emaidan.com.ua 0.3% ift.tt 0.5% breitbart.com 0.4%
Table 6.14: Top 20 domains included in tweets/posts from Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit.
Events per community Total
URLs
shared by
/pol/ Reddit Twitter Gab The Donald Iran Russia Events URLs
Russians 76,155 366,319 1,225,550 254,016 61,968 0 151,222 2,135,230 48,497
Iranians 3,274 28,812 232,898 5,763 971 19,629 0 291,347 4,692
Both 331 2,060 85,467 962 283 334 565 90,002 153
Table 6.15: Total number of events in each community for URLs shared by a) Russian trolls; b) Iranian trolls;
and c) Both Russian and Iranian trolls.
work shows they play an important and influential role on the dissemination of news [331] and
memes [330].
Table 6.15 summarizes the number of events (i.e., occurrences of a given URL) for each com-
munity/group of users that we consider (Russia refers to Russian trolls on Twitter, while Iran refers
to Iranian trolls on Twitter). Note that we decouple The Donald from the rest of Reddit as previous
work showed that it is quite efficient in pushing information in other communities [330]. From the
table we make several observations: 1) Twitter has the largest number of events in all groups of
URLs mainly because it is the largest community and 2) Gab has a considerably large number of
events; more than /pol/ and The Donald, which are bigger communities.
August 2016.
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Figure 6.24: Percent of destination events caused by the source community to the destination community for
URLs shared by a) Russian trolls; b) Iranian trolls; and c) both Russian and Iranian trolls.
For each unique URL, we fit a statistical model known as Hawkes Processes [204, 205], which
allows us to estimate the strength of connections between each of these communities in terms of how
likely an event – the URL being posted by either trolls or normal users to a particular platform – is
to cause subsequent events in each of the groups. We fit each Hawkes model using the methodology
presented by [330]. In a nutshell, by fitting a Hawkes model we obtain all the necessary parameters
that allow us to assess the root cause of each event (i.e., the community that is “responsible” for
the creation of the event). By aggregating the root causes for all events we are able to measure the
influence and efficiency of each Web community we considered.
We demonstrate our results with two different metrics: 1) the absolute influence, or percent-
age of events on the destination community caused by events on the source community and 2) the
influence relative to size, which shows the number of events caused on the destination platform as
a percent of the number of events on the source platform. The latter can also be interpreted as a
measure of how efficient a community is in pushing URLs to other communities.
Fig. 6.24 reports our results for the absolute influence for each group of URLs. When looking
at the influence for the URLs shared by Russian trolls on Twitter (Fig. 6.24(a)), we find that Russian
trolls were particularly influential to users from Gab (1.9%), the rest of Twitter (1.29%), and /pol/
(1.08%). When looking at the communities that influenced the Russian trolls we find the rest of
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Figure 6.25: Influence from source to destination community, normalized by the number of events in the source
community for URLs shared by a) Russian trolls; b) Iranian trolls; and c) Both Russian and Iranian trolls. We
also include the total external influence of each community.
Twitter (7%) followed by Reddit (4%). By looking at URLs shared by Iranian trolls on Twitter
(Fig. 6.24(b)), we find that Iranian trolls were most successful in pushing URLs to The Donald
(1.52%), the rest of Reddit (1.39%), and Gab (1.05%), somewhat ironic considering The Donald
and Gab’s zealous pro-Trump leanings and the Iranian trolls’ clear anti-Trump leanings [102, 328].
Similarly to Russian trolls, the Iranian trolls were most influenced by Reddit (5.6%) and the rest of
Twitter (4.6%). When looking at the URLs posted by both Russian and Iranian trolls we find that,
overall, the Russian trolls were more influential in spreading URLs to the other Web communities
with the exception of (again, somewhat ironically) /pol/.
But how do these results change when we normalize the influence with respect to the number
of events that each community creates? Fig. 6.25 shows the influence relative to size for each pair of
communities/groups of users. For URLs shared by Russian trolls (Fig. 6.25(a)) we find that Russian
trolls were particularly efficient in spreading the URLs to Twitter (10.4%)—which is not a surprise,
given that the accounts operate directly on this platform—and Gab (3.19%). For the URLs shared
by Iranian trolls, we again observe that were most efficient in pushing the URLs to Twitter (3.6%),
and the rest of Reddit (2.04%). Also, it is worth noting that in both groups of URLs The Donald
had the highest external influence to the other platforms. This highlights that The Donald is an
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impactful actor in the information ecosystem and is quite possibly exploited by trolls as a vector to
push specific information to other communities. Finally, when looking at the URLs shared by both
Russian and Iranian trolls, we find that Russian trolls were more efficient (greater impact relative to
the number of URLs posted) at spreading URLs in all the communities with the exception of /pol/,
where Iranians were more efficient.
6.2.5 Remarks
In this work, we analyzed the behavior and evolution of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and
Reddit during the course of several years. We shed light to the target campaigns of each group
of trolls, we examined how their behavior evolved over time, and what content they disseminated.
Furthermore, we find some interesting differences between the trolls depending on their origin and
the platform from which they operate. For instance, for the latter, we find discussions related to
cryptocurrencies only on Reddit by Russian trolls, while for the former we find that Russian trolls
were pro-Trump and Iranian trolls anti-Trump. Also, we quantify the influence that these state-
sponsored trolls had on several mainstream and alternative Web communities (Twitter, Reddit, /pol/,
and Gab), showing that Russian trolls were more efficient and influential in spreading URLs on other
Web communities than Iranian trolls, with the exception of /pol/.
Our findings have serious implications for society at large. First, our analysis shows that while
troll accounts use peculiar tactics and talking points to further their agendas, these are not completely
disjoint from regular users, and therefore developing automated systems to identify and block such
accounts remains an open challenge. Second, our results also indicate that automated systems to
detect trolls are likely to be difficult to realize: trolls change their behavior over time, and thus even
a classifier that works perfectly on one campaign might not catch future campaigns. Third, and
perhaps most worrying, we find that state-sponsored trolls have a meaningful amount of influence
on fringe communities like The Donald, 4chan’s /pol/, and Gab, and that the topics pushed by the
trolls resonate strongly with these communities. This might be due to users on these communities
that sympathize with the views the trolls aim to share (i.e., “useful idiots”) or to unidentified state-
sponsored actors on these communities. In either case, considering recent tragic events like the Tree
of Life Synagogue shootings, perpetuated by a Gab user seemingly influenced by content posted
there, the potential for mass societal upheaval cannot be overstated. Because of this, we implore the
research community, as well as governments and non-government organizations to expend whatever
resources are at their disposal to develop technology and policy to address this new, and effective,
form of digital warfare.
Chapter 7
Discussion & Conclusions
In this thesis, we studied several aspects of the information ecosystem on the Web. We shed light
into three main relevant lines of work: 1) understanding the spread of information through the lens
of multiple Web communities and modeling the interplay between them; 2) characterizing emerging
Web communities and services by undertaking exploratory large-scale quantitative analyses; and
3) understanding the behavior and impact of state-sponsored actors on the information ecosystem
on the Web. Below, for each line of work, we provide the main take-aways and possible future
directions.
7.1 Understanding the Spread Of Information Through The
Lens Of Multiple Web Communities
Remarks. In this line of work, we studied the spread of news and image-based memes across four
Web communities, namely, Twitter, Reddit, 4chan’s /pol/ and Gab. By designing and developing
a scalable processing pipeline we were able to detect and track the propagation of memes across
the Web. Then using Hawkes Processes, we modeled the interplay between the various Web com-
munities and we quantified the influence that each community have to the other with respect to
the dissemination of news and memes. The main take-aways from this work are: 1) small fringe
Web communities like 4chan’s /pol/ and The Donald subreddit have a surprisingly strong influence,
despite their small size, to mainstream communities like Twitter; and 2) we find important differ-
ences between the communities we study with regard to the dissemination of news and memes. For
instance, for news, we find that users on different communities prefer different news sources, espe-
cially for the alternative ones, while for memes, we find that users on small fringe Web communities
tend to share more memes that are likely to be used in a weaponized or hateful context.
Future Directions. There are several possible future directions that derive from the findings of this
thesis. First, we present a novel methodology for assessing the influence between multiple Web
communities. This framework, based on Hawkes Processes, can be used in a lot of different do-
mains to assess the influence between various entities. For instance, this framework can be applied
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in the user-level in order to assess the influence that users of a specific community have to each other
with respect to the dissemination of a specific information. Also, by changing the notion of what a
process and what an event is in the framework one can make interesting influence estimation stud-
ies. With regard to the dissemination of news, an interesting future direction is to leverage Natural
Language Processing techniques in order to understand how news articles are discussed on various
Web communities and if there are important differences between the various Web communities in
consideration. With regard to the dissemination of memes there are several future directions that can
be based on our developed memes processing pipeline. Specifically, one can leverage our pipeline
to detect images pertaining to specific memes and then qualitatively analyze them in order to un-
derstand how memes are becoming weaponized and how multiple memes are combined together to
deliver a specific idea. For instance, to study how the Pepe the Frog meme is used in conjunction
with other memes with the goal to deliver a specific political message. Another line of work, in-
cludes focusing on the detection of potential hateful and harmful memes and devising mitigation
strategies that will be employed by Web communities (e.g., Twitter) in order to safeguard their users
from potentially offensive content. Finally, the developed pipeline can be used to study images that
are not bounded to a specific domain (e.g., memes). For instance, [329] demonstrate how our image
processing pipeline can be used in conjunction with the Google Cloud Vision API to characterize
the images posted by Russian trolls on Twitter.
7.2 Characterizing the Role of Emerging Web Communities and
Services on the Information Ecosystem
Remarks. In this line of work, we have explored the Gab social network as well as two Web
archiving services: the Wayback Machine and archive.is, with the goal to assess their role on
the information ecosystem. We find several interesting findings when exploring these communities
and services. First, we find that Gab attracts the interest of the alt-right community as the most
popular users in the platform are alt-right celebrities. Also, we find that its users have a preference
in sharing news articles from alternative news sources, while when examining the prevalence of
hate speech, we find that it exhibits a high degree of hate speech. Second, after our comprehensive
analysis on the use of Web archiving services, we find that they are particularly popular in fringe
Web communities for the preservation of Web content. In addition, we find that these services are
extensively used by Reddit bots to preserve content posted on specific subreddits, and that Reddit
moderators “force” users to share archived URLs from news sources with conflicting ideology in
order to penalize their ad revenue. Overall, these findings indicate that Web archiving services are
an important actor on the information ecosystem and that it should be taken into account for studies
that focus on URLs.
Future Directions. There are several future directions that can be derived from this line of work.
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First, the Gab social network is still relatively unstudied when compared to other mainstream com-
munities like Twitter, hence a lot of its aspects are unclear. For instance, it will be interesting to study
the evolution of Gab users over time and whether they are becoming more hateful/radicalized over
time. Also, it will be interesting to study whether Gab’s popularity increases with purges or large
bans of users from other popular Web communities like Twitter. Furthermore, it will be interesting
to study the prevalence of automated accounts within the platform and whether they are trying to
promote specific talking points (in our work we find some anecdotal evidence of spam bots on Gab).
Finally, we implore the research community to qualitatively study the Gab community in order to
shed light into emerging Web phenomena like hate speech, fake news, and online radicalization.
In a more broad direction, there are still a lot of Web communities for which we lack a clear un-
derstanding of what their role on the Web information ecosystem is. For example, Web communities
like Discord, WhatsApp, Mastodon, and Telegram, are relatively unstudied and it is unclear whether
they contribute in the spread of false information on the Web. A possible future direction is provid-
ing characterization of these Web communities and assessing whether campaigns are organized in
such communities, especially in the ones that support private channels like Discord, WhatsApp, and
Telegram.
Our work on Web archiving services points to several research avenues. For instance, future
work could better understand the role of archiving services in the dis/misinformation ecosystem,
e.g., with respect to the content that gets archived and the context in which archive URLs are dis-
seminated. Moreover, further work could shed light on the actors archiving specific URLs in specific
contexts, as well as how much traction they get on Web communities like Twitter and Reddit. Finally,
we believe that a deeper dive into the socio-technical and ethical implications of archiving services
is warranted: they serve a crucial role in ensuring that Web content persists, but do so without regard
to (and often in spite of) the rights and consent of content producers.
7.3 Towards Understanding State-Sponsored Actors
Remarks. In this work we provide a comprehensive exploratory analysis on the behavior of state-
sponsored actors on the Web. First, we compare the behavior of state-sponsored actors on Twitter and
how they compare to a set of random users. We find important differences between state-sponsored
actors and random users ranging from the use of Twitter clients to their self-reported locations. In
addition, we provide useful insights with regard to the evolution of their accounts and how do they
posed as. Second, we provide an analysis of Russian and Iranian trolls on Twitter and Reddit. We
investigated how they evolved over time and what influence they have in other communities: namely,
Reddit, Twitter, 4chan’s /pol/, and Gab. We find that the behavior and targets of these actors vary
over time and that these actors were particularly influential in spreading news articles to other Web
communities. In particular, we find that the Russia state-sponsored actors were more influential in
spreading news to the other communities, with the exception of /pol/ where Iranian trolls were more
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influential.
Future Directions. Despite providing a comprehensive overview on the behavior of state-sponsored
actors on the Web, there are still several unexplored research avenues. First, as a research com-
munity, we should develop tools to detect and mitigate campaigns organized from state-sponsored
actors. Second, there is a variety of other state-sponsored actors that are unexplored. For instance,
Twitter detected and suspended a lot of accounts associated with Venezuela and Bangladesh gov-
ernments [262]: it will be interesting to see how these actors compare with the Russian and Iranian
actors presented in this thesis and whether there are meaningful differences in their behavior. Finally,
we believe that our influence estimation results show the need for more sophisticated measurements
in the domains of opinion manipulation and spread of false information by state-sponsored actors.
7.4 Conclusion
In this thesis, we shed some light into the complex Web information ecosystem through the lens of
multiple Web communities. Our work reveals the need to take a cross-platform view of the infor-
mation ecosystem as there are a lot of Web communities that despite their small size are particularly
influential and can have real-world impact. Also, it indicates the need to develop sophisticated tools
and techniques to detect the spread of information across the Web by considering the diverse types
of information (i.e., text, images, and URLs). We argue that the aforementioned are of paramount
importance for getting a more representative view of the information ecosystem, hence helping in
better understanding this ecosystem as a whole.
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